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While I know private keys are important and you really don't want to leak them, I have to wonder if the security community's focus on the private keys as the cr
by jameshart 13y ago
While I know private keys are important and you really don't want to leak them, I have to wonder if the security community's focus on the private keys as the crown jewels that heartbleed accesses is a little misplaced.
If someone can steal your private key, yes, they can now impersonate your SSL server. For HTTPS, they'll need to actually perform a DNS spoof or similar to truly exploit that change, though. I guess there might be more of a concern about things like DKIM keys being stolen. We have to be a little less trusting of SSL certs to verify identity.
But in all this fuss about the keys, we seem to be forgetting that the heartbleed vulnerability allowed attackers to sniff random cleartext as it passed through OpenSSL. Session identities, usernames, passwords, sure - but again, the security industry focuses on credentials being stolen as the worst case scenario. But what about all the other private data going across the SSL connection?
This reminds me a little of the focus on operating system security preventing privilege escalation, while ignoring the risk of malware trashing all of a user's own data - you might lose all your photographs, but at least the device drivers will be safe.
When it comes to heartbleed, users might legitimately fear that data they sent over SSL could have been eavesdropped by anybody; but the security industry doesn't seem to care about that as much as it does about whether the private key could have been compromised.
- deeviant 13y ago"If someone can steal your private key, yes, they can now impersonate your SSL server." I don't understand this comment. If they steal your private key, they can impersonate the client and do everything the client can do. I don't understand the "impersonate the SSL server". If they steal the public key, then they can impersonate the server.
- nitrogen 13y agoNo, you can't do anything with a public key. Public keys are meant to be public. You might be confusing session keys, public keys, and private keys.
- lstamour 13y agoNot an expert, but I'll attempt an answer: "your private key" refers to the server's key. The public key is already available. What gives a connection the lock icon is the verification of the public key by verifying signatures to recognize that the correct private key was used. In this diagram, the private key we refer to is the red key symbol on the far right: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/96/Usage-of-Digital-Certificate.svg http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/96/Usage-of-... In this diagram, ignoring TLS for the moment, what we care about is the purple box. That represents the kind of verification we have of a server's web traffic -- the purple box is the response from the server. The public key is shared and anyone can get a copy by asking, that's how they know where the certificate came from -- that it came from a valid CA -- the problem is that if anyone can get access to the red key (or the green key from earlier), they can impersonate a certificate because to the encryption, they are valid, the signatures match. It's like someone stealing your password or PIN code. The private key just happens to be much longer than that.
- NoodleIncident 13y agoPreface: I don't understand this stuff much at all. I was under the impression that stuff gets encrypted with the public key, and can only be decrypted with the private key. Doesn't owning the private key let you snoop on all traffic, all of the time, forever until they change the keys?
- lstamour 13y agoDepends. This might be useful here: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/why-web-needs-perfect-forward-secrecy https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/why-web-needs-perfect-... If really interested in the topic, Google the acronyms on this page: http://www.certificate-transparency.org/comparison http://www.certificate-transparency.org/comparison
- robertgraham 13y agoYou still have to be in a spot to snoop. If you are a random hacker wanting to snoop on a Russian bank, once you get their private key, you have to now tap into the network. This is unlikely to be within your ability. You might fly to Russia and sit in cybercafe's open to catch people on the open WiFi, but it's not something that's easy. On the other hand, as the above comment says, you can use heartbleed in other ways, such as catching people's cookies from memory, then insert those cookies into your own browser and hijack their connection. Among the things I'm famous for is having written a proxy server you can aim your browser through in order to do cookie hijacking: https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/hamster/ https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/hamster/