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That's not the notion of consciousness we're dealing with when talking about the "hard" problem of consciousness. You're describing its psycho-functional interp

by apl 12y ago

That's not the notion of consciousness we're dealing with when talking about the "hard" problem of consciousness. You're describing its psycho-functional interpretation: the ability to see yourself as a "self". Qualia are a largely orthogonal issue. Specifically, it's imaginable that an entity we'd consider unintelligent has a rich and detailed subjective internal life.

Udo 12y ago
I agree it's a psycho-functional interpretation (I would call it duck typing), but my argument is that everything else looks like a pseudo-scientific attempt at philosophy to me. It's not clear that we need a theory of consciousness at all, how is something as ill-defined as consciousness even viable in a mathematical context?
- apl 12y ago
  > I would call it duck typing Ha, that's a fairly apt comparison. > It's not clear that we need a theory of consciousness at > all, how is something as ill-defined as consciousness even > viable in a mathematical context? That's not clear to me either, but there are some convincing arguments in favour of treating it at least logically if not quantitatively (like IIT does). I recommend the work of David Chalmers in this context because it's mathematically sound and written from the perspective of a dualist. Definitely worthwhile...
dragonwriter 12y ago
> Specifically, it's imaginable that an entity we'd consider unintelligent has a rich and detailed subjective internal life. Yes, just as its possible that an entity we'd consider intelligent doesn't, but since it's subjective, its not subject to empirical -- and, hence, scientific -- verification. Anything we are going to say objectively on issues related to consciousness isn't going to address that, because that's a question outside the scope of science.
- KC8ZKF 12y ago
  It's ontologically subjective but epistemologically objective, in the sense that we can ask questions and observe behavior. Pain is a good example.

by apl 12y ago

Udo 12y ago

I agree it's a psycho-functional interpretation (I would call it duck typing), but my argument is that everything else looks like a pseudo-scientific attempt at philosophy to me. It's not clear that we need a theory of consciousness at all, how is something as ill-defined as consciousness even viable in a mathematical context?

apl 12y ago
> I would call it duck typing Ha, that's a fairly apt comparison. > It's not clear that we need a theory of consciousness at > all, how is something as ill-defined as consciousness even > viable in a mathematical context? That's not clear to me either, but there are some convincing arguments in favour of treating it at least logically if not quantitatively (like IIT does). I recommend the work of David Chalmers in this context because it's mathematically sound and written from the perspective of a dualist. Definitely worthwhile...

dragonwriter 12y ago

> Specifically, it's imaginable that an entity we'd consider unintelligent has a rich and detailed subjective internal life. Yes, just as its possible that an entity we'd consider intelligent doesn't, but since it's subjective, its not subject to empirical -- and, hence, scientific -- verification. Anything we are going to say objectively on issues related to consciousness isn't going to address that, because that's a question outside the scope of science.

KC8ZKF 12y ago
It's ontologically subjective but epistemologically objective, in the sense that we can ask questions and observe behavior. Pain is a good example.