3 ms·
The problem is that a memory unsafe language leaves gaping holes. Protection against timing attacks doesn't help me if one can read my private keys (remotely!)
by chopin 13y ago
The problem is that a memory unsafe language leaves gaping holes. Protection against timing attacks doesn't help me if one can read my private keys (remotely!) with a simple Python script. Timing attacks at least require colocation in most cases and are much harder to implement and run for meaningful results. It's certainly worth thinking about how we can put memory problems to death in at least crypto code and imho C has proven to be a permanent problem in that regard.
I am still a (interested) Haskell beginner but whenever this discussion comes up the first thing I think is "why not try this in Haskell?" and I never give a thought that I would do this in Java which is my everyday language (and reasonably memory safe).
- jude- 13y ago"Timing attacks at least require colocation in most cases and are much harder to implement and run for meaningful results" Not true. It's long been known that timing attacks over a LAN are practical (replace LAN with intra-datacenter network). Relevant paper from 2003: https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf