5 ms·

You're doing crypto in the browser, while claiming on your home page: > Everything is encrypted before it leaves your computer. Even the Cryptocat network itse

You're doing crypto in the browser, while claiming on your home page: > Everything is encrypted before it leaves your computer. Even the Cryptocat network itself can't read your messages. You're seriously misleading users regarding the security of crypto -- the web is an environment that has ZERO controls on code updates. Given this remarkably self-serving and ill-conceived stance, it's difficult to imagine how your crypto could ever be considered trustworthy. Web-based distribution simply is not, in its current form, a viable model for distributing code that must survive the compromise of the original distributing party. None of the technical (off-server code signing) or social (review of update notices) tools available in non-web distribution methods are available. The damage that you and other projects cause to public awareness and comprehension of crypto issues is potential staggering. When you factor in the real risks people take when relying on crypto to communicate in hostile situations, you're doing more than just making nerds grumpy -- you have the potential to significantly harm people's lives. Crypto is not an amateur's game. Some things are too important to be left to experimentation by unqualified engineers.

smcgregor 13y ago
I don't think CryptoCat has been distributed as a traditional web app for at least a year (probably more). The browser code is distributed as an extension, which does not have the properties you describe. edit for sub-comment: A traditional web app updates every time you hit the URL. In a browser extension your code is not necessarily tied to any remote origin, including the Chrome/Firefox stores. It is a user's choice to automatically receive updates from the vendor and this is the same choice that you make if you use apt-get vs manual download/checksum/sig check/audit.
- teacup50 13y ago
  > The browser code is distributed as an extension, which does not have the properties you describe. Actually, browser extensions have the exact same properties except for being code signed. That's not enough: http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/01/malware-vendors-buy-chrome-extensions-to-send-adware-filled-updates/ http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/01/malware-vendors-buy-... > I don't think CryptoCat has been distributed as a traditional web app for at least a year (probably more). That they ever shipped in-browser crypto demonstrates that they shouldn't be shipping crypto.
  - pilif 13y ago
    Malicious people buying extensions and then malwareing it is as likely or not as malicious people buying the vendor of whatever tool you are using on the desktop once its auto-updating feature is good enough (that would actually be slightly worse, because in the case if the extension you at least get to read what's actually executed). What you are saying is that you don't trust any kind of application to do crypto unless you have previously audited it. That's a reasonable stance to take but it's irrelevant whether you distrust a third-party browser extension or a third-party native app. The main argument against crypto in JS extensions is that getting crypto correct in regards to timing based side-channel attacks is very hard to impossible. But if you are dealing with a specific browser in an extension context, this might be somewhat mitigated which would bring us back to the trust issue, which, again, IMHO is not dependent on the platform you use
    - teacup50 13y ago
      > ... once its auto-updating feature is good enough ... This is why it's a very bad idea to implement silent automatic updates, and why they're the wrong thing to copy from the web.

smcgregor 13y ago

I don't think CryptoCat has been distributed as a traditional web app for at least a year (probably more). The browser code is distributed as an extension, which does not have the properties you describe. edit for sub-comment: A traditional web app updates every time you hit the URL. In a browser extension your code is not necessarily tied to any remote origin, including the Chrome/Firefox stores. It is a user's choice to automatically receive updates from the vendor and this is the same choice that you make if you use apt-get vs manual download/checksum/sig check/audit.

teacup50 13y ago
> The browser code is distributed as an extension, which does not have the properties you describe. Actually, browser extensions have the exact same properties except for being code signed. That's not enough: http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/01/malware-vendors-buy-chrome-extensions-to-send-adware-filled-updates/ http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/01/malware-vendors-buy-... > I don't think CryptoCat has been distributed as a traditional web app for at least a year (probably more). That they ever shipped in-browser crypto demonstrates that they shouldn't be shipping crypto.
- pilif 13y ago
  Malicious people buying extensions and then malwareing it is as likely or not as malicious people buying the vendor of whatever tool you are using on the desktop once its auto-updating feature is good enough (that would actually be slightly worse, because in the case if the extension you at least get to read what's actually executed). What you are saying is that you don't trust any kind of application to do crypto unless you have previously audited it. That's a reasonable stance to take but it's irrelevant whether you distrust a third-party browser extension or a third-party native app. The main argument against crypto in JS extensions is that getting crypto correct in regards to timing based side-channel attacks is very hard to impossible. But if you are dealing with a specific browser in an extension context, this might be somewhat mitigated which would bring us back to the trust issue, which, again, IMHO is not dependent on the platform you use
  - teacup50 13y ago
    > ... once its auto-updating feature is good enough ... This is why it's a very bad idea to implement silent automatic updates, and why they're the wrong thing to copy from the web.