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So who needs, apart from the spies from other countries and TPtacek more precise list of the possibly vulnerable products than the one already here? I don't thi
by acqq 13y ago
So who needs, apart from the spies from other countries and TPtacek more precise list of the possibly vulnerable products than the one already here? I don't think many people see the benefits in making the list more precise. The companies mentioned have all the incentives to remain silent.
- tptacek 13y agoAll things being equal I'd rather know more than less. Remember, I'm not asking how many vendors keep the BSAFE default. I'm asking how many use BSAFE in a way where the RNG matters.
- acqq 13y agoIsn't your company's business to discover the security flaws? I believe the fact that you don't know the details means that there isn't much interest, at least in your part of the world, to fund such a research. There are no incentives for academia to make it too. All that doesn't mean the list doesn't exist, only that there is no economic reason to publish it.
- tptacek 13y agoNo. My company provides an engineering service for vendors to find security flaws in specific pieces of software before (and sometimes after) that software ships. You should think of us as part of the development process. If you gave us a piece of software that used BSAFE, you could reasonably expect detailed mitigation advice on not having a PKRNG exposed in your system. No process in the market compensates us for acquiring a Ricoh printer and digging into its firmware to find how any why it's using BSAFE. It's not an especially interesting research project either. I'm not surprised we don't know which products actually use Dual_EC, and I don't find the fact that we don't particularly telling. I'm saying something different: that I have worked with software that used BSAFE, and it used BSAFE for idiosyncratic reasons that didn't much implicate Dual_EC. I would not, for instance, be at all surprised to find an embedded device that used BSAFE for some goofy thing, but used OpenSSL as its TLS library.
- rdl 13y agoThe only "process in the market" for this kind of work is individuals or companies breaking random things in public to build their reputation as auditors (e.g. homokov), or selling vulns. But as you point out it's only really awesome when you follow the Cryptography Research model: find a new class of attack, develop the countermeasure, package (potentially patent) the countermeasure, then make scary demos of the attack to get responsible parties to buy your countermeasure. In this case the mitigation is so simple ("don't use PKRNG; avoid RSA, Inc. going forward.") that it's not monetizable, so it's really only for reputation points.