> If you use strong passwords and don't reuse them, you already know your risks. Nobody does this. Geeks who use password management are are an extreme minorit

> If you use strong passwords and don't reuse them, you already know your risks. Nobody does this. Geeks who use password management are are an extreme minority, and solutions like LastPass are crock that solve the same problem by papering over infrastructural failings and mean users are never completely free to move. Anecdotally I believe people typically use a 'good password' for banking etc, and a handful of lazy passwords. Cryptographically speaking, they're all weak of course, but imho people are better off with knowing one or two really good passwords (I used a 12 character mixed case password containing symbols entirely from QWERTY induced muscle memory) and letting their browser deal with derivation for different endpoints. > Do you mean, with the help of SRP, you can store some sensitive data on server, which won't be available to this server, but will be available to user? Not SRP specifically. Forget SRP. What I mean is generally that any user public key (whether it was originally derived from a user secret like a password or not) can be used by an organisation for online encryption and authentication and offline decryption, where data can be decrypted by either the organisation using their private key, or by the user using their password.