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> The takeaway is that your children may grow up in a world where it's impossible to guarantee the government can't get into your computer if it really wanted t

by comex 13y ago

> The takeaway is that your children may grow up in a world where it's impossible to guarantee the government can't get into your computer if it really wanted to. This is impossible to guarantee today. Certainly if you run the zero-day magnets known as browsers, and even if not, there is always some possibility of physical intrusion. > More and more network adapters seem to have DMA access to your computer. With an IOMMU (VT-d or equivalent on other platforms), it should be possible to protect against malicious DMA from any source. Also, not all phones have basebands with DMA access to main memory. I think iPhones do not, though I am not sure, and some older iPhones have been attacked by turning on "auto answer", demonstrating direct access to the microphone.

aliakbarkhan 13y ago
> This is impossible to guarantee today. Certainly if you run the zero-day magnets known as browsers, and even if not, there is always some possibility of physical intrusion. Bingo. Even if you go all-out with security and only browse the web with a pure text web browser through Tor running on a VM that you purge after every use, use full-disk encryption with plausible deniability, fully shut down your computer and wait until the RAM is cool before leaving, inspect your computer for NSA/other implants every time before boot, tape your webcam and mic, never use your real name, and whatever else you can think of, you're just going to go nuts from all the paranoia, as well as from realizing all the myriad ways your security could still be broken (don't forget to check the keyboard for a built-in logger and look inside your case for PCI cards you don't recognize, and hope they don't have any implants that look convincingly like something you'd recognize as yours). Never mind that this isn't a very viable way to do most things most people actually use their computers for, like personal email, online banking, social networking, and so on.
devconsole 13y ago
Unfortunately, projects such as DROPOUTJEEP confirm that the iPhone isn't to be trusted. This is impossible to guarantee today. Certainly if you run the zero-day magnets known as browsers, and even if not, there is always some possibility of physical intrusion. Today you can use OS's such as Tails to prevent most exploits from embedding themselves into your computer. This is what Snowden used, for example. But if hardware becomes compromised, Tails will offer much less protection. Here's an interesting section of the article: The department must describe the computer it wants to target with as much detail as possible. For example, an investigator may be covertly communicating with a suspected child molester and know an IP address, and then obtain a warrant to use malware to find the actual location. In the case of botnets, malware might be used to try to free the compromised computers from a criminal’s control. Imagine if child molestors begin using Tails. The government response may be to try to set up some kind of "Tails dragnet" via compromised network interfaces. It should be possible for a network adapter to detect that Tails is running. At that point, since it has DMA access, and since few people use Tails at any given time, it should be possible to instuct a network adapter to search through a computer's memory for evidence of activities that the government doesn't like. Since Tails offers strong anonymity protection, there's no way to describe a computer "as specifically as possible" other than to say "it's running Tails while watching child porn." The unfortunate conclusion is that in the future, someone like Snowden might immediately be caught. "If someone is using a strong anonymity tool and GPG to hide their conversation, we should probably configure their network card to monitor their activity." Once hardware begins to turn against you, there seems to be nothing anyone can do to protect themselves. Encryption doesn't work against an adversary that has access to your computer's memory.
- andreyf 13y ago
  > projects such as DROPOUTJEEP confirm that the iPhone isn't to be trusted That iPhones used to completely trust physically connected devices without any verification was obvious to anyone paying attention even before it was verified at Black Hat USA 2013 [1]. This was fixed in iOS 7. The evidence we have of DROPOUTJEEP says it is installed via "close access methods" [2]. I wouldn't be surprised if remote vulnerabilities exist that could be used to install it remotely, but I am aware of no public evidence that they are being exploited now. 1. http://www.zdnet.com/researchers-reveal-how-to-hack-an-iphone-in-60-seconds-7000018822/ http://www.zdnet.com/researchers-reveal-how-to-hack-an-iphon... 2. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-12-30/how-nsa-hacks-your-iphone-presenting-dropout-jeep http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-12-30/how-nsa-hacks-your-...
- cinquemb 13y ago
  >The unfortunate conclusion is that in the future, someone like Snowden might immediately be caught. I think that is too naive. Snowden types don't assume they won't be caught, they probably assume that it is only a matter of time until they are caught, and play the cards they have in such a way that you make it really hard to send your garden variety cia/dia/spec ops/defense contractors out on a pick up operation not only only from a feasibility standpoint, but from a geopolitical stand point (e.g. What will Beijing's/Moscow's/D.C.'s response be if we run such an operation in their front yard? What precedents might we be setting?). Also to note that offensive/defensive technical capabilities aren't as asymmetric as they appear for all possible targets of nation states, some yes, but probably not as much to those with the technical knowledge who can create/use such and derivative systems which might very well be other nation states (or appearing to originate from such).
  - devconsole 13y ago
    Also to note that offensive/defensive technical capabilities aren't as asymmetric as they appear for all possible targets of nation states, some yes, but probably not as much to those with the technical knowledge who can create/use such and derivative systems. If you concede that your computer has a chip with DMA access which can be used by the government, then you must concede that the same chip can monitor you for activity that triggers active surveillance. For example, I think Tails is going to force governemnts into monitoring at least which operating system you're using. There's no way to target a specific Tails user, so the only recourse is for the government to do dragnet surveillance of everyone using Tails, or ignore the activities of those using Tails. Since the latter seems politically untenable, the former is becoming more likely with time. When the government can passively check whether your activity is fitting the pattern of some kind of criminal activity, the situation is about as asymmetric as I can imagine. Is there really any technical knowledge that could protect you?

by comex 13y ago

aliakbarkhan 13y ago

> This is impossible to guarantee today. Certainly if you run the zero-day magnets known as browsers, and even if not, there is always some possibility of physical intrusion. Bingo. Even if you go all-out with security and only browse the web with a pure text web browser through Tor running on a VM that you purge after every use, use full-disk encryption with plausible deniability, fully shut down your computer and wait until the RAM is cool before leaving, inspect your computer for NSA/other implants every time before boot, tape your webcam and mic, never use your real name, and whatever else you can think of, you're just going to go nuts from all the paranoia, as well as from realizing all the myriad ways your security could still be broken (don't forget to check the keyboard for a built-in logger and look inside your case for PCI cards you don't recognize, and hope they don't have any implants that look convincingly like something you'd recognize as yours). Never mind that this isn't a very viable way to do most things most people actually use their computers for, like personal email, online banking, social networking, and so on.

devconsole 13y ago

Unfortunately, projects such as DROPOUTJEEP confirm that the iPhone isn't to be trusted. This is impossible to guarantee today. Certainly if you run the zero-day magnets known as browsers, and even if not, there is always some possibility of physical intrusion. Today you can use OS's such as Tails to prevent most exploits from embedding themselves into your computer. This is what Snowden used, for example. But if hardware becomes compromised, Tails will offer much less protection. Here's an interesting section of the article: The department must describe the computer it wants to target with as much detail as possible. For example, an investigator may be covertly communicating with a suspected child molester and know an IP address, and then obtain a warrant to use malware to find the actual location. In the case of botnets, malware might be used to try to free the compromised computers from a criminal’s control. Imagine if child molestors begin using Tails. The government response may be to try to set up some kind of "Tails dragnet" via compromised network interfaces. It should be possible for a network adapter to detect that Tails is running. At that point, since it has DMA access, and since few people use Tails at any given time, it should be possible to instuct a network adapter to search through a computer's memory for evidence of activities that the government doesn't like. Since Tails offers strong anonymity protection, there's no way to describe a computer "as specifically as possible" other than to say "it's running Tails while watching child porn." The unfortunate conclusion is that in the future, someone like Snowden might immediately be caught. "If someone is using a strong anonymity tool and GPG to hide their conversation, we should probably configure their network card to monitor their activity." Once hardware begins to turn against you, there seems to be nothing anyone can do to protect themselves. Encryption doesn't work against an adversary that has access to your computer's memory.

andreyf 13y ago
> projects such as DROPOUTJEEP confirm that the iPhone isn't to be trusted That iPhones used to completely trust physically connected devices without any verification was obvious to anyone paying attention even before it was verified at Black Hat USA 2013 [1]. This was fixed in iOS 7. The evidence we have of DROPOUTJEEP says it is installed via "close access methods" [2]. I wouldn't be surprised if remote vulnerabilities exist that could be used to install it remotely, but I am aware of no public evidence that they are being exploited now. 1. http://www.zdnet.com/researchers-reveal-how-to-hack-an-iphone-in-60-seconds-7000018822/ http://www.zdnet.com/researchers-reveal-how-to-hack-an-iphon... 2. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-12-30/how-nsa-hacks-your-iphone-presenting-dropout-jeep http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-12-30/how-nsa-hacks-your-...
cinquemb 13y ago
>The unfortunate conclusion is that in the future, someone like Snowden might immediately be caught. I think that is too naive. Snowden types don't assume they won't be caught, they probably assume that it is only a matter of time until they are caught, and play the cards they have in such a way that you make it really hard to send your garden variety cia/dia/spec ops/defense contractors out on a pick up operation not only only from a feasibility standpoint, but from a geopolitical stand point (e.g. What will Beijing's/Moscow's/D.C.'s response be if we run such an operation in their front yard? What precedents might we be setting?). Also to note that offensive/defensive technical capabilities aren't as asymmetric as they appear for all possible targets of nation states, some yes, but probably not as much to those with the technical knowledge who can create/use such and derivative systems which might very well be other nation states (or appearing to originate from such).
- devconsole 13y ago
  Also to note that offensive/defensive technical capabilities aren't as asymmetric as they appear for all possible targets of nation states, some yes, but probably not as much to those with the technical knowledge who can create/use such and derivative systems. If you concede that your computer has a chip with DMA access which can be used by the government, then you must concede that the same chip can monitor you for activity that triggers active surveillance. For example, I think Tails is going to force governemnts into monitoring at least which operating system you're using. There's no way to target a specific Tails user, so the only recourse is for the government to do dragnet surveillance of everyone using Tails, or ignore the activities of those using Tails. Since the latter seems politically untenable, the former is becoming more likely with time. When the government can passively check whether your activity is fitting the pattern of some kind of criminal activity, the situation is about as asymmetric as I can imagine. Is there really any technical knowledge that could protect you?