2 ms·
Only mentioned in passing, but: Third, we have already accepted that our design is vulnerable to end-to-end timing attacks https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-
by sp332 13y ago
Only mentioned in passing, but: Third, we have already accepted that our design is vulnerable to end-to-end timing attacks https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough
It doesn't matter if your connection is slow, all that matters is that latency is fairly consistent during the attack. You can use statistics to extract high-confidence data even from noisy signals, if you run the attack long enough to get lots of timing data.
- bhitov 13y ago> Third, we have already accepted that our design is vulnerable to end-to-end timing attacks https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough They are not talking about the same kind of timing attacks. Deanonymization attacks require vastly less latency consistency.
- sp332 13y agoOh, I see! Thanks for the context.