The linked document is missing its figures and tables, which makes it a little hard to get at the nuts and bolts of the analysis. I don't know if a more complet

The linked document is missing its figures and tables, which makes it a little hard to get at the nuts and bolts of the analysis. I don't know if a more complete version is publicly available yet. They appear to conclude that "economic elites" get their policy preferences enacted more often than the median voter (though there's a good deal of inertia that makes change difficult no matter which groups want it). That's not surprising to me in a republican system: Elites are the ones getting elected! This is not necessarily a bug if you think voters are better as judges of character, values and capability than as issue-by-issue decision makers. The authors disagree, though I think they describe the other side of the argument uncharitably: A possible objection to populistic democracy is that average citizens are inattentive to politics and ignorant about public policy; why should we worry if their poorly informed preferences do not influence policy making? Perhaps economic elites and interest group leaders enjoy greater policy expertise than the average citizen does. Perhaps they know better which policies will benefit everyone, and perhaps they seek the common good, rather than selfish ends, when deciding which policies to support. But we tend to doubt it. We believe instead that – collectively – ordinary citizens generally know their own values and interests pretty well, and that their expressed policy preferences are worthy of respect.