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> But before you get cocky, remember -- all these crazy features in TLS were put there for a reason. Someone wanted and demanded them. While I guess that must
by jrochkind1 13y ago
> But before you get cocky, remember -- all these crazy features in TLS were put there for a reason. Someone wanted and demanded them.
While I guess that must be true, the OP was clever enough not to say that someone actually needed them.
And really, all we can say for sure is true is that someone wanted them. Whether they had to demand them or not depends on if there was any resistance to the feature from the standards body. Having seen some standards processes at play, it's sometimes more like "Hey, I think this is probably a good idea," "Okay, sounds good." Of course, some of those would escalate to "demands" if resistance was put up, and lack of energy for that fight is why sometimes resistance isn't.
However, I feel like the last couple years has seen such a raft of vulnerabilities that it may lead to an actually qualitative change in how people approach these things, and in the future security standards-making is going to be a lot more conservative about adding features. One can hope.
Doesn't change the main point that security is hard, and that surely the next gen of TLS, if it happens, will wind up with some vulnerabilities too.
- tptacek 13y agoPeople do need resumption. If you were designing a new encrypted transport protocol, it's likely that your starting point would include a mechanism to persist the initial key exchange across multiple connections; that's a sensible feature. It may be less and less necessary over the next decade if we transition to faster and faster ECC handshakes, but most handshakes today use RSA. Similarly: renegotiation, an armpit feature of TLS, has a sensible use case: a server doesn't necessarily know whether a TLS client certificate is required until it can see the HTTP URL requested. But that doesn't happen until after the handshake completes. I'm not sure renegotiation is the best solution to that problem (as opposed to an HTTP 4xx status code response), but it's not as if the feature was crazy.