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It's pretty clear that your taking a scientific-materialist stance. So, my question to you is how do you explain qualia? Qualia is a term describing the actual

It's pretty clear that your taking a scientific-materialist stance. So, my question to you is how do you explain qualia? Qualia is a term describing the actual _feeling_ of something as consciously perceived. Wikipedia explains it better: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia The problem is this: Consider perceiving the color red. An outside observer can explain this as photons hitting my eye and me reacting. The only problem is, I can actually see the color. How can a series of chemical reactions cause me to feel? The irony of this is, of course, that pzombies (philosophical zombies: beings that don't feel anything but act exactly as though they do) would come to the same conclusion. Since it is impossible for anyone other than myself to verify that I exist as anything more than a series of chemical reactions (ie. I actually feel), it is a difficult problem to work with. I, for my part, was led to the conclusion that the scientific-materialist perspective was wrong, or at least grossly incomplete. It seems logical as science is essentially the art of useful fiction: we make up the simplest story that predicts the right answers and use it until it breaks (and sometimes beyond that and just avoid the points we know it breaks at). I'm very interested in hearing others' views.

modeless 17y ago
I feel that the problem you describe is exacerbated (as so many philosophical "problems" are) by the imprecision of the language used in framing the problem. Rather than bicker over word definitions, I would prefer to wait until we have computers powerful enough to simulate the brain, at which time we can answer such questions using the precise language of mathematics. Of course I can't prove that we will be able to create such computers. If we can't then that would be evidence for a non-physical basis of consciousness. However, I feel that right now the burden of proof is on the people who claim that consciousness doesn't obey the laws of physics, as we haven't yet found any other process which doesn't.
- foldr 17y ago
  [I am not the OP] > I would prefer to wait until we have computers powerful enough to simulate the brain, at which time we can answer such questions using the precise language of mathematics. I find this stance baffling. How would a complete simulation of the brain tell us how a chemical reaction could cause a feeling? That seems quite a lot to hope for! There is also a question-begging element here. What you consider a "complete" simulation of the brain will differ depending on whether or not you are a materialist in the first place. (I.e., will the simulation include feelings as part of its model? If it doesn't, aren't you begging the question in favor of physicalism?) >as we haven't yet found any other process which doesn't [obey the laws of physics]. Isn't this basically true by definition? If we find something that doesn't obey the laws of current physics, we just modify the laws. We certainly found processes which didn't obey the currently accepted laws of physics at a number of points in the history of physics.
  - modeless 17y ago
    Like I said, I believe the "problem" itself is ill-defined. Philosophy in general has a tendency to devolve into arguments over word definitions and I simply don't think that's productive. A simulation of the brain will give us the data we need to frame the problem precisely enough to actually answer it. > If we find something that doesn't obey the laws of current physics, we just modify the laws. If consciousness is truly outside the domain of science then logically there would be no law we could create to account for its effects. But I'll go a step further and say that I believe consciousness obeys the laws of physics as we currently understand them. Again I don't have a proof of this, but neither do the people who say it doesn't.
    - foldr 17y ago
      >Like I said, I believe the "problem" itself is ill-defined. You keep saying that, but you neither specify which problem you are referring to, or in which respect you believe it to be ill-defined. So it's kind of hard to respond to a vague assertion of that sort. It's ironic that you of all people should be accusing philosophers of using language imprecisely. >But I'll go a step further and say that I believe consciousness obeys the laws of physics as we currently understand them. Again: what is your reason for believing this? It is not enough just to assert it. Also, you are forgetting the logical possibility that consciousness is compatible with the laws of current physics but not actually explained by them. (In the same way that, for example, the truth of the equation "2 + 2 = 4" is compatible with the truth of Newton's second law, but not explained by it because they are statements in different domains.)
      - modeless 17y ago
        The problem was stated by christopherolah, and labeled as such. I'll quote it here for your convenience: "The problem is this: Consider perceiving the color red. An outside observer can explain this as photons hitting my eye and me reacting. The only problem is, I can actually see the color. How can a series of chemical reactions cause me to feel?" As I have said, the respect in which it is ill-defined is the imprecise definitions of the words used. An argument about this will eventually turn to haggling over the definitions of words like "see", "perceive", and especially "feel". "what is your reason for believing [consciousness obeys physics]?" I don't claim to have a strong argument. This thread is already too long so I'm not going to list my reasons, but the point I'd like to make is that the opposing view doesn't have strong arguments either, and I feel the burden of proof rests more heavily on that side, considering Occam's razor.
nazgulnarsil 17y ago
qualia has a physical description: simply describe a brain the moment that it is receiving sense data of light in the red spectrum. that this is currently beyond us technologically doesn't mean that it is in any way a philosophical conundrum.
- deleted 17y ago
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- 321abc 17y ago
  There's a difference between describing the brain receiving data and describing me seeing red. I don't experience myself as a brain, and I certainly don't experience "receiving data", so your description of these things would not be of things I experience when I see red.
  - nazgulnarsil 17y ago
    sure it is, simply make it your brain that we describe and it will be you seeing red. the brain being described doesn't experience itself as a brain...so what?
    - 321abc 17y ago
      It's the difference between describing how something works and describing what something's like to the person doing whatever it is you're describing. Science can (arguably) get at how something works, or at least make some predictions and models concerning these things, but that's not the same as getting at what something's like, from a "subjective" standpoint. Scientists can ask me about what the experience of "red" is like, and I can tell them that it's not quite like blue or green, and can point to it, but the experience itself (like all experience) remains a completely private matter for me. Just think about it. Look at any red object and compare it with any "scientific" description regarding wavelengths and retinas, neurons, synapses, neurotransmitters, visual cortexes, atoms, molecules, or what have you. Clearly none of these thing are in any way related to what it's actually like for you to see that red object. Now, you may well believe that what's going on when you look at a red object is "really" some interaction between what those scientific terms describe in some model of what's going on with your brain, sensory organs, etc. But this requires a sort of suspension of disbelief, as you have to set aside your actual "subjective" experience of the red object itself (an experience which lacks the mediation of all these scientific terms, models, or even what they refer to, as you don't experience the neurons, or retinas, or neurotransmitters, as such, you just see the red object). The subjective experience is really where science is quite helpless. It's been this way for hundreds if not thousands of years, and there's no sign it's getting any closer now.
ewjordan 17y ago
I, for my part, was led to the conclusion that the scientific-materialist perspective was wrong, or at least grossly incomplete. It seems logical as science is essentially the art of useful fiction: we make up the simplest story that predicts the right answers and use it until it breaks (and sometimes beyond that and just avoid the points we know it breaks at). The distinction between materialist and non-materialist is not that the non-materialist believes science is merely incomplete, as any materialist would agree with that stance; it is that he denies the very ability of science to investigate certain effects, and further, he believes those effects to be important and not mere hypothetical possibilities. Contrast this to the materialist, who while he accepts that fundamentally there is a limit to what we can know about our universe (we're within the system, after all, and it's provably impossible to know everything about the workings of a closed system from within), still believes that we can figure out most of the important things by observing what we see around us and experimenting. In particular the materialist doesn't think there's anything so special about humans that their workings are not completely susceptible to scientific investigation. Usually the non-materialist thinks that there's something magical happening in living creatures that makes them fundamentally opaque to observation and description. Since it is impossible for anyone other than myself to verify that I exist as anything more than a series of chemical reactions (ie. I actually feel), it is a difficult problem to work with. I'd argue that it's also impossible for you to verify this fact. Who's to say that you don't just think you actually feel things but in reality it's just your brain playing a trick on itself? Taking that further (and getting into the definition problem others have mentioned), who's to say there's any difference at all between the delusion and the perception of experience?
- christopherolah 17y ago
  >I'd argue that it's also impossible for you to verify this fact. Who's to say that you don't just think you actually feel things >but in reality it's just your brain playing a trick on itself? >Taking that further (and getting into the definition problem others have mentioned), who's to say there's any difference >at all between the delusion and the perception of experience? Because to think such a thing way would be qualia in and of itself...
- foldr 17y ago

modeless 17y ago

I feel that the problem you describe is exacerbated (as so many philosophical "problems" are) by the imprecision of the language used in framing the problem. Rather than bicker over word definitions, I would prefer to wait until we have computers powerful enough to simulate the brain, at which time we can answer such questions using the precise language of mathematics. Of course I can't prove that we will be able to create such computers. If we can't then that would be evidence for a non-physical basis of consciousness. However, I feel that right now the burden of proof is on the people who claim that consciousness doesn't obey the laws of physics, as we haven't yet found any other process which doesn't.

foldr 17y ago
[I am not the OP] > I would prefer to wait until we have computers powerful enough to simulate the brain, at which time we can answer such questions using the precise language of mathematics. I find this stance baffling. How would a complete simulation of the brain tell us how a chemical reaction could cause a feeling? That seems quite a lot to hope for! There is also a question-begging element here. What you consider a "complete" simulation of the brain will differ depending on whether or not you are a materialist in the first place. (I.e., will the simulation include feelings as part of its model? If it doesn't, aren't you begging the question in favor of physicalism?) >as we haven't yet found any other process which doesn't [obey the laws of physics]. Isn't this basically true by definition? If we find something that doesn't obey the laws of current physics, we just modify the laws. We certainly found processes which didn't obey the currently accepted laws of physics at a number of points in the history of physics.
- modeless 17y ago
  Like I said, I believe the "problem" itself is ill-defined. Philosophy in general has a tendency to devolve into arguments over word definitions and I simply don't think that's productive. A simulation of the brain will give us the data we need to frame the problem precisely enough to actually answer it. > If we find something that doesn't obey the laws of current physics, we just modify the laws. If consciousness is truly outside the domain of science then logically there would be no law we could create to account for its effects. But I'll go a step further and say that I believe consciousness obeys the laws of physics as we currently understand them. Again I don't have a proof of this, but neither do the people who say it doesn't.
  - foldr 17y ago
    >Like I said, I believe the "problem" itself is ill-defined. You keep saying that, but you neither specify which problem you are referring to, or in which respect you believe it to be ill-defined. So it's kind of hard to respond to a vague assertion of that sort. It's ironic that you of all people should be accusing philosophers of using language imprecisely. >But I'll go a step further and say that I believe consciousness obeys the laws of physics as we currently understand them. Again: what is your reason for believing this? It is not enough just to assert it. Also, you are forgetting the logical possibility that consciousness is compatible with the laws of current physics but not actually explained by them. (In the same way that, for example, the truth of the equation "2 + 2 = 4" is compatible with the truth of Newton's second law, but not explained by it because they are statements in different domains.)
    - modeless 17y ago
      The problem was stated by christopherolah, and labeled as such. I'll quote it here for your convenience: "The problem is this: Consider perceiving the color red. An outside observer can explain this as photons hitting my eye and me reacting. The only problem is, I can actually see the color. How can a series of chemical reactions cause me to feel?" As I have said, the respect in which it is ill-defined is the imprecise definitions of the words used. An argument about this will eventually turn to haggling over the definitions of words like "see", "perceive", and especially "feel". "what is your reason for believing [consciousness obeys physics]?" I don't claim to have a strong argument. This thread is already too long so I'm not going to list my reasons, but the point I'd like to make is that the opposing view doesn't have strong arguments either, and I feel the burden of proof rests more heavily on that side, considering Occam's razor.

nazgulnarsil 17y ago

qualia has a physical description: simply describe a brain the moment that it is receiving sense data of light in the red spectrum. that this is currently beyond us technologically doesn't mean that it is in any way a philosophical conundrum.

deleted 17y ago
[deleted]
321abc 17y ago
There's a difference between describing the brain receiving data and describing me seeing red. I don't experience myself as a brain, and I certainly don't experience "receiving data", so your description of these things would not be of things I experience when I see red.
- nazgulnarsil 17y ago
  sure it is, simply make it your brain that we describe and it will be you seeing red. the brain being described doesn't experience itself as a brain...so what?
  - 321abc 17y ago
    It's the difference between describing how something works and describing what something's like to the person doing whatever it is you're describing. Science can (arguably) get at how something works, or at least make some predictions and models concerning these things, but that's not the same as getting at what something's like, from a "subjective" standpoint. Scientists can ask me about what the experience of "red" is like, and I can tell them that it's not quite like blue or green, and can point to it, but the experience itself (like all experience) remains a completely private matter for me. Just think about it. Look at any red object and compare it with any "scientific" description regarding wavelengths and retinas, neurons, synapses, neurotransmitters, visual cortexes, atoms, molecules, or what have you. Clearly none of these thing are in any way related to what it's actually like for you to see that red object. Now, you may well believe that what's going on when you look at a red object is "really" some interaction between what those scientific terms describe in some model of what's going on with your brain, sensory organs, etc. But this requires a sort of suspension of disbelief, as you have to set aside your actual "subjective" experience of the red object itself (an experience which lacks the mediation of all these scientific terms, models, or even what they refer to, as you don't experience the neurons, or retinas, or neurotransmitters, as such, you just see the red object). The subjective experience is really where science is quite helpless. It's been this way for hundreds if not thousands of years, and there's no sign it's getting any closer now.

ewjordan 17y ago

I, for my part, was led to the conclusion that the scientific-materialist perspective was wrong, or at least grossly incomplete. It seems logical as science is essentially the art of useful fiction: we make up the simplest story that predicts the right answers and use it until it breaks (and sometimes beyond that and just avoid the points we know it breaks at). The distinction between materialist and non-materialist is not that the non-materialist believes science is merely incomplete, as any materialist would agree with that stance; it is that he denies the very ability of science to investigate certain effects, and further, he believes those effects to be important and not mere hypothetical possibilities. Contrast this to the materialist, who while he accepts that fundamentally there is a limit to what we can know about our universe (we're within the system, after all, and it's provably impossible to know everything about the workings of a closed system from within), still believes that we can figure out most of the important things by observing what we see around us and experimenting. In particular the materialist doesn't think there's anything so special about humans that their workings are not completely susceptible to scientific investigation. Usually the non-materialist thinks that there's something magical happening in living creatures that makes them fundamentally opaque to observation and description. Since it is impossible for anyone other than myself to verify that I exist as anything more than a series of chemical reactions (ie. I actually feel), it is a difficult problem to work with. I'd argue that it's also impossible for you to verify this fact. Who's to say that you don't just think you actually feel things but in reality it's just your brain playing a trick on itself? Taking that further (and getting into the definition problem others have mentioned), who's to say there's any difference at all between the delusion and the perception of experience?

christopherolah 17y ago
>I'd argue that it's also impossible for you to verify this fact. Who's to say that you don't just think you actually feel things >but in reality it's just your brain playing a trick on itself? >Taking that further (and getting into the definition problem others have mentioned), who's to say there's any difference >at all between the delusion and the perception of experience? Because to think such a thing way would be qualia in and of itself...
foldr 17y ago