I'd argue that the author's views are too concerned with intuition. If we reduce consciousness to a scale rather than a binary property; of course a thermostat

I'd argue that the author's views are too concerned with intuition. If we reduce consciousness to a scale rather than a binary property; of course a thermostat is somewhere on the scale, it simply has such a small value that it's not worth considering - leading to our philosophical intuition. There's nothing magical about our level of consciousness; as unintuitive as that may be. Aaronson argues that the model must yield to our intuition, but if the model is consistent and explains our observations, our intuition should yield to it. - the obvious analog here being quantum mechanics In regards to saying "both that the Hard Problem is meaningless, and that progress in neuroscience will soon solve the problem if it hasn’t already," neuroscientists and mathematicians too often overlook the Turing test here. It's consistent (if not accurate) to say that the "Hard Problem" is ill-defined, but maintain that we've clearly solved it if we can comprehensively beat the Turing test. That's what the Turing test was designed for, knowing that we've created a conscious machine because it's indistinguishable from a human; even if we can't decide on what consciousness is.