3 ms·
That is what they appeared to satisfy then (2006-2009). We know now that if implemented it would allow them almost real-time or even real-time decryption of com
by acqq 13y ago
That is what they appeared to satisfy then (2006-2009). We know now that if implemented it would allow them almost real-time or even real-time decryption of communication of whoever uses it, as we discussed here:
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7503287 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7503287
We also know extended_random_value is actually implemented in RSA's BSAFE library, as the paper http://dualec.org/DualECTLS.pdf http://dualec.org/DualECTLS.pdf shows.
And we know http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/43164/which-products-are-affected-by-nsas-ability-to-crack-pseudo-random-number-gener http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/43164/which-prod...
"the RSA BSAFE library uses Dual_EC_DRBG (...) by default (...)
I can easily find (hint: use your favourite search engine to search for the terms "This product includes" "RSA BSAFE") implementations, oddly skewed towards imaging and gaming devices: surprisingly many printer/copier/fax devices use BSAFE, though for unknown purposes.
Including Ricoh, Minolta, Océ/Canon, Brother, Fuji/Xerox, Epson ...
Your Playstation (PDF), PSP, or your Nintendo DS wifi (PDF)
Software from Adobe, Hitachi, Oracle and HP Some Nokia phones(PDF)"
- tptacek 13y agoWhich of those products do you know to actually be using Dual_EC at all?
- acqq 13y agoAt least, every product which uses defaults of the library? You know, "leave the hard choices to the experts who know more."
- tptacek 13y agoCan we name one of them that uses Dual_EC, and has been shown to do so? I know a little about BSafe, and my impression is that most programs that use it don't use it to get TLS, which their OS already provides. Feel free to correct me if you've got more BSafe experience than I do. This is obviously a rehash of an argument that recurs on HN a lot, but just to be fair to what I'm trying to say here: that argument has (as far as I can tell) never been resolved.
- acqq 13y agoSo who needs, apart from the spies from other countries and TPtacek more precise list of the possibly vulnerable products than the one already here? I don't think many people see the benefits in making the list more precise. The companies mentioned have all the incentives to remain silent.
- tptacek 13y agoAll things being equal I'd rather know more than less. Remember, I'm not asking how many vendors keep the BSAFE default. I'm asking how many use BSAFE in a way where the RNG matters.
- acqq 13y agoIsn't your company's business to discover the security flaws? I believe the fact that you don't know the details means that there isn't much interest, at least in your part of the world, to fund such a research. There are no incentives for academia to make it too. All that doesn't mean the list doesn't exist, only that there is no economic reason to publish it.
- tptacek 13y agoNo. My company provides an engineering service for vendors to find security flaws in specific pieces of software before (and sometimes after) that software ships. You should think of us as part of the development process. If you gave us a piece of software that used BSAFE, you could reasonably expect detailed mitigation advice on not having a PKRNG exposed in your system. No process in the market compensates us for acquiring a Ricoh printer and digging into its firmware to find how any why it's using BSAFE. It's not an especially interesting research project either. I'm not surprised we don't know which products actually use Dual_EC, and I don't find the fact that we don't particularly telling. I'm saying something different: that I have worked with software that used BSAFE, and it used BSAFE for idiosyncratic reasons that didn't much implicate Dual_EC. I would not, for instance, be at all surprised to find an embedded device that used BSAFE for some goofy thing, but used OpenSSL as its TLS library.
- healsjnr1 13y agoThis is almost certainly not true given the fact that ECDRBG is chronically slow (think orders of magnitude). Any developers working on implementations which generate a reasonable amount of random data switch to HMAC very quickly.
- acqq 13y agoSo "it's not true that companies who use default use default because if they use default they will measure the speed and then not use default?" Too much reading Catch 22? In fact, the companies who use default simply use it. Period. And they use default in spite of it being slower than something else.
- healsjnr1 13y agoI think that's a very long bow to draw... Especially seeing as the trouble shooting guide for bsafe libraries has a section dedicated to speeding up the toolkit which advises switching to HMAC. I'm not sure about you, but when I see a chronic change in performance I look into it, and if there is a vendor recommended suggestion, I usually try it. This is particularly true for the Java tools as it is trivial in the extreme to compare the bsafe performance with the standard oracle crypto performance. Basically, as tptacek points out, there is a lot of information we aren't privy to and there is no point assuming every bsafe customer is using ec .
- acqq 13y agoWhen the company uses the default in the product, it uses it. There's nothing "to draw." It's a true statement, not a hypothesis. And it has nothing to do with what you do when you "see a chronic change in performance." If somebody uses something and not something else, there's no "change" at all. Nobody ever claimed "every customer uses Dual_EC." The claim is: there are a lot of famous customers and products using BSAFE and the Dual_EC is the default in BSAFE. Interestingly, Dual_EC can still be negotiated in other implementations too. Poisoning the standards sets leaves some possibilities as long as the dangerous implementations are present.