3 ms·
Inducing system load on a Tor hidden service, to generate heat from the CPU, to increase temperature of the quartz crystal driving the system clock, to cause sy
by zaroth 13y ago
Inducing system load on a Tor hidden service, to generate heat from the CPU, to increase temperature of the quartz crystal driving the system clock, to cause system clock skew, which is remotely detectable via the TCP sequence number generated by rand(), or more directly by TCP timestamps (RFC 1323).
This lets you try to check if a given hidden service is running on a known machine, or if two hidden services are running on the same machine.
Could you skip everything in the middle, since request latency is correlated with system load? You have to load the server in either case, so both are active attacks. I think the problem is that latency is so variable due to Tor itself, it's actually faster to measure server load through clock skew than through request latency.
How would you find a candidate public server to run this attack against? "Many hidden servers are also publicly advertised Tor nodes, in order to mask hidden server traffic with other Tor traffic, so this scenario is plausible." But I think you would run your public Tor relay on a different machine behind the same firewall, since you want the absolute minimum amount of processes running on the machine actually hosting the hidden service.
(My comment on this from yesterday, but it's back on the front page as a new submission)
- weland 13y ago> Could you skip everything in the middle, since request latency is correlated with system load? You have to load the server in either case, so both are active attacks. I think the problem is that latency is so variable due to Tor itself, it's actually faster to measure server load through clock skew than through request latency. I don't think it's only the variable latency due to Tor, but also the fact that latency is tightly enough correlated with the load and the software and hardware configuration that it can't be reliably used for fingerprinting. Clock skew, on the other hand, occurs due to various fabrication parameters not being constant; it has a random element that can be reliably used to fingerprint physical machines. To put it another way, two identical machines -- built out of identical components, running perfectly identical software, on entirely identical storage media, with exactly the same bits written in exactly the same location of the hard drive and RAM -- placed behind a NAT would be impossible, or at least much harder to discern based on latency alone, while being comparatively easier to discern by clock skew.