4 ms·
The actual analysis is available here: http://dualec.org/ http://dualec.org/ I don't see much cryptographically new here; authors stretched what is a simple at
by pbsd 13y ago
The actual analysis is available here: http://dualec.org/ http://dualec.org/
I don't see much cryptographically new here; authors stretched what is a simple attack into 17 pages, and noticed that some non-standard TLS extensions that increase the amount of random data on wire make the attack easier.
- mcphilip 13y agoOne of the authors of that duealec paper had this to say [1]: >Our results <dualec.org> say nothing about whether NIST, the NSA, or anyone else inserted a backdoor into dual ec. Instead, they say that if you know the relationship between P and Q, then some TLS implementations can be broken at a given cost. The precise results are more nuanced than that. You can read the website for a summary or the paper for the details. [1]http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg11730.html http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg11730.ht...
- acqq 13y agoMaybe not cryptographically, but it is definitely news and looks relevant for practical security engineering: they demonstate that the RSA BSAFE implementation in C was especially easy to be attacked compared to the other implementations: in seconds vs in hours, even without the newsworthy "extended_random_value."