5 ms·

I'm not sure I follow your comment. How do you see DNSSEC as signing anything over to the government? The point of DNSSEC was/is solely to prevent cache poiso

by axaxs 13y ago

I'm not sure I follow your comment. How do you see DNSSEC as signing anything over to the government? The point of DNSSEC was/is solely to prevent cache poisoning by "chaining" answers from root to auth with signatures. It only proves the answer provided is correct by DNS means. It does not attempt to guarantee authenticity of a destination. Also, DNSSEC supports multiple algorithms, including ECDSA, though RSA is the most widely used at the moment. Is it perfect? Of course not. But it's out there now, and it works for what it was designed for.

tptacek 13y ago
The roots of the DNS tree are controlled by world governments. The roots of the DNSSEC PKI are the roots of the DNS tree. And, no, the point of DNSSEC isn't solely to prevent cache poisoning; in fact, the motivating use case for DNSSEC in 2014 is DANE, which replaces the CA hierarchy with DNSSEC.
- danyork 13y ago
  I'm not sure I see how the roots of the DNS tree are controlled by world governments. Here are the root servers: http://www.root-servers.org/ http://www.root-servers.org/ They are controlled by a wide range of organizations scattered all over the world.
  - borando 13y ago
    The data in root "." is controlled by ICANN, a US corporation. The data in the most important gTLD, .com, is run by Verisign on contract with the US Chamber of Commerce. The ccTLDs (.fr, .tw, etc.) are controlled by world governments. Sure, the root and major TLDs are anycasted across the globe, but the "wide range" of organizations are just mirroring content that is in one way or another controlled by world governments, and given (for example) ICE domain seizures, it would be prudent not to over-rely on DNS. Personally I support DNSCurve as a means to secure DNS, not to replace security we already have elsewhere.
    - danyork 13y ago
      I guess we'll have to agree to disagree. I've worked with the ICANN DNS people enough and am aware of their practices enough (ex. https://www.iana.org/dnssec/icann-dps.txt https://www.iana.org/dnssec/icann-dps.txt ) that I don't see how the root zone could be compromised without people knowing. Separately, DNScurve is interesting, but really solves a different problem than DNSSEC. I find this a useful comparison: http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/45770/if-dnssec-is-so-questionable-why-is-it-ahead-of-dnscurve-in-adoption http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/45770/if-dnssec-...
- axaxs 13y ago
  Assuming that the governments really could just manipulate the root at will(every root, which is many machines, remember)... the only thing they could do is break DNSSEC. The DS hints would not match the KSK of the tld zone otherwise...unless of course every government in the world was in on it together...illuminati, free-masons, oh the Rothchilds are in on it too I think. Seriously, this is a borderline absurd statement. The only way to manipulate the root in a way that allows DNSSEC to work otherwise is to redirect all traffic for every tld to new government owned servers with a matching KSK in place. Not very realistic.
- blumentopf 13y ago
  By definition a tree has a single root. Please specify what you mean be "roots". The private key of the DNS root was split in seven parts held by seven people [1]. It is stored in two HSMs, one on the east coast of the United States, one on the west coast. Could the NSA or some other agency have gotten hold of the private key? Probably. But spinning that as "the DNSSEC root is controlled by the governments" is FUD. [1] http://venturebeat.com/2010/07/28/seven-security-experts-get-the-key-to-reboot-the-internet/ http://venturebeat.com/2010/07/28/seven-security-experts-get...
  - IvyMike 13y ago
    When DNSSEC says "bit.ly" is correct and valid, what organizations or entities could have messed with the results?
    - dfc 13y ago
      Why did you pick an example that does not use DNSSEC? It seems your thesis would be a lot stronger if you used a top and second level domain that actually implemented DNSSEC: root@fw:~# unbound-host -t A -v bit.ly bit.ly has address 69.58.188.39 (insecure) bit.ly has address 69.58.188.40 (insecure) More: http://dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com/bit.ly http://dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com/bit.ly and http://dnsviz.net/d/bit.ly/dnssec/ http://dnsviz.net/d/bit.ly/dnssec/
      - IvyMike 13y ago
        > Why did you pick an example that does not use DNSSEC? Because I'm trying to illustrate how much additional security you might or might not get if you added DNSSEC, especially with regards to government entities.
        dfc 13y ago
        The answer is "N/A." The .ly tld is not signed so DNSSEC could never attest to the authenticity of the A record for bit.ly. In order for this to be a useful exercise you should structure the question in such a way that there is as much potential for government interference as possible. (Unless you are looking for a specific answer and you are trying to lead the respondent.) Government interference with DNSSEC is not limited to the `.` zone. Or put another way, DNSSEC's attack surface area is not limited to the sacred KSK.
- kijeda 13y ago
  It would be useful to put forward a single credible scenario where "world" governments can use the DNS root private key in any fashion without detection. It is impossible to have a reasoned debate about DNSSEC with straw men like this.
  - tptacek 13y ago
    Are you familiar with the CAP theorem, or do you believe that it's impossible for one query to a globally distributed database to get a different answer for the same question than every other query? Every time someone tells me that DNSSEC tampering would be "detectible", it always seems premised on the idea that everyone sees the same data. Of course, attackers will isolate their targets and attack them surgically. What's worse, none of what you're talking about is cryptographic. This is protection by dint of being lucky enough to be on the right part of the network to be hard to attack. No sound cryptosystem works like that.
- edwintorok 13y ago
  It would be good if we actually had CA hierarchy, I wouldn't call the current CA system a hierarchy[]: any Root CA can issue a valid certificate for any domain, all Root CAs are equal in power, a compromise of any* of them allows valid certificates to be issued for anything. Sure there are protections like certificate pinning, etc. but still the more Root CAs you have, the higher the risks. I think that reducing the amount of organizations controlling your particular branch of DNS is good. You may trust the US CA issue cert for US sites, those are more or less under their control anyway, but you probably don't want to trust them for .eu sites. Or why should I trust the Chinese CA for anything but chinese sites? And more to the point: why should a CA be allowed to issue a cert for a site that already has a cert issues by another CA. DNSSEC is hierarchic, there is one key for example.com. in the parent zone com., if someone else wants to put a key for example.com. into com. they'll have to replace it. Presumable the owner of example.com. would monitor its own record in com. and notice tampering. You can't easily have random CA issuing certs for your sites without being detected. Of course having only a single entity is not good again, because then you introduce a single point of failure. [*] well of course at the X509 level you have subordinate CAs, and a hierarchy, but it is in no way tied to DNS.
- news_embargo 13y ago
  I thought your first comment was just grumbling, but this comment suggests some misunderstanding. The root zsk is split over a group (Shamir share) held by mostly non-US key holders. (One from the US is Dan Kaminsky, whose work and my user name has special relevancy for you. You'd agree he's not part of the US government.) I believe all the key holders are trustworthy, and if any were not, you'd need a majority (5 of the 7) to subvert the zsk. So an xkcd-wrench-style attack on the key by governments would require implausible circumstances. The key ceremony is video taped and can be watched: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9j-sfP9GUU Other TLDs (some being countries) also hold key signing ceremonies and video tape them. You can watch other countries perform key signing as well. But these sovereign zsks are subordinate to the ICANN community held keys. I.e., it's more accurate (than your statement) to say that there are seven people walking the earth who have parent keys over actual country soveriegn zones. And while you might not know all these people yourself, they're from the DNS operator and hacker community. If anything, you're 180 degrees wrong in your statement that governments run DNSSEC. You can read more about the DNSSEC root zone key management process and people (non-governmental) online. Here are informal press stories with the usual set of mistakes and minor errors: http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/28/seven-people-keys-worldwide-internet-security-web https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/07/dnssec_root_key.html And the root DNSSEC operation in general: http://www.root-dnssec.org/ I don't see the government in DNSSEC. Not even ICANN can alter the root zsk (but they are of course instrumental in any key roll over, since they manage the physical facilities where the "DNSSEC Seven" must be iris scanned, etc., to sign any proposed new root key).

by axaxs 13y ago

tptacek 13y ago

The roots of the DNS tree are controlled by world governments. The roots of the DNSSEC PKI are the roots of the DNS tree. And, no, the point of DNSSEC isn't solely to prevent cache poisoning; in fact, the motivating use case for DNSSEC in 2014 is DANE, which replaces the CA hierarchy with DNSSEC.

danyork 13y ago
I'm not sure I see how the roots of the DNS tree are controlled by world governments. Here are the root servers: http://www.root-servers.org/ http://www.root-servers.org/ They are controlled by a wide range of organizations scattered all over the world.
- borando 13y ago
  The data in root "." is controlled by ICANN, a US corporation. The data in the most important gTLD, .com, is run by Verisign on contract with the US Chamber of Commerce. The ccTLDs (.fr, .tw, etc.) are controlled by world governments. Sure, the root and major TLDs are anycasted across the globe, but the "wide range" of organizations are just mirroring content that is in one way or another controlled by world governments, and given (for example) ICE domain seizures, it would be prudent not to over-rely on DNS. Personally I support DNSCurve as a means to secure DNS, not to replace security we already have elsewhere.
  - danyork 13y ago
    I guess we'll have to agree to disagree. I've worked with the ICANN DNS people enough and am aware of their practices enough (ex. https://www.iana.org/dnssec/icann-dps.txt https://www.iana.org/dnssec/icann-dps.txt ) that I don't see how the root zone could be compromised without people knowing. Separately, DNScurve is interesting, but really solves a different problem than DNSSEC. I find this a useful comparison: http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/45770/if-dnssec-is-so-questionable-why-is-it-ahead-of-dnscurve-in-adoption http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/45770/if-dnssec-...
axaxs 13y ago
Assuming that the governments really could just manipulate the root at will(every root, which is many machines, remember)... the only thing they could do is break DNSSEC. The DS hints would not match the KSK of the tld zone otherwise...unless of course every government in the world was in on it together...illuminati, free-masons, oh the Rothchilds are in on it too I think. Seriously, this is a borderline absurd statement. The only way to manipulate the root in a way that allows DNSSEC to work otherwise is to redirect all traffic for every tld to new government owned servers with a matching KSK in place. Not very realistic.
blumentopf 13y ago
By definition a tree has a single root. Please specify what you mean be "roots". The private key of the DNS root was split in seven parts held by seven people [1]. It is stored in two HSMs, one on the east coast of the United States, one on the west coast. Could the NSA or some other agency have gotten hold of the private key? Probably. But spinning that as "the DNSSEC root is controlled by the governments" is FUD. [1] http://venturebeat.com/2010/07/28/seven-security-experts-get-the-key-to-reboot-the-internet/ http://venturebeat.com/2010/07/28/seven-security-experts-get...
- IvyMike 13y ago
  When DNSSEC says "bit.ly" is correct and valid, what organizations or entities could have messed with the results?
  - dfc 13y ago
    Why did you pick an example that does not use DNSSEC? It seems your thesis would be a lot stronger if you used a top and second level domain that actually implemented DNSSEC: root@fw:~# unbound-host -t A -v bit.ly bit.ly has address 69.58.188.39 (insecure) bit.ly has address 69.58.188.40 (insecure) More: http://dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com/bit.ly http://dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com/bit.ly and http://dnsviz.net/d/bit.ly/dnssec/ http://dnsviz.net/d/bit.ly/dnssec/
    - IvyMike 13y ago
      > Why did you pick an example that does not use DNSSEC? Because I'm trying to illustrate how much additional security you might or might not get if you added DNSSEC, especially with regards to government entities.
      - dfc 13y ago
        The answer is "N/A." The .ly tld is not signed so DNSSEC could never attest to the authenticity of the A record for bit.ly. In order for this to be a useful exercise you should structure the question in such a way that there is as much potential for government interference as possible. (Unless you are looking for a specific answer and you are trying to lead the respondent.) Government interference with DNSSEC is not limited to the `.` zone. Or put another way, DNSSEC's attack surface area is not limited to the sacred KSK.
kijeda 13y ago
It would be useful to put forward a single credible scenario where "world" governments can use the DNS root private key in any fashion without detection. It is impossible to have a reasoned debate about DNSSEC with straw men like this.
- tptacek 13y ago
  Are you familiar with the CAP theorem, or do you believe that it's impossible for one query to a globally distributed database to get a different answer for the same question than every other query? Every time someone tells me that DNSSEC tampering would be "detectible", it always seems premised on the idea that everyone sees the same data. Of course, attackers will isolate their targets and attack them surgically. What's worse, none of what you're talking about is cryptographic. This is protection by dint of being lucky enough to be on the right part of the network to be hard to attack. No sound cryptosystem works like that.
edwintorok 13y ago
It would be good if we actually had CA hierarchy, I wouldn't call the current CA system a hierarchy[]: any Root CA can issue a valid certificate for any domain, all Root CAs are equal in power, a compromise of any* of them allows valid certificates to be issued for anything. Sure there are protections like certificate pinning, etc. but still the more Root CAs you have, the higher the risks. I think that reducing the amount of organizations controlling your particular branch of DNS is good. You may trust the US CA issue cert for US sites, those are more or less under their control anyway, but you probably don't want to trust them for .eu sites. Or why should I trust the Chinese CA for anything but chinese sites? And more to the point: why should a CA be allowed to issue a cert for a site that already has a cert issues by another CA. DNSSEC is hierarchic, there is one key for example.com. in the parent zone com., if someone else wants to put a key for example.com. into com. they'll have to replace it. Presumable the owner of example.com. would monitor its own record in com. and notice tampering. You can't easily have random CA issuing certs for your sites without being detected. Of course having only a single entity is not good again, because then you introduce a single point of failure. [*] well of course at the X509 level you have subordinate CAs, and a hierarchy, but it is in no way tied to DNS.
news_embargo 13y ago
I thought your first comment was just grumbling, but this comment suggests some misunderstanding. The root zsk is split over a group (Shamir share) held by mostly non-US key holders. (One from the US is Dan Kaminsky, whose work and my user name has special relevancy for you. You'd agree he's not part of the US government.) I believe all the key holders are trustworthy, and if any were not, you'd need a majority (5 of the 7) to subvert the zsk. So an xkcd-wrench-style attack on the key by governments would require implausible circumstances. The key ceremony is video taped and can be watched: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b9j-sfP9GUU Other TLDs (some being countries) also hold key signing ceremonies and video tape them. You can watch other countries perform key signing as well. But these sovereign zsks are subordinate to the ICANN community held keys. I.e., it's more accurate (than your statement) to say that there are seven people walking the earth who have parent keys over actual country soveriegn zones. And while you might not know all these people yourself, they're from the DNS operator and hacker community. If anything, you're 180 degrees wrong in your statement that governments run DNSSEC. You can read more about the DNSSEC root zone key management process and people (non-governmental) online. Here are informal press stories with the usual set of mistakes and minor errors: http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/28/seven-people-keys-worldwide-internet-security-web https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/07/dnssec_root_key.html And the root DNSSEC operation in general: http://www.root-dnssec.org/ I don't see the government in DNSSEC. Not even ICANN can alter the root zsk (but they are of course instrumental in any key roll over, since they manage the physical facilities where the "DNSSEC Seven" must be iris scanned, etc., to sign any proposed new root key).