> Church-Turing Thesis all over again I've heard it referred to as the Church–Turing–Deutsch principle [1], since Deutsch talked about the physical version of

> Church-Turing Thesis all over again I've heard it referred to as the Church–Turing–Deutsch principle [1], since Deutsch talked about the physical version of it. I think it's interesting that the assumption that nature is computable comes so naturally, even though as far as I can tell it's entirely unclear whether it is or not. In particular, Deutsch points out that if the universe needs reals that includes a whole bunch of noncomputable numbers, and in fact our favorite model of physics for a significant chunk of history ('classical physics') did require reals and so was noncomputable. I also tend to assume that nature is computable, but I don't think these assertions have really "held up for a damn long time". As well as the fact that we managed with not much of a model followed by a noncomputable one for most of history, it seems to me that there might be a bias towards finding computable models over noncomputable models, which makes any reasoning based on observing that we've found a bunch of computable models suspect. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church-Turing-Deutsch_principle https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church-Turing-Deutsch_principl...