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See http://learn.agilebits.com/1Password4/Security/keychain-design.html http://learn.agilebits.com/1Password4/Security/keychain-desi... for more information on

by chmars 13y ago

See http://learn.agilebits.com/1Password4/Security/keychain-design.html http://learn.agilebits.com/1Password4/Security/keychain-desi... for more information on the keychain design, in particular: 'Some metadata remains unencrypted: Which folder an item is in; what category (Login, Credit Card, …) an item belongs to; creation time; modify time; and last sync time. The item UUIDs are fully available, which can be used to determine how many attachments, if any, an item has associated with it. The UUID of any folder an item belongs to is unencrypted, and thus an attacker can determine which items are in the same folder.'

Canada 13y ago
Yeah, I saw that, and I believe it to be a poor design decision. They say, "The Agile Keychain kept some information (most notably Location and Title) unencrypted so that these could be used to search for or identify a particular item, while the more sensitive content could remain encrypted." The Windows and OS X clients, as well as the Firefox and Chrome plugins, if not all of their software, doesn't allow this search to occur unless the database is unlocked anyway. So 1Password leaks the list of sites you are storing logins for, in exchange for zero benefit. Users with different logins to the same site will probably put usernames in the titles to differentiate those entries, so 1Password is surely leaking a lot of usernames as well. The design document goes on to say, "the primary threat to 1Password users was thought to be from an attacker stealing the data once and pursuing an off-line attack. It did not anticipate an attacker who could tamper with user data that would be subsequently processed by the legitimate owner." That was a reasonable assumption when the database was stored locally, but is not OK when you store it with an untrustworthy third party such as Dropbox. Their document talks about HMAC, but I get the feeling this is limited to the content of the encrypted fields. Even then, look at files such as "contents". It leaks all kinds of sensitive information. It also concerns me that 1Password data files seem very adhoc. Sometimes JSON, sometimes XML. The clients watch for file changes and re-reads automatically. It potentially exposes the app to malicious databases. If I were assessing these applications I'd start by fuzzing these JSON and XML files.

by chmars 13y ago

Canada 13y ago

Yeah, I saw that, and I believe it to be a poor design decision. They say, "The Agile Keychain kept some information (most notably Location and Title) unencrypted so that these could be used to search for or identify a particular item, while the more sensitive content could remain encrypted." The Windows and OS X clients, as well as the Firefox and Chrome plugins, if not all of their software, doesn't allow this search to occur unless the database is unlocked anyway. So 1Password leaks the list of sites you are storing logins for, in exchange for zero benefit. Users with different logins to the same site will probably put usernames in the titles to differentiate those entries, so 1Password is surely leaking a lot of usernames as well. The design document goes on to say, "the primary threat to 1Password users was thought to be from an attacker stealing the data once and pursuing an off-line attack. It did not anticipate an attacker who could tamper with user data that would be subsequently processed by the legitimate owner." That was a reasonable assumption when the database was stored locally, but is not OK when you store it with an untrustworthy third party such as Dropbox. Their document talks about HMAC, but I get the feeling this is limited to the content of the encrypted fields. Even then, look at files such as "contents". It leaks all kinds of sensitive information. It also concerns me that 1Password data files seem very adhoc. Sometimes JSON, sometimes XML. The clients watch for file changes and re-reads automatically. It potentially exposes the app to malicious databases. If I were assessing these applications I'd start by fuzzing these JSON and XML files.