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Decapitation strike. ICBMs are pretty easy to detect. Little tactical warheads being deorbited, not so much. There is very little you could practically do to d

Decapitation strike. ICBMs are pretty easy to detect. Little tactical warheads being deorbited, not so much. There is very little you could practically do to defend against such a thing. Even if you could reliably know every time the host vehicle was going to pass overhead (unlikely) and send the relevant leaders to bunkers (impractical), that's no use -- that little warhead could have been released at any time with just enough extra fuel to go into a slightly different orbit, leaving you with no idea when a strike might happen.

arethuza 12y ago
Given that the two times the world arguably came closest to nuclear wars (Cuban Missile Crisis and Able Archer 83) were, at least in part, caused by the deployment of weapons that looked like they were intended for decapitation strikes I suspect having such a weapon whirling about above our heads would do no good to overall world security. Also, it's fairly easy to work around a possible decapitation strike - have the political leaders tell the military what to do in the event they are killed: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letters_of_last_resort http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letters_of_last_resort
- nknighthb 12y ago
  Nuclear weapons in general do no good to overall world security, that doesn't seem to stop anybody. The UK's strategy is unique, and, for the same reason, probably ineffective. Nobody else uses it because nobody else is willing to leave the matter in military hands. So long as a zombie Margaret Thatcher doesn't reclaim the PM's office, I doubt anyone believes that the letters instruct the captains to do anything other than report to an ally.
  - arethuza 12y ago
    The Soviets (and possibly the Russians) had a system called Perimetr (AKA "The Dead Hand) that was supposed to be an automate a nuclear response. I guess both the UK and the Soviets were terrified (for good reasons) of decapitation strikes - the UK because we are so close to the USSR and the Soviets because they knew how keen the US military was on "a Sunday punch" attack (as LeMay called it).
dalke 12y ago
I considered that option when I wrote my comment. There are only a few countries with the resources to detect an ICBM launch. These are also countries which can detect orbiting satellites and determine their orbit. For that matter, there are amateur organizations which track satellite orbits, and are usually the first ones to report when the US has put up a new spy satellite; doing so within a few days. Yes, it's possible to shift the plane of the orbit when over, say, the South Pacific, and get an element of surprise. "Just enough" is still quite a bit. The Shuttle and Soyuz use air breaking, and take about an hour from the deorbit burn to landing. Any country that can detect an ICBM launch, with 30 minutes of warning, can likely also detect the ionization trail of a craft/vehicle/weapon going through reentry. Also, said craft won't be able to use any external targeting guidance like GPL until after getting through the blackout. If I read http://www.spaceflight101.com/soyuz-tma-10m-mission-updates.html http://www.spaceflight101.com/soyuz-tma-10m-mission-updates.... right, there's at least 10 and more likely 15 minutes of warning from ionization trail detection to hitting the ground. By comparison, https://www.princeton.edu/sgs/publications/sgs/pdf/3_1-2gronlund.pdf https://www.princeton.edu/sgs/publications/sgs/pdf/3_1-2gron... lists a sub-launched Trident as being able to hit a target 3,000 km away in 9.8 minutes. Also, it's easier to launch a missile from a sub, and easier to test sub launches than it is to test satellite-based attack deorbits.
- nknighthb 12y ago
  For the same reason it's difficult to hide an ICBM launch, it's difficult to hide a spy satellite launch. Such launches are routinely mentioned in the press before they even occur. We know when new satellites go up, we just don't know their exact orbital characteristics until somebody actually spots them. They are then routinely lost again, either because their orbit was modified, or whoever spotted it didn't get its orbital characteristics quite right. They're also a heck of a lot bigger than tactical warheads. You don't really have to shift the orbital plane of the warhead at all, just raise or lower the orbit a hair so that after a while, the warhead's location has little if any discernible link to the host vehicle's location. Even if you did go for a plane change, it's really not "quite a bit", it's a question of how long you're willing to wait. The blackout period is overblown. Look up TDRSS -- the Shuttle didn't have a blackout period at all for most of its operational life, thanks to the mind-blowing strategy of... not trying to broadcast downward through the ionization layer. Soyuz is also a lot bigger than a tactical warhead. The comparison is off by probably 2+ orders of magnitude.

arethuza 12y ago

Given that the two times the world arguably came closest to nuclear wars (Cuban Missile Crisis and Able Archer 83) were, at least in part, caused by the deployment of weapons that looked like they were intended for decapitation strikes I suspect having such a weapon whirling about above our heads would do no good to overall world security. Also, it's fairly easy to work around a possible decapitation strike - have the political leaders tell the military what to do in the event they are killed: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letters_of_last_resort http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letters_of_last_resort

nknighthb 12y ago
Nuclear weapons in general do no good to overall world security, that doesn't seem to stop anybody. The UK's strategy is unique, and, for the same reason, probably ineffective. Nobody else uses it because nobody else is willing to leave the matter in military hands. So long as a zombie Margaret Thatcher doesn't reclaim the PM's office, I doubt anyone believes that the letters instruct the captains to do anything other than report to an ally.
- arethuza 12y ago
  The Soviets (and possibly the Russians) had a system called Perimetr (AKA "The Dead Hand) that was supposed to be an automate a nuclear response. I guess both the UK and the Soviets were terrified (for good reasons) of decapitation strikes - the UK because we are so close to the USSR and the Soviets because they knew how keen the US military was on "a Sunday punch" attack (as LeMay called it).

dalke 12y ago

I considered that option when I wrote my comment. There are only a few countries with the resources to detect an ICBM launch. These are also countries which can detect orbiting satellites and determine their orbit. For that matter, there are amateur organizations which track satellite orbits, and are usually the first ones to report when the US has put up a new spy satellite; doing so within a few days. Yes, it's possible to shift the plane of the orbit when over, say, the South Pacific, and get an element of surprise. "Just enough" is still quite a bit. The Shuttle and Soyuz use air breaking, and take about an hour from the deorbit burn to landing. Any country that can detect an ICBM launch, with 30 minutes of warning, can likely also detect the ionization trail of a craft/vehicle/weapon going through reentry. Also, said craft won't be able to use any external targeting guidance like GPL until after getting through the blackout. If I read http://www.spaceflight101.com/soyuz-tma-10m-mission-updates.html http://www.spaceflight101.com/soyuz-tma-10m-mission-updates.... right, there's at least 10 and more likely 15 minutes of warning from ionization trail detection to hitting the ground. By comparison, https://www.princeton.edu/sgs/publications/sgs/pdf/3_1-2gronlund.pdf https://www.princeton.edu/sgs/publications/sgs/pdf/3_1-2gron... lists a sub-launched Trident as being able to hit a target 3,000 km away in 9.8 minutes. Also, it's easier to launch a missile from a sub, and easier to test sub launches than it is to test satellite-based attack deorbits.

nknighthb 12y ago
For the same reason it's difficult to hide an ICBM launch, it's difficult to hide a spy satellite launch. Such launches are routinely mentioned in the press before they even occur. We know when new satellites go up, we just don't know their exact orbital characteristics until somebody actually spots them. They are then routinely lost again, either because their orbit was modified, or whoever spotted it didn't get its orbital characteristics quite right. They're also a heck of a lot bigger than tactical warheads. You don't really have to shift the orbital plane of the warhead at all, just raise or lower the orbit a hair so that after a while, the warhead's location has little if any discernible link to the host vehicle's location. Even if you did go for a plane change, it's really not "quite a bit", it's a question of how long you're willing to wait. The blackout period is overblown. Look up TDRSS -- the Shuttle didn't have a blackout period at all for most of its operational life, thanks to the mind-blowing strategy of... not trying to broadcast downward through the ionization layer. Soyuz is also a lot bigger than a tactical warhead. The comparison is off by probably 2+ orders of magnitude.