6 ms·

My opinion: If everything was broken, then why did they go through so uch trouble in the lavabit case?

middleclick 12y ago
Because that was the Justice Department and not the NSA? Any government is not one coherent entity.
opendais 12y ago
Devil's advocate: Cost/benefit. Snowden already knew they'd be grabbing everything that they could on him. Why spend potentially million(s) dollars cracking the encryption when you can get it cheaper with a court order?
mindslight 12y ago
It's not out of the realm of possibilities for intelligence agencies to let soldiers die rather than risk divulging their actual capabilities. But I personally don't see much of a (self-determination-ful) way forward other than making the assumption that some public key crypto works (ie one way functions exist), and building secure systems based on it.
- rosser 12y ago
  It's not out of the realm of possibilities for intelligence agencies to let soldiers die rather than risk divulging their actual capabilities. Not just soldiers, witness the Coventry Blitz.
  - MattHeard 12y ago
    > In his 1974 book The Ultra Secret, Group Captain F. W. Winterbotham asserted that the British government had advance warning of the attack from Ultra: intercepted German radio messages encrypted with the Enigma cipher machine and decoded by British cryptoanalysts at Bletchley Park. He further claimed that Winston Churchill ordered that no defensive measures should be taken to protect Coventry, lest the Germans suspect that their cipher had been broken.[1] Winterbotham was a key figure for Ultra; he supervised the "Special Liaison Officers" who delivered Ultra material to field commanders.[2] > However, Winterbotham's claim has been rejected by other Ultra participants and by historians. They state that while Churchill was indeed aware that a major bombing raid would take place, no one knew what the target would be.[3][4] > Peter Calvocoressi was head of the Air Section at Bletchley Park, which translated and analysed all deciphered Luftwaffe messages. He wrote "Ultra never mentioned Coventry... Churchill, so far from pondering whether to save Coventry or safeguard Ultra, was under the impression that the raid was to be on London."[5] > Scientist R. V. Jones, who led the British side in the Battle of the Beams, wrote that "Enigma signals to the X-beam stations were not broken in time," and that he was unaware that Coventry was the intended target. Furthermore, a technical mistake caused jamming countermeasures to be ineffective. Jones also noted that Churchill returned to London that afternoon, which indicated that Churchill believed that London was the likely target for the raid.[6] Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coventry_Blitz#Coventry_and_Ultra https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coventry_Blitz#Coventry_and_Ul... References: 1. Winterbotham, F. W. The Ultra Secret, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974 ISBN 0-297-76832-8; also London, Futura, 1975, ISBN 0-86007-268-1 2. Ray, John, "The Night Blitz", Cassel & Co 1996, ISBN 0-304-35676-X p. 155 3. "Defending Coventry" (http://www.historiccoventry.co.uk/blitz/defend-cov.php http://www.historiccoventry.co.uk/blitz/defend-cov.php). Historic Coventry. 4. Hunt, David (28 August 1976), "The raid on Coventry", The Times: 11 5. Calvocoressi, Peter (1981). Top Secret Ultra. New York: Ballantine Books. pp. 85–86. ISBN 0-345-30069-6. 6. Jones, R. V. (1978). Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939–1945. London: Hamilton. p. 149. ISBN 0-241-89746-7. This book was also published in the US under the title The Wizard War.
    - mpyne 12y ago
      All that being as it may (because you're right), don't let that detract from the larger point about the tension between using intelligence products (like a tip-off about a bombing raid) and protecting the sources and methods of those intelligence products for the future. The British were paranoid about this; if they wanted to attack a tactical target where the Germans would think "there's no way they could have known about this, our codes must be broken", they'd always send a decoy scout or something out first to "accidentally come across" the secret target. The Americans did similar things; when Adm. Yamamoto was shot down, his flight was duly "detected" by a reconnaissance plane first, even though the Americans knew full well when it was taking off and where it was going.
  - cpeterso 12y ago
    Another example: the search for the Malaysia Airlines plane was hampered because regional governments were reluctant to release their radar information because it would reveal their systems' capabilities to other regional governments.
bqe 12y ago
Parallel construction.
thrillgore 12y ago
Egos?
GigabyteCoin 12y ago
imho it was as a show of force. To deter anybody in a similar situation from taking the same stance against the U.S. government in the future. The relentless legal troubles of the lavabit case closely mimic the troubles of Joseph Nacchio (who refused NSA wiretapping while he was CEO of Qwest) [0] [0] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Nacchio#Qwest http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Nacchio#Qwest

Because that was the Justice Department and not the NSA? Any government is not one coherent entity.

Devil's advocate: Cost/benefit. Snowden already knew they'd be grabbing everything that they could on him. Why spend potentially million(s) dollars cracking the encryption when you can get it cheaper with a court order?

mindslight 12y ago

It's not out of the realm of possibilities for intelligence agencies to let soldiers die rather than risk divulging their actual capabilities. But I personally don't see much of a (self-determination-ful) way forward other than making the assumption that some public key crypto works (ie one way functions exist), and building secure systems based on it.

rosser 12y ago
It's not out of the realm of possibilities for intelligence agencies to let soldiers die rather than risk divulging their actual capabilities. Not just soldiers, witness the Coventry Blitz.
- MattHeard 12y ago
  > In his 1974 book The Ultra Secret, Group Captain F. W. Winterbotham asserted that the British government had advance warning of the attack from Ultra: intercepted German radio messages encrypted with the Enigma cipher machine and decoded by British cryptoanalysts at Bletchley Park. He further claimed that Winston Churchill ordered that no defensive measures should be taken to protect Coventry, lest the Germans suspect that their cipher had been broken.[1] Winterbotham was a key figure for Ultra; he supervised the "Special Liaison Officers" who delivered Ultra material to field commanders.[2] > However, Winterbotham's claim has been rejected by other Ultra participants and by historians. They state that while Churchill was indeed aware that a major bombing raid would take place, no one knew what the target would be.[3][4] > Peter Calvocoressi was head of the Air Section at Bletchley Park, which translated and analysed all deciphered Luftwaffe messages. He wrote "Ultra never mentioned Coventry... Churchill, so far from pondering whether to save Coventry or safeguard Ultra, was under the impression that the raid was to be on London."[5] > Scientist R. V. Jones, who led the British side in the Battle of the Beams, wrote that "Enigma signals to the X-beam stations were not broken in time," and that he was unaware that Coventry was the intended target. Furthermore, a technical mistake caused jamming countermeasures to be ineffective. Jones also noted that Churchill returned to London that afternoon, which indicated that Churchill believed that London was the likely target for the raid.[6] Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coventry_Blitz#Coventry_and_Ultra https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coventry_Blitz#Coventry_and_Ul... References: 1. Winterbotham, F. W. The Ultra Secret, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974 ISBN 0-297-76832-8; also London, Futura, 1975, ISBN 0-86007-268-1 2. Ray, John, "The Night Blitz", Cassel & Co 1996, ISBN 0-304-35676-X p. 155 3. "Defending Coventry" (http://www.historiccoventry.co.uk/blitz/defend-cov.php http://www.historiccoventry.co.uk/blitz/defend-cov.php). Historic Coventry. 4. Hunt, David (28 August 1976), "The raid on Coventry", The Times: 11 5. Calvocoressi, Peter (1981). Top Secret Ultra. New York: Ballantine Books. pp. 85–86. ISBN 0-345-30069-6. 6. Jones, R. V. (1978). Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939–1945. London: Hamilton. p. 149. ISBN 0-241-89746-7. This book was also published in the US under the title The Wizard War.
  - mpyne 12y ago
    All that being as it may (because you're right), don't let that detract from the larger point about the tension between using intelligence products (like a tip-off about a bombing raid) and protecting the sources and methods of those intelligence products for the future. The British were paranoid about this; if they wanted to attack a tactical target where the Germans would think "there's no way they could have known about this, our codes must be broken", they'd always send a decoy scout or something out first to "accidentally come across" the secret target. The Americans did similar things; when Adm. Yamamoto was shot down, his flight was duly "detected" by a reconnaissance plane first, even though the Americans knew full well when it was taking off and where it was going.
- cpeterso 12y ago
  Another example: the search for the Malaysia Airlines plane was hampered because regional governments were reluctant to release their radar information because it would reveal their systems' capabilities to other regional governments.

bqe 12y ago

Parallel construction.

thrillgore 12y ago

Egos?

GigabyteCoin 12y ago

imho it was as a show of force. To deter anybody in a similar situation from taking the same stance against the U.S. government in the future. The relentless legal troubles of the lavabit case closely mimic the troubles of Joseph Nacchio (who refused NSA wiretapping while he was CEO of Qwest) [0] [0] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Nacchio#Qwest http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Nacchio#Qwest