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OpenSSL Heartbleed Security Update
- gojomo 13y agoLoading an https://APPNAME.herokuapp.com https://APPNAME.herokuapp.com page, I'm seeing a certificate (sn:"0E:3E:94:7F:C0:64:D7:4A:52:B1:38:D7:71:90:88:1F") with an "Issued Date" of "1/20/14"... which doesn't sound like it's been regenerated in the last 24 hours. Am I interpreting the certificate info wrong? [edit per official answer below: YES] (Are fresh certificates sometimes given much older start times? [edit: YES]) This blogpost doesn't clearly address *.herokuapp.com HTTPS service, as opposed to the custom-domains "ssl:endpoint" service.
- dpritchett 13y agoI'm pretty sure if you're using herokuapp.com then you're not using your own cert and Heroku will update it for you. If you're using ssl:endpoint then you will have had to submit your own cert, and that will need replacing.
- gojomo 13y agoIndeed, that's my expectation with herokuapp.com. However, this blogpost says, "As of Tuesday, April 8 at 15:55 UTC, all Heroku certificates and infrastructure have been updated and are no longer vulnerable"... while the certificate still superficially looks like it's almost 3 months old. Something isn't as it seems, I hope it's just the certificate age.
- praseodym 13y agoSeveral certificate vendors reissue certificates with the same "not valid before"/"issued" date as the original one.
- munger 13y agoYep, I was just hassling our billing SaaS provider about this, but then I looked into their SSL vendor heartbleed post, and their customers mention this in the comments: http://blog.digicert.com/2014/04/heartbleed-openssl-fix/ http://blog.digicert.com/2014/04/heartbleed-openssl-fix/ Excerpt: "Also, Busy IT Guy is right; it's a little disheartening to be listed as Unsafe after having done all the right things, just because the issue date didn’t get updated."
- dpiddy 13y agoHi, Heroku engineer here. We rekeyed our certificates, including the one for *.herokuapp.com, meaning we resent our original certificate requests (CSR) to our CA but signed with new private keys. This is why the dates didn't change. Our CA will eventually revoke the previous incarnations of our certificates, signed with the old private keys, making them invalid.
- gojomo 13y agoThanks! It might be reassuring to others who see the same mixed-signals if the official blogpost made specific mention of APPNAME.herokuapp.com HTTPS, and that the certificates may look older but really are fresh.
- craigkerstiens 13y agoThanks for the feedback, we have updated the blog post to include some information regarding this.
- smw 13y agoAm I missing something, or doesn't the browser have to explicitly check for key revocation? I know the checkbox was off in my version of Chrome. Maybe I set it, but I'm not sure. This [1] Seems to suggest that Firefox, for instance, only checks for EV certs? [1] http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2013/05/13/how-certificate-revocation-doesnt-work-in-practice.html http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2013/05/13/how-certificate...
- orblivion 13y agoSo is there a simple way to check if an arbitrary site updated their certs?
- grittygrease 13y agoThis is completely the wrong approach. Your private key might have been compromised and you're generating another certificate for the same compromised private key? What is that supposed to do?
- danielpal 13y ago"This vulnerability can be remotely exploited to leak encryption secrets from Heroku applications, allowing an attacker to retrieve the private key used for SSL encryption and decode data obtained by intercepting traffic" Does anyone know if this is "actually" true?. By looking at the bug it seems you can dump up to 64 bytes at a time from the stack. Given that the attacker doesn't control were from the stack at all and looking at the code the top of the stack is probably holding some random structure, is it really possible for the attacker to retrieve the private key? I just want to be sure before spending a bunch of money to replace re-issue all certs.
- aetherson 13y ago64k, not 64.
- danielpal 13y agoOK fair, 64K. But is it actually possible to control were you get the 64K from or is it just off the top of the stack? And is it actually possible that the top of the stack has your private key?
- M4v3R 13y agoIt has been repedately demonstrated that it is possible to get private key from the server using this vulnerability, as well as user login details. You don't have only one shot - you can query the server multiple times (and every time you will receive slightly different data) until you have everything you want. So yeah, the issue was/is very serious.
- erichurkman 13y agoSee this post for a trivial example of session theft from JIRA [1]. You may not get the memory chunk you want the first time, but you can repeat it until you do. [1] https://www.mattslifebytes.com/?p=533 https://www.mattslifebytes.com/?p=533
- makomk 13y agoIt's from somewhere on the heap not the stack. You can influence where on the heap the data comes from by adjusting the size of your request, amongst other tricks.
- mixedbit 13y agoIn case the bug was really actively exploited on Heroku, updating private keys and changing Heroku password can be not enough. SSL endpoints forward all HTTPS traffic, so according to my understanding cookies, application specific passwords, basic auth credentials could have been potentially compromised. Another potential vector are add-ons that use encrypted connections (for example Heroku Postgres). These also could have been targeted, in which case add-ons credentials would need to be regenerated.
- tlrobinson 13y agoThat is my understanding as well. Any memory in the same process as OpenSSL could be compromised. In the case of Heroku that includes any traffic to/from your app, but not dynos' memory, so internal application credentials should be ok, unless those services were also vulnerable. Hopefully Heroku is coordinating with add-ons to determine that and automatically regenerate affected credentials.
- higherpurpose 13y agoEveryone should be adopting perfect forward secrecy in their TLS connections. No excuses at this point.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- diminoten 13y agoThe one thing that might be of some small comfort to others is the fact that at least the NSA didn't know about this bug. If they had, there wouldn't be any talk of HTTPS being a barrier in their leaked presentations. That said, all of that encrypted traffic they've got stored up can now, thanks to this bug, be decrypted.
- maxerickson 13y agoI would think that when they discover a superpower they compartmentalize that information. You could make the inference that, if they did have it, they were not making broad use of it.
- mpyne 13y agoThey did compartmentalize. They still do. That's why having an insider with sysadmin access and prestige for social engineering purposes is so dangerous.
- maxerickson 13y agoYeah. We should still take Rumsfeld's advice about what we don't know.
- mpyne 13y agoSure, the advice is still as sound as it ever was. So was the advice about going to war with the Army you had, not the one you'd wished you had.
- sjs382 13y agoIt could have been discovered them between the presentation and now.
- pdw 13y agoThe bug was introduced in version 1.0.1, released 14 Mar 2012. Aren't most of Snowden's documents older than that? And we certainly don't know what the NSA has been doing since Snowden collected his files late 2012 / beginning 2013.