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SHA-256 Certificates Are Coming
- mrsaint 13y agoCAs are already preparing as well. GlobalSign for example: https://www.globalsign.eu/ssl-information-center/transitioning-to-sha-256.html https://www.globalsign.eu/ssl-information-center/transitioni... And generally: https://casecurity.org/2014/01/30/why-we-need-to-move-to-sha-2/ https://casecurity.org/2014/01/30/why-we-need-to-move-to-sha...
- smussmann 13y ago> There are lots of properties by which one can evaluate a hash function, but the most important are preimage resistance (if I give you a hash, can you find an input with that hash value?), second preimage resistance (if I give you a message, can you find another that hashes to the same value?) and collision resistance (can you find two messages with the same hash?). Of those, the third appears to be much harder to meet than the first two, based on historical results against hash functions. To my (crypto noob) eyes, it seems like second preimage resistance is just a specific case of collision resistance. In both, we're trying to find two messages that have the same hash value, but with collision resistance, we can choose the first one arbitrarily. The last sentence, saying that collision resistance is a higher barrier than second preimage resistance, thus doesn't seem to make much sense to me. What am I missing?
- jessaustin 13y agoOne way to look at it: collision resistance prevents more attacks than mere 2nd preimage resistance, so that is a "higher" barrier. As you say, a certain type of attack would be to arbitrarily pick the first message and then try to find a collision, but that isn't the only conceivable attack. You might be able to run an attack that would generate message pairs that would have a higher likelihood of defeating a particular hash, if the hash had 2nd preimage but not collision resistance. EDIT: I agree with sibling comments.
- pbsd 13y agoCollision resistance implies 2nd-preimage resistance, and is therefore the stronger notion. Suppose your function is collision resistant, but not 2nd-preimage resistant. Then this means we cannot find an arbitrary pair (x, y) such that H(x) = H(y). But given a fixed x, H(x) we can find y such that H(y) = H(x). This is of course absurd, since we can easily turn the latter 2nd-preimage attack into a collision attack by fixing some arbitrary x ahead of time. It is also the case in practice that collisions are easier to find. This is owed to the fact that a collision attack has much more degrees of freedom given to the attacker than a (second) preimage attack.
- agl 13y agoCollision resistance is harder to meet in the same way that "stronger" results are harder to prove. That is, I think you're correct and that my wording was just confusing, sorry! Historically, many hash functions have been broken by collisions, but even very "weak" hash functions (i.e. MD5) still have full design strength for preimage and second-preimage resistance (as far as I know).
- smussmann 13y agoYeah, I think I was just confused. An off-by-one error in applying negatives, I think. Thank you for the article. I found it interesting to think about.
- dfc 13y agoOut of curiosity is there a reason why cert-test.sandbox.g.c resolves to so many IPs compared to www.g.c? dfc@ronin:~$ host cert-test.sandbox.google.com |grep address |wc 16 64 894 dfc@ronin:~$ host www.google.com |grep address |wc 6 25 262 I wanted to see how the various vendor ssl tests would handle sha256. Everything i tested had no problem, but they all took a little longer than usual because of the number of DNS results. PS Not that it would matter but unlike other google hosts the cert-test does not have any IPv6 records.
- agl 13y agoI don't think the load balancing is setup as tightly as www.google.com. It doesn't get much traffic after all.
- duskwuff 13y agoConsider the three attacks that you've described here (preimage, second preimage, and collision) as differently constrained cases of: H(m) = x = H(m') Where m is the original message, x is its hash, and m' is the second message that you need to find. For a preimage, you're given a value of x, and you don't even know what m is. For a second preimage, you're given a value of m to start from. (And, thus, you know x.) For a collision, you get to pick any m (and x) that you want to make your collision work. This last case is easiest to work with, since you can set up the messages in whatever way you need to exploit even a very subtle vulnerability. In a second preimage attack, the original message is given to you, so it may not set things up in an easily attackable way. In a sense, a second preimage is a specific case of a collision. The critical difference is that a second preimage is a targeted collision.
- ctz 13y agoThe sentence is saying that collision resistance seems to be practically harder to achieve than second order preimage resistance. One reason is a lot of hash functions are iterative in nature (you have a compression function repeatedly applied to a state, mixing the message into the state in small pieces). For collision resistance, finding a collision in just the compression function (or a limited number of applications of it) is enough to find a collision in the whole hash function (you can 'work outwards' from the collision). You can't use that effect in second order preimage resistance. IANAC.
- couchand 13y agoFor those who have this question and somewhat less cryptography experience, consider the birthday problem: it's much harder to find someone in a crowded room that shares your birthday than it is to find two people who share a birthday.
- IvyMike 13y ago> But there are a lot of people using Windows XP prior to Service Pack 3, and they will have problems. I think a lot of times people on HN and related sites are a little callous to the needs of users stuck on old platforms. But in this case even I'm like "screw those people". Is there any common legitimate reason to be on XP but not be able to go to SP3?
- x0x0 13y agoYou say callous, I say realistic about the prospect of selling things to people using 10 year old hardware. If you aren't my customer, and most likely aren't going to become my customer, I choose not to expend (often lots of) extra work to support you.
- mentat 13y agoSo Hacker News is about selling? I'd be interested to see if this is one of the big divides here.
- wlesieutre 13y agoIt's about startups and it's hosted by a VC startup accelerator. A huge number of startups fail because they aren't able to get paying customers, so yes, selling is a big topic here.
- mentat 13y agoThat's a far cry from "the only topic that matters." Aside: burn karma burn, if that's the community I don't want to be a part of it
- JoshTriplett 13y ago>> But there are a lot of people using Windows XP prior to Service Pack 3, and they will have problems. s/will// ; if you're running XP at all, let alone XP without the latest service pack, you have problems, and this is hardly the most prominent of them.
- otterley 13y agoIt's already here in fact. About a month ago, Comodo stopped issuing certificates from its old SHA-1 intermediaries. When we had ours reissued after Heartbleed, it was signed by a SHA-256 intermediate certificate. We found out the impact of this the hard way -- not only with Windows older than XP Service Pack 3, but also with embedded systems and devices built with OpenSSL older than 0.9.8o.
- yuhong 13y agoHacker News is already using it, probably because of this.
- imrehg 13y agoThese kinds of things really suck, when people you rely on supply you with things that breaks your stuff unexpectedly... Breaking stuff is okay, surprising the customers is not, imho...
- kijin 13y agoWhat type of certificate did you get, and what was the intermediate certificate named? I'm asking because I recently bought a Comodo PositiveSSL certificate, and it was still signed with SHA-1. The intermediate certificate was also signed with SHA-1 (the same one that they've been using for quite a while already). I guess they reserve SHA-256 to more expensive products for now?
- otterley 13y agoOurs is Organization Validated - it's possible that they're still using SHA-1 intermediates for Domain Validated certificates.
- nuxi7 13y agoReally? Openssl changelog implies all versions starting with 0.9.8 should handle sha256 signed certs. RHEL5's openssl 0.9.8e and Debian "Lenny" 5.0's openssl 0.9.8g both work fine with the SHA-256 signed cert. Although they may have backports applied.
- kijin 13y agoOther than Windows XP pre-SP3, does anyone have a list of operating systems and/or devices that will have a problem with SHA-256 certificates? I tried loading https://cert-test.sandbox.google.com/ https://cert-test.sandbox.google.com/ in Android 2.3, the earliest version of Android that I care about. This is an OS that has given me much pain because it doesn't support SNI. So I was pleasantly surprised to find that it recognizes the SHA-256 certificate just fine. What about OSX and iOS?
- myhf 13y agoThis article talks about strength in terms of number of operations, but wouldn't it make more sense to think in terms of amount of energy? SHA-256 can be very cost-effective to mount a long-term collision attack against, given the existence of SHA-256 ASICs.
- pushedx 13y agoI've mounted a growing suspicion that Bitcoin was developed to create a need for SHA-256 ASICs. Well, here they are, and it's much easier to brute-force a SHA-256 hash collision than it was 5 years ago. In fact you can compute billions of hashes per second for less than the cost of a PC.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- gwillen 13y agoAs an owner of a Bitcoin ASIC, I don't _think_ they're usable for general SHA-256. I think they're all specialized for SHA-256(SHA-256(X)), where X must be a packet in a bitcoin-specific format.
- cantfindmypass 13y agoCorrect, they cannot compute SHA256() or SHA256(SHA256()) of arbitrary data.
- pushedx 13y agoWell, I stand corrected. Especially in light of the analyses provided in sibling comments.
- pbsd 13y agoWell, we can lower bound it using physical limitations. An irreversible bit operation (e.g., xoring or anding two bits together), by Landauer's principle [1], costs at least 7.92x10^-28 kWh.I don't know what is the minimum number of bit operations on SHA-256, but it must be at least 256 times 64 rounds. A collision attack costs approximately 2^128 evaluations, which gives us 256x64x7.92x10^-28x2^128 ~ 2^52 kHw for a collision. This is an extremely optimistic lower bound: the real cost would be many orders of magnitude higher. For comparison, the current global annual energy consumption is estimated to be ~2^47 kWh [2]. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer's_principle https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer's_principle [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_energy_consumption https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_energy_consumption
- apaprocki 13y agoRe: XP, Maybe I'm just not aware and others just know this -- but it seems like XP numbers in GA are screwy. The vast majority of XP users report the latest versions of FF/Chrome, which doesn't seem correct. Are there known proxy devices or something similar that cause GA to mis-report OS?