3 ms·
The thing about privacy against a threat like PRISM and other mass-surveillance threats is that there is a threshold below which efforts don't actually protect.
by Zigurd 13y ago
The thing about privacy against a threat like PRISM and other mass-surveillance threats is that there is a threshold below which efforts don't actually protect.
End-to-end encryption is a pretty reasonable threshold. Skype proved it could be convenient enough for grandma (and yes I'm aware that user-controlled keys for store and forward is more difficult).
So, yeah. Below that threshold the best is just least bad. I don't see why you are so touchy about that. Many people here foresaw that the government would be so intransigent that, unless services implemented open and verifiable tools for enabling end-to-end encryption, anything short of that would be ineffective in restoring trust in the services we use.
- contingencies 13y agoEnd-to-end encryption is a pretty reasonable threshold. Skype proved it could be convenient enough for grandma Err .. are you are aware they give out keys to certain governments and send different code to certain clients (eg. within China)? In privacy terms they are basically the same as Google now with its centralized model and SSL, just using some obfuscated vaguaries of P2P slash centralized communications paths (which they refuse to document openly) instead of centralized store and forward.