4 ms·
As Thomas is not sure what I'm "trying to say here that" his "comment doesn't already say," he actually wrote: "All extended_random_value does is add, to the ra
by acqq 13y ago
As Thomas is not sure what I'm "trying to say here that" his "comment doesn't already say," he actually wrote: "All extended_random_value does is add, to the random_bytes value in the TLS handshake, another variable-length blob of random data."
It sounds smallish "just another random-data blob." It's actually huge "up to additional 65365 bytes from the generator added to the default 28" before the encryption even starts.
Thomas also wrote "The ostensible idea behind the extension is that there are protocols that want randomness proportional to key sizes."
The biggest ECC key is 571 bits which fit in just 72 bytes and this thing provides up to 65535 bytes. Again, fully different impression. I quoted the draft to show the actual number. The numbers matter here. Hadn't I looked at the draft directly, I'd get the fully different impression only reading Thomas' comment.
- tptacek 13y agoI think you're missing the part where people can make credible arguments that twenty eight bytes of random state (the protocol as standardized) is already a problem. The difference between 10 and 60,000 extra bytes seems to make a big difference to you, and, fair enough I guess, but the underlying problem isn't the size of the random state. Read the Dual_EC exploit paper that just came out; the authors used minimal compute resources and standard TLS to exploit a model Dual_EC problem.
- acqq 13y agoAbout that (even a little more over 28 bytes makes the big change) we can agree: The paper http://dualec.org/DualECTLS.pdf http://dualec.org/DualECTLS.pdf shows that exploiting Dual EC takes hours (without additional bytes), but that RSA (intentionally or unintentionally) managed to adjust the BSAFE C implementation to enable especially easy exploits: in seconds vs more than an hour on the 16-CPU AMD cluster for other implementations (Table 1 in the PDF). The reason: "due to the use of the requested number of bytes rather than the number of remaining bytes after pulling from the cache, the concatenation of the 32-byte session ID and the 28 pseudorandom bytes in the server random always contains a full 30-byte output block and between one and 30 bytes of a subsequent block." So the 28 default bytes take hours, just adjusting that a little to push always continuous 58 bytes from the PRNG resulted in reducing the exploit time to seconds. The small number of bytes more, the big difference. Paper's conclusion: "Our analysis strongly suggests that, from an attacker's perspective, backdooring a PRNG should be combined not merely with influencing implementations to use the PRNG but also with influencing other details that secretly improve the exploitability of the PRNG." This is exactly why having the "extended_random_value" too was so convenient to the NSA.
- tptacek 13y agoThat's offline time, isn't it? In other words: the numbers we're talking about are based on the computing resources available to these researchers. It's not as if not having extended_random_value or OpaquePRF means the NSA needs to monitor many many TLS connections, right?
- acqq 13y agoTo me it looks that the "just seconds" on the off-the-shelf hardware means that creating the custom chip can allow for a large-scale real-time online decryption of "many many" connections. And even if such a chip is not feasible, additional bytes do make attack much more scalable and reduce the possible response times significantly.
- tptacek 13y agoMaybe we're talking past each other. I'm saying, there are different kinds of complexities in implementing attacks on TLS. The first, most obvious kind is what this paper is talking about: the amount of raw compute it takes to break whatever part of the protocol you're targeting. When this paper says it takes minutes (or seconds) to reverse model Dual_EC, they're referring to the amount of time it takes to work out the current state of the RNG from the partial state disclosed in the TLS handshake. Another complexity is the kind we saw in the RC4 attacks, where you're exploiting a statistical bias recurring over many connections. It doesn't matter how fast your computer is, because the attack requires your victim to make large numbers of related requests to the target system. That's the "many many" I'm referring to. A TLS handshake change that took NSA from needing 2 million connections down to 1 connection would be extremely bad. For full context, another complexity is the nature of the TLS connections we're talking about. The RC4 attacks we've seen depended on the BEAST attack model, where attackers could predetermine which connections the victim made (owing to the control HTML/JS gave them); that attack is much more difficult to carry out over other application protocols. So, similarly to the point I just made above, it would also be very bad if a protocol extension took an attack that only worked in the BEAST model and made it work in (say) the SMTP STARTTLS model. Just to be clear: with Dual_EC, we're already in the worst-case scenario with or without TLS extensions. If a group of researchers with a straightforward hardware setup can reverse the RNG state in an hour, it's reasonable to assume that NSA (if it cares about this attack, and I think it does) can do it in real time.
- tptacek 13y agoIncidentally, here are the original requirements that these drafts were intended to satisfy: In a number of United States Government applications, it is desirable to have some material with the following properties: 1. It is contributed both by client and server. 2. It is arbitrary-length. 3. It is mixed into the eventual keying material. 4. It is structured and decodable by the receiving party. (Amusingly, this comment got downvoted.)
- acqq 13y agoThat is what they appeared to satisfy then (2006-2009). We know now that if implemented it would allow them almost real-time or even real-time decryption of communication of whoever uses it, as we discussed here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7503287 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7503287 We also know extended_random_value is actually implemented in RSA's BSAFE library, as the paper http://dualec.org/DualECTLS.pdf http://dualec.org/DualECTLS.pdf shows. And we know http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/43164/which-products-are-affected-by-nsas-ability-to-crack-pseudo-random-number-gener http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/43164/which-prod... "the RSA BSAFE library uses Dual_EC_DRBG (...) by default (...) I can easily find (hint: use your favourite search engine to search for the terms "This product includes" "RSA BSAFE") implementations, oddly skewed towards imaging and gaming devices: surprisingly many printer/copier/fax devices use BSAFE, though for unknown purposes. Including Ricoh, Minolta, Océ/Canon, Brother, Fuji/Xerox, Epson ... Your Playstation (PDF), PSP, or your Nintendo DS wifi (PDF) Software from Adobe, Hitachi, Oracle and HP Some Nokia phones(PDF)"