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I'm really confused. If you think your original certificate may have been compromised, the only reason to get a new certificate would be to protect your users f
by jeremyjh 13y ago
I'm really confused. If you think your original certificate may have been compromised, the only reason to get a new certificate would be to protect your users from a MITM attack. Since you have not revoked your old certificate, you have done nothing to reduce this risk.
- guan 13y agoThis is all kind of pointless for my silly personal blog, so you could view it as a symbolic way of registering my displeasure with StartCom ;-) To answer your question, suppose I think my key has been compromised. Then I don’t want to continue using that key because non-MITM’ed communication between my server and the client is compromised. So I generate a new key, and I’d like a a new certificate for that new key—the old one won’t work (Apple Secure Transport bug notwithstanding). My users are still vulnerable to a MITM attack, yes. --edit: assuming that the user’s connection uses a non-PFS cipher suite.
- guan 13y agoTo put it more succinctly: my private key has potentially been compromised, not my certificate. By generating a new private key (which implies a new certificate), I can protect against non-MITM eavesdropping for non-PFS ciphers.