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https://github.com/psztorc/Truthcoin/blob/master/docs/3_PM_Applications.pdf https://github.com/psztorc/Truthcoin/blob/master/docs/3_PM_A... "Public Bads, for e

https://github.com/psztorc/Truthcoin/blob/master/docs/3_PM_Applications.pdf https://github.com/psztorc/Truthcoin/blob/master/docs/3_PM_A... "Public Bads, for example “The ‘New Haven Lighthouse Point Park’ lighthouse to be destroyed before date X” are unlikely to be funded this way, because the Winning State must be made public somehow, and criminals must remain private. Attempts to shift the Schelling-indicator from “Number 1/2/3” to something else, such as “on a Monday/Tuesday/Wednesday evening”, have the disadvantage of alerting law enforcement in advance of the likelihood and manner of a future crime. Trades made just before the crime would, for free, alert law enforcement to an imminent threat of crime. Such ‘tip-off trades’ would be made by any profit-seeking members of the crime group themselves. Therefore, (surprisingly and fortunately) this feature cannot fund anonymous goods such as crimes"

simple_logic 13y ago
This is absolutely not true. Unfortunately, a well-designed claim can circumvent this restriction: "The lighthouse will be destroyed in 2015 and the criminal group will broadcast a string hashing to 'cc9a1595600ebb745ec2cea73e80aad5' one second before the explosion". This gives no useful information to the police, but it's enough for the criminal to unambiguously identify himself. I'm disappointed that they didn't consider such scenarios.
- x1798DE 13y ago
  Who would be the counter-party in that bet? If someone said, "I'll bet you a hundred thousand dollars that I won't blow up that lighthouse", I'd say, "No thanks.", since the outcome of the bet is entirely in the hands of the person making it. Not to mention the fact that the objection still holds true to the extent that information is revealed. If you say the lighthouse is going to be destroyed in 2015, the police can still give the lighthouse additional security measures in advance of 2015, if not at the specific time. The less information you reveal, the less money you'll make from the market (since you're only trading on part of your private information). Additionally, while there's nothing stopping a distributed system from allowing death contracts to pay out in the event of a murder or forbidding death contracts in general, it's quite possible that the participants in a market could develop social norms which prevent this from happening (e.g. everyone votes "void" when a dead person is murdered, or everyone votes "void" on all death contracts). I'm not saying I'd rely on it, but I think in mature markets of this nature, you'd actually see some of that behavior.
  - chongli 13y ago
    Who would be the counter-party in that bet? If someone said, "I'll bet you a hundred thousand dollars that I won't blow up that lighthouse", I'd say, "No thanks.", since the outcome of the bet is entirely in the hands of the person making it. Well of course. Why do you care if the lighthouse is destroyed? The counter-party to the bet is anyone who actually wants the lighthouse destroyed and are willing to pay to see it through.
    - edmundedgar 13y ago
      The other problem when you try to censor this is that the illegality and immorality of these contracts actually depends on the intention, which you can't see on a public network. TruthCoin (or any other anonymous system for doing this) wouldn't be able to tell the difference between a payment to somebody to burn down the lighthouse and an insurance contract to help you rebuild the lighthouse if it burns down. Likewise, for all you'll know looking at the transactions, a payment conditional on someone's death could be a will, a life insurance policy, a political bet or an assassination contract. These all look the same to the network; What matters is the intention behind them.
      - simple_logic 12y ago
        wouldn't be able to tell the difference between a payment to somebody to burn down the lighthouse and an insurance contract A prediction market provides trust that a payment will happen if a specific event happens. But insurance also requires another kind of trust. If you want to insure your goods, the insurer needs to evaluate the moral hazard in order to determine his rate. But here, he doesn't know if the buyer of the contract is the owner of the lighthouse, so there's no way he can do that: maybe the buyer turns out to be someone who won't suffer from the loss of the lighthouse and who can easily commit a crime. Because the moral hazard is huge, the insurer can't provide insurance at competitive rates. Insurance contracts where the buyer of the insurance is anonymous to the insurer don't seem desirable to me. They enable assassination markets but have no real use (except for small amounts that won't create moral hazard, but I'd call that betting rather than insurance).
  - 13y ago
deleted 13y ago
[deleted]

simple_logic 13y ago

This is absolutely not true. Unfortunately, a well-designed claim can circumvent this restriction: "The lighthouse will be destroyed in 2015 and the criminal group will broadcast a string hashing to 'cc9a1595600ebb745ec2cea73e80aad5' one second before the explosion". This gives no useful information to the police, but it's enough for the criminal to unambiguously identify himself. I'm disappointed that they didn't consider such scenarios.

x1798DE 13y ago
Who would be the counter-party in that bet? If someone said, "I'll bet you a hundred thousand dollars that I won't blow up that lighthouse", I'd say, "No thanks.", since the outcome of the bet is entirely in the hands of the person making it. Not to mention the fact that the objection still holds true to the extent that information is revealed. If you say the lighthouse is going to be destroyed in 2015, the police can still give the lighthouse additional security measures in advance of 2015, if not at the specific time. The less information you reveal, the less money you'll make from the market (since you're only trading on part of your private information). Additionally, while there's nothing stopping a distributed system from allowing death contracts to pay out in the event of a murder or forbidding death contracts in general, it's quite possible that the participants in a market could develop social norms which prevent this from happening (e.g. everyone votes "void" when a dead person is murdered, or everyone votes "void" on all death contracts). I'm not saying I'd rely on it, but I think in mature markets of this nature, you'd actually see some of that behavior.
- chongli 13y ago
  Who would be the counter-party in that bet? If someone said, "I'll bet you a hundred thousand dollars that I won't blow up that lighthouse", I'd say, "No thanks.", since the outcome of the bet is entirely in the hands of the person making it. Well of course. Why do you care if the lighthouse is destroyed? The counter-party to the bet is anyone who actually wants the lighthouse destroyed and are willing to pay to see it through.
  - edmundedgar 13y ago
    The other problem when you try to censor this is that the illegality and immorality of these contracts actually depends on the intention, which you can't see on a public network. TruthCoin (or any other anonymous system for doing this) wouldn't be able to tell the difference between a payment to somebody to burn down the lighthouse and an insurance contract to help you rebuild the lighthouse if it burns down. Likewise, for all you'll know looking at the transactions, a payment conditional on someone's death could be a will, a life insurance policy, a political bet or an assassination contract. These all look the same to the network; What matters is the intention behind them.
    - simple_logic 12y ago
      wouldn't be able to tell the difference between a payment to somebody to burn down the lighthouse and an insurance contract A prediction market provides trust that a payment will happen if a specific event happens. But insurance also requires another kind of trust. If you want to insure your goods, the insurer needs to evaluate the moral hazard in order to determine his rate. But here, he doesn't know if the buyer of the contract is the owner of the lighthouse, so there's no way he can do that: maybe the buyer turns out to be someone who won't suffer from the loss of the lighthouse and who can easily commit a crime. Because the moral hazard is huge, the insurer can't provide insurance at competitive rates. Insurance contracts where the buyer of the insurance is anonymous to the insurer don't seem desirable to me. They enable assassination markets but have no real use (except for small amounts that won't create moral hazard, but I'd call that betting rather than insurance).
- 13y ago

deleted 13y ago

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