3 ms·
Instead of giving the amount to the captain, they could throw it away to the sea. Nobody would cheat then. In real life situations, you may want to replace the
by niyazpk 17y ago
Instead of giving the amount to the captain, they could throw it away to the sea. Nobody would cheat then.
In real life situations, you may want to replace the sea by the government or some kind of common fund in the domain.
- silentOpen 17y agoInteresting idea but no parties in the protocol would be motivated to do that. This might be useful in a situation where a group entity exists that is approximately the same size as the division group -- e.g. an endowment, shared property, common business, or co-op.
- eru 17y ago> Nobody would cheat then. Depends. Perhaps somebody would try to bully (i.e. play a game of chicken http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_(game) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_(game)): "Either you lower your share in my favour, or I will claim too much and you get nothing."
- billswift 17y agoIt wouldn't work if it was explicitly known. The others could just as easily decide to cut him out of the distribution entirely.
- eru 17y agoYes. Or if the victim could commit to not yielding to threats like this beforehand. Being able to commit oneself is of huge importance in games like chicken (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_(game) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_(game)).
- donaldc 17y agoIf I were a pirate who had little gold to lose, and a grudge against some of my fellow pirates, I could always play the spoiler and cause everyone's gold to go to the captain or into the sea...