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So here's how I would make a Keybase.io that is resistant to server compromise. 1. don't store private keys (of users). 2. distribute the organization around t
by peterwwillis 12y ago
So here's how I would make a Keybase.io that is resistant to server compromise.
1. don't store private keys (of users). 2. distribute the organization around the globe; different datacenters, different states/countries, different peers/service providers. 3. use different infrastructure, hardware/software, hardened, with tripwires. 4. make your clients auth all the sources, with a minimum of N/3 valid, identical responses from distinct parts of the network. 5. implement the rest of the service's functionality as described in the post.
As long as you have a shit-ton of distributed locations you can survive internet outages, state actor intervention, service provider compromise and server compromise. It would all have to be highly available mesh network, of course, but it's feasible and should be pretty low on resource use as it's just public keys you're copying around.
- kylec 12y agoYes, you can architect a system that's more difficult to compromise or knock offline, but a better solution would be to remove the need to trust the server or to have it constantly online. To their credit, the Keybase guys have done this - their client fetches information about a user from the Keybase server, but performs the verifications itself and deposits the public key into your PGP keyring if successful. Once that's done, you don't need Kebase at all in order to communicate with that person securely.