Close. Aaronson's most devastating argument (he offers two more) is that Tonini's \Phi or "integrated information" of an input-output system (function), under a

Close. Aaronson's most devastating argument (he offers two more) is that Tonini's \Phi or "integrated information" of an input-output system (function), under a reasonable operationalization as a measure of how correlated subsets of inputs are with subsets of outputs, is just not good measure of "consciousness" because, as it happens, large families of rather mundane systems that one wouldn't think as "conscious" in fact have provably large "integrated information" or \Phi by design --such as Reed-Solomon codes, for instance. Put in another way, if Tonini were right then your (say) portable DVD player ought to be "conscious" because, surprisingly, the amount of "integrated information" achieved by the scratch- and skip-tolerant error-correcting code it uses internally has to be huge in order for it to work. But that is prima facie ridiculous; so either we are wrong and the DVD player is in fact "conscious" or, more likely, Tononi's proposed definition of consciousness is lacking. Again as I said Aaronson makes two other points, but I think this one alone is the most conclusive.