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There's one significant difference I think between what Akamai did and what we (CloudFlare) did. Akamai thought their memory allocator meant they were safe and
by jgrahamc 13y ago
There's one significant difference I think between what Akamai did and what we (CloudFlare) did.
Akamai thought their memory allocator meant they were safe and so didn't change their SSL keys; we weren't convinced by our own analysis (which I was involved in) launched the challenge, and simultaneously started the process of revoking keys.
In the challenge blog post we said: "We’ve begun the process of reissuing and revoking the keys CloudFlare manages on behalf of our customers. In order to ensure that we don’t overburden the certificate authority resources, we are staging this process. We expect that it will be complete by early next week."
That wasn't BS, we were doing that and we had a _ton_ of keys to deal with. Today's blog post is a result of further analysis and the announcement that we revoked everything.
BTW I'm not done with analysis of OpenSSL memory. There's still something weird going on (I think in the bignum library) where data isn't getting OPENSSL_cleanse'd from memory.
- filmgirlcw 13y agoThat's a really good point. I had read the original post as "we're reissuing and revoking some keys" but didn't understand you would be doing all keys, regardless of the challenge results, therefore I thought the process was expanded to everyone AFTER the challenge was won. Glad to hear you were already in the process of doing the staggered reissue/revoke cycle. And also props for reissuing and revoking everything. That's hugely important.
- tptacek 13y agoI am "a little bit" not a fan of waiting to rekey. A lot of people did that. I am "a lot" not a fan of setting up a challenge game to have people try to pull the key with one hand figuratively tied behind their back, when a debugger or memory dump would have decisively answered the question --- and, presumably, did exactly that for at least some of the winners. I am "severely" not a fan of marketing skepticism about the severity of a flaw. This is almost vulnerability response 101: it's the reason Cisco and Microsoft tag memory corruption flaws "possible remote code execution" even when they're obviously not exploitable. Err on the side of severity. As evidence for my concern, I'll again observe that Bruce Schneier's read of the Crowdflare Challenge blog post was that your team believed it to be "next to impossible" to extract RSA keys. As you know, very few people in your audience have the technical background to evaluate that claim, especially when it's accompanied by heap metadata diagrams. I don't think any of this is earth-shattering or even all that controversial. I would just hate to see a standard response to complicated vulnerabilities become "set up a challenge site". Challenges are great! You guys should do more of them! Just don't do them to answer critical security questions. :) Edited to sound less petulant.
- jgrahamc 13y agoEdited to sound less petulant. No worries. I can see through petulant to the message.
- tptacek 13y agoWell played. :P
- eastdakota 13y agoWorth noting that the cost imposed on the Internet's infrastructure of mass revocation is non-trivial: http://blog.cloudflare.com/the-hard-costs-of-heartbleed http://blog.cloudflare.com/the-hard-costs-of-heartbleed Just CloudFlare revoking all the certs on our network added 40Gbps of net new traffic to one CA. Mass revocation without making sure all systems were ready to handle it would have also been irresponsible. Props to Globalsign (our primary CA partner) for working with us to make sure we could pull it off.
- tptacek 13y agoThat is a totally understandable reason for why it took many hours or days to revoke keys. I'm not really faulting you for that. My issue here is different, more subtle, and nerdier.