4 ms·
Really....? I guess an NSA honeypot would be more subtle, but seriously I don't know whether to be sad or angry; def check_auth(username, password): glob
by zaroth 13y ago
Really....? I guess an NSA honeypot would be more subtle, but seriously I don't know whether to be sad or angry;
def check_auth(username, password):
global auth_username, auth_password
return username == auth_username and password == auth_password
- codys 13y agoWhat is being complained about here? The obvious thing that stands out to me is potential timing attacks: 'and' doing short circuit eval, and '==' exiting early when the first byte is non-equal (or the lengths are non-equal).
- zaroth 13y agoYou nailed it. In other words, literally everything is wrong with that function.
- michaelmior 13y agoI would agree with the other comment that I suspect it would be impossible to get accurate data for a timing attack over Tor. Not only is the connection slow, but my experience has been that bandwidth and latency can be highly variable.
- handsomeransoms 13y agoWith enough sampling, it should be possible. Additionally, the values you are trying to infer are pretty small (8 bytes each) so that makes it easier.
- michaelmior 13y agoFair point. I'll admit I'm biased because I've messed around with trying time attacks on my vulnerable code in arguably ideal scenarios and haven't had much luck. So the feasibility of this is questionable to me, but I'm willing to accept that it's an issue. In any case, the above block of code should be easily fixable.
- civilian 13y agoThe request is going over tor-- do timing attacks work with that? When I browse with tor my connection is so slow that I don't think I could get good data for timing attacks.
- sp332 13y agoOnly mentioned in passing, but: Third, we have already accepted that our design is vulnerable to end-to-end timing attacks https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough It doesn't matter if your connection is slow, all that matters is that latency is fairly consistent during the attack. You can use statistics to extract high-confidence data even from noisy signals, if you run the attack long enough to get lots of timing data.
- bhitov 12y ago> Third, we have already accepted that our design is vulnerable to end-to-end timing attacks https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough They are not talking about the same kind of timing attacks. Deanonymization attacks require vastly less latency consistency.
- sp332 12y agoOh, I see! Thanks for the context.
- denom 13y agoWould a good drop in replacement here be something like hashing the two strings to the same length and using `hmac.compare_digest` ? https://docs.python.org/2/library/hmac.html#hmac.compare_digest https://docs.python.org/2/library/hmac.html#hmac.compare_dig... Honestly, I don't know enough about timing attacks to be sure.
- mbreese 13y agoHere's some pseudo code... passed=true for (i=0; i< len(auth_username); i++) { if (i >= len(username) || auth_username[i] != username[i]) { passed = false } } for (i=0; i< len(auth_password); i++) { if (i >= len(password) || auth_password[i] != password[i]) { passed = false } } return passed This could potentially still be used to check the length of the username and password, but that would be more difficult. Hashing the username (like you mentioned) and comparing those character by character (like above) should yield the exact same timing for any inputs.
- TheLoneWolfling 13y agoNote: There is no guarantee that a compiler won't optimize this to non-constant time. And even if it keeps it constant time, a processor may end up running a function like this in non-constant time, due to caching and branch prediction effects.
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- zaroth 12y agoHashing the username (like you mentioned) and comparing those character by character (like above) should yield the exact same timing for any inputs. I like to use a "constant-time compare" against an HMAC of the inputs with a random key. You can initialize the key just once, it doesn't have to be a nonce, just an unknown value. The point is the attacker no longer knows or controls what value is on 'their side' of the comparison, so timing becomes irrelevant. For the comparison itself, I usually see |= and XOR being used and then the final value being checked to be non-zero, rather than a boolean. I think the theory is the compiler is a lot less likely the exit the loop early if you're accumulating with XOR versus a single branch flipping a boolean to be false. Here's a good write-up with some sample code: http://codahale.com/a-lesson-in-timing-attacks/ http://codahale.com/a-lesson-in-timing-attacks/. Note in that write-up they are talking about timing attacks comparing HMAC results, but that is when the attacker has control over the HMAC result not the HMAC input. If the attacker provided value is being fed into HMAC with a secret key, then you are absolutely safe from timing attacks. If the attacker has control over the HMAC result, and you are checking if that HMAC is valid, then you are back to defending against timing attacks by trying to achieve a constant-time compare. The only thing left to leak is the HMAC will clock differently based on the block-length of the input. But block size is rather coarse, and in this case you could limit inputs to be less than one block size in all cases.
- micahflee 13y agoI have doubts that a timing attack would even be exploitable here since it's a hidden service, but I just made the string comparison constant-time to be safe: https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare/issues/3 https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare/issues/3 Keep in mind that the username/password are just hex-encoded 128 bits from /dev/urandom, so they're not guessable at all without some sort of leakage attack, like a timing attack. And if anyone attempts to do a timing attack the person hosting the file will see all the requests scrolling down their terminal in real-time and can always hit ctrl-c. There's also the bit about knowing the hidden service .onion to attack in the first place, which wouldn't be trivial to discover, especially since I envision these to mostly be very short-lived. But all that said, this is great feedback. Keep it coming and feel free to open security issues on github.
- harshreality 13y agoWhat is the semantic difference between username and password? If they're both randomly generated for a particular resource, why not combine them into one access key field?
- manux 13y agoPardon my lack of knowledge, but how is this single function in the server an NSA honeypot?
- pyre 13y agoHe said that an NSA honeypot would be more subtle, without glaring security issues like the ones in the presented example.
- aegiso 13y agoIs this a stab at the fact that there's no hashing? Or that the credentials are pointless when you could just generate a random url to authenticate, since the HTTP channel is encrypted anyway?
- Xcelerate 13y agoI feel like you could have gotten your point across to him without being so snarky.
- zaroth 12y agoUpvoted and you're right.
- daveid 12y agoQuestion: Would it help mitigate timing attacks if the function would sleep for a random amount of time?
- zaroth 12y agoIt does add more noise, which means you need more samples to detect the timing differences from the comparison. But it's generally not accepted as a 'solution' compared to making the function constant-time.