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But will it be the "same person"? Does cold-starting from the same neural network give you the same consciousness or a copy? Does consciousness require some for

But will it be the "same person"? Does cold-starting from the same neural network give you the same consciousness or a copy? Does consciousness require some form of continuity that's lost if you lower neural activity beyond a certain level?

bermanoid 13y ago
If you could accurately enough define all of the terms in your questions to the point that any imaginable evidence would answer them, I might be interested in the answers. Unfortunately there don't exist definitions that concrete yet, which means that you haven't even asked a real question. That's why you're being downvoted.
- dalek_cannes 13y ago
  That's quite understandable. But this is a question that's going to have to be answered at some point in the future, especially for legal reasons. I'm sure someone's already asked it with regards to cryogenics. I would personally prefer the procedure to death, but if it becomes widespread enough to be used for life extension, I'm not really sure.
invalidOrTaken 13y ago
I don't know why this was downvoted. While fanciful and far-ranging, it was asked in good faith.
jnbiche 13y ago
Who is downvoting all these comments made in good faith? The same thing is happening in other posts on the front page, and elsewhere on this page. If you downvoted this, you need to go review the HN guidelines [1] and Paul's recent comments on what makes an ideal HN comment [2]. Downvoting is not something you do for a comment you mildly disagree with -- it should be reserved for posts that explicitly violate community standards. This is not one of them, regardless of whether or not you or I agree with the particular sentiment. 1. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7445761 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7445761 2. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7445761 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7445761
- ethanhunt_ 13y ago
  I wonder if changing the downvote button to a "flag" link would be more appropriate for how the button is intended to be used.
  - weirdcat 13y ago
    This would make a lot of sense. Flagging clearly says "this comment is not appropriate on this site", while downvoting usually means simply "I don't agree with this comment".
    - eps 13y ago
      Downvoting also means "this comment should be this high", however the problem is that there's o indication when a comment is at score of 1, so people would inadvertently push it into gray area.
  - jnbiche 13y ago
    I don't think that's a bad idea. However, anyone who has been around here long enough to accumulate 1000 karma (or whatever it is now) should know better than to downvote anodyne comments with which one mildly disagrees. I think people are getting emotional about certain subjects and lashing out by downvoting any comments that provoke rational discussion on those subjects. In other words, downvoting exactly the kind of comments pg is trying to foster in HN.
  - joshuacc 13y ago
    There is already a "flag" link available to those with sufficient karma.
- davorak 13y ago
  I do not think it is that straight forward. > But will it be the "same person"? Does cold-starting from the same neural network give you the same consciousness or a copy? Does consciousness require some form of continuity that's lost if you lower neural activity beyond a certain level? The sense in which consciousness is used in the comment does not have a commonly held definition to my knowledge. I would be surprised if the poster is using a personal rigorous definition of consciousness in the comment. I have not see a rigorous well defined definition of consciousness when paired with any question along the lines of "But will it be the same person? I would say it could fall into: "Please avoid introducing classic flamewar topics unless you have something genuinely new to say about them." in the commenting guidelines: http://ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html http://ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html Though it is more of classic for using ill defined words and concepts that people nonetheless hold near and dear. Though think it is a good police to only down vote a comment like that if the full conversation by the poster continued to use ill defined concepts rather then refining them through out the conversation.
dalek_cannes 13y ago
Perhaps I did not phrase this question properly, hence the downvotes. Let me retry: Consider a situation perhaps 5-10 years from now when this procedure is widespread. A critically wounded person has two treatment options: the best is this procedure followed by repairs. Second best is traditional surgery, which carries some risk. If the person is unconscious and cannot give consent, are we going to treat this as just another procedure? In which case the doctor can make the decision. I ask because humans tend to identify themselves with an area localized somewhere in the space behind their heads. The do not identify themselves with exact mental replicas of themselves. This has never been a problem in history because such replicas do not occur in nature and we never had the technology to create them. But this procedure may -- I repeat may -- produce a virtual replica of sorts by putting a pause in between brain activity. Like I said, people have already asked this about cryogenics, but no cryogenically frozen person has ever been reanimated. This procedure, however, is viable.
- jnbiche 13y ago
  Actually, this type of procedure done succesfully would strongly imply that there is something beyond simple neuronal activity that comprises a person's "selfhood". Dr.Sam Parnia, the resuscitationist mentioned elsewhere in this thread, has some thoughts on this: http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/apr/06/sam-parnia-resurrection-lazarus-effect http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/apr/06/sam-parnia-re...
  - throwaway5752 13y ago
    There's nothing in this article or the one you linked to that suggests consciousness is anything but the product of biochemical activity in the brain. I'm sincerely curious how you think that's the case. edit: i use 'neuronal' and 'biochemical' interchangeably in this context, because I don't see a sharp distinction. I read the whole article, but I missed the quote you excerpted. I am boggled by it. Systemic death means nothing if neurons don't die (apoptosis) and the brain remains structurally intact - it's structural and chemical properties of neurons that determine self, and if those are preserved then it's fairly shallow notion of death. I mean, what does he say about people that suffer strokes or TBI and are completely changed by it, even though they never were clinically dead? Sorry if I misinterpreted you, but you utilized the passive voice in a way that made it seem like you were strongly implying it. edit: you may be unaware of the enormous structural complexity of the brain (see purkinje cells) and the fact that sensitivity to input can result in structural changes (synaptic plasticity). It's the graph structure of the billions of neurons and hundreds of trillions of connections combined with the structural changes at those connections that effect their sensitivity to neurotrasmitters - not the series of impulses at any point in time - that encodes self.
colin_mccabe 13y ago
The brain stores information in physical ways that don't get lost just because neural activity ceases for a while. One way is in the physical layout of the brain (what neurons are connected to what) which changes over time. Another is epigenetic changes in the genes of the neurons themselves which alter their behavior. The brain isn't a CPU or an artificial neural network where you turn off the power and lose all the state. We've already known for a long time that people's EEGs can flatline without wiping out their memories and personalities, so this isn't exactly new information. But it is nice to see more confirmation that the brain is storing state in a different way.
- andyjohnson0 13y ago
  "Another is epigenetic changes in the genes of the neurons themselves which alter their behavior." Fascinating. I wasn't aware that epigenetics had a role in memory formation - I think I assumed it all happened at the electrochemical level. I found some information at [1] but its fairly impenetrable for a non-specialist. Anyway, thanks! [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epigenetics_in_learning_and_memory http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epigenetics_in_learning_and_mem...
olalonde 13y ago
By definition, there's no way we could possibly know, even by experiencing it ourself (assuming the "copy" is indistinguishable from the original).
baddox 13y ago
That is an interesting philosophical question, but it's mostly semantic. I would say that it's the "same person" just as much as you remain the same person as the cells and atoms making up your body are still you as they move through time.
collyw 13y ago
>Does cold-starting from the same neural network give you the same consciousness or a copy? You are making a rather big assumption that consciousness comes about because of brain activity. As far as I am aware this has not been scientifically proven. (I am not denying a relationship between the two).
- malka 13y ago
  given that consciousness is inherently subjective (I cannot assert that you or any other human being has a consciousness /lives a subjective experience.), I have doubts that the scientific method will be appliable someday to such a field.
  - collyw 13y ago
    Buddhists write a lot more logically than scientists on the subject. As they point out, "you can not observe an experience", and science relies on observing subjects.
    - omarchowdhury 13y ago
      When did Buddhists say "you can not observe an experience"?
      - collyw 13y ago
        Something the Dali Lama talks about in the book "The Art of Happiness". Or has science come up with a way to observe that now?
smegel 13y ago
The network is chemical, not electrical, so why would a freeze/thaw change anything? (unless it actually did have some chemical reaction, which hopefully wont happen).
noonespecial 13y ago
That seems as silly as asking if when I reboot my computer is it has the "same" data or a copy. The bit pattern is the bit pattern. Another way to think about it might be "how would the 'copy' know its a copy? If it doesn't, does it even matter?
6d0debc071 13y ago
It seems like a worthwhile gamble either way. If my consciousness dies, then the last function of my life would be giving my family and friends someone who would still love them and take care of them, and, in a way, it would be giving birth to a new life. It's something I'd want them to have even if I weren't there. And if my consciousness lives, so much the better.
Houshalter 13y ago
Would it matter if it was a "copy"? Whatever that even means when we are talking about the same brain. It's certainly the same person with the same memories and everything. I don't see why going unconscious would change that.
mikeash 13y ago
Before we discuss the continuity of consciousness after suspending brain activity like this, I think we should first demonstrate continuity of consciousness from one moment to the next. Are you the "same person" you were one second ago? We all think we are, but there's no proof. The continuity we experience could merely be an artifact of memory, and not real. Me-in-one-second might not share consciousness with me-now. It seems to be jumping the gun a great deal to try to establish this for exceptional circumstances before we establish it for the common everyday one.

bermanoid 13y ago

If you could accurately enough define all of the terms in your questions to the point that any imaginable evidence would answer them, I might be interested in the answers. Unfortunately there don't exist definitions that concrete yet, which means that you haven't even asked a real question. That's why you're being downvoted.

dalek_cannes 13y ago
That's quite understandable. But this is a question that's going to have to be answered at some point in the future, especially for legal reasons. I'm sure someone's already asked it with regards to cryogenics. I would personally prefer the procedure to death, but if it becomes widespread enough to be used for life extension, I'm not really sure.

invalidOrTaken 13y ago

I don't know why this was downvoted. While fanciful and far-ranging, it was asked in good faith.

jnbiche 13y ago

Who is downvoting all these comments made in good faith? The same thing is happening in other posts on the front page, and elsewhere on this page. If you downvoted this, you need to go review the HN guidelines [1] and Paul's recent comments on what makes an ideal HN comment [2]. Downvoting is not something you do for a comment you mildly disagree with -- it should be reserved for posts that explicitly violate community standards. This is not one of them, regardless of whether or not you or I agree with the particular sentiment. 1. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7445761 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7445761 2. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7445761 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7445761

ethanhunt_ 13y ago
I wonder if changing the downvote button to a "flag" link would be more appropriate for how the button is intended to be used.
- weirdcat 13y ago
  This would make a lot of sense. Flagging clearly says "this comment is not appropriate on this site", while downvoting usually means simply "I don't agree with this comment".
  - eps 13y ago
    Downvoting also means "this comment should be this high", however the problem is that there's o indication when a comment is at score of 1, so people would inadvertently push it into gray area.
- jnbiche 13y ago
  I don't think that's a bad idea. However, anyone who has been around here long enough to accumulate 1000 karma (or whatever it is now) should know better than to downvote anodyne comments with which one mildly disagrees. I think people are getting emotional about certain subjects and lashing out by downvoting any comments that provoke rational discussion on those subjects. In other words, downvoting exactly the kind of comments pg is trying to foster in HN.
- joshuacc 13y ago
  There is already a "flag" link available to those with sufficient karma.
davorak 13y ago
I do not think it is that straight forward. > But will it be the "same person"? Does cold-starting from the same neural network give you the same consciousness or a copy? Does consciousness require some form of continuity that's lost if you lower neural activity beyond a certain level? The sense in which consciousness is used in the comment does not have a commonly held definition to my knowledge. I would be surprised if the poster is using a personal rigorous definition of consciousness in the comment. I have not see a rigorous well defined definition of consciousness when paired with any question along the lines of "But will it be the same person? I would say it could fall into: "Please avoid introducing classic flamewar topics unless you have something genuinely new to say about them." in the commenting guidelines: http://ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html http://ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html Though it is more of classic for using ill defined words and concepts that people nonetheless hold near and dear. Though think it is a good police to only down vote a comment like that if the full conversation by the poster continued to use ill defined concepts rather then refining them through out the conversation.

dalek_cannes 13y ago

Perhaps I did not phrase this question properly, hence the downvotes. Let me retry: Consider a situation perhaps 5-10 years from now when this procedure is widespread. A critically wounded person has two treatment options: the best is this procedure followed by repairs. Second best is traditional surgery, which carries some risk. If the person is unconscious and cannot give consent, are we going to treat this as just another procedure? In which case the doctor can make the decision. I ask because humans tend to identify themselves with an area localized somewhere in the space behind their heads. The do not identify themselves with exact mental replicas of themselves. This has never been a problem in history because such replicas do not occur in nature and we never had the technology to create them. But this procedure may -- I repeat may -- produce a virtual replica of sorts by putting a pause in between brain activity. Like I said, people have already asked this about cryogenics, but no cryogenically frozen person has ever been reanimated. This procedure, however, is viable.

jnbiche 13y ago
Actually, this type of procedure done succesfully would strongly imply that there is something beyond simple neuronal activity that comprises a person's "selfhood". Dr.Sam Parnia, the resuscitationist mentioned elsewhere in this thread, has some thoughts on this: http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/apr/06/sam-parnia-resurrection-lazarus-effect http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/apr/06/sam-parnia-re...
- throwaway5752 13y ago
  There's nothing in this article or the one you linked to that suggests consciousness is anything but the product of biochemical activity in the brain. I'm sincerely curious how you think that's the case. edit: i use 'neuronal' and 'biochemical' interchangeably in this context, because I don't see a sharp distinction. I read the whole article, but I missed the quote you excerpted. I am boggled by it. Systemic death means nothing if neurons don't die (apoptosis) and the brain remains structurally intact - it's structural and chemical properties of neurons that determine self, and if those are preserved then it's fairly shallow notion of death. I mean, what does he say about people that suffer strokes or TBI and are completely changed by it, even though they never were clinically dead? Sorry if I misinterpreted you, but you utilized the passive voice in a way that made it seem like you were strongly implying it. edit: you may be unaware of the enormous structural complexity of the brain (see purkinje cells) and the fact that sensitivity to input can result in structural changes (synaptic plasticity). It's the graph structure of the billions of neurons and hundreds of trillions of connections combined with the structural changes at those connections that effect their sensitivity to neurotrasmitters - not the series of impulses at any point in time - that encodes self.

colin_mccabe 13y ago

The brain stores information in physical ways that don't get lost just because neural activity ceases for a while. One way is in the physical layout of the brain (what neurons are connected to what) which changes over time. Another is epigenetic changes in the genes of the neurons themselves which alter their behavior. The brain isn't a CPU or an artificial neural network where you turn off the power and lose all the state. We've already known for a long time that people's EEGs can flatline without wiping out their memories and personalities, so this isn't exactly new information. But it is nice to see more confirmation that the brain is storing state in a different way.

andyjohnson0 13y ago
"Another is epigenetic changes in the genes of the neurons themselves which alter their behavior." Fascinating. I wasn't aware that epigenetics had a role in memory formation - I think I assumed it all happened at the electrochemical level. I found some information at [1] but its fairly impenetrable for a non-specialist. Anyway, thanks! [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epigenetics_in_learning_and_memory http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epigenetics_in_learning_and_mem...

olalonde 13y ago

By definition, there's no way we could possibly know, even by experiencing it ourself (assuming the "copy" is indistinguishable from the original).

baddox 13y ago

That is an interesting philosophical question, but it's mostly semantic. I would say that it's the "same person" just as much as you remain the same person as the cells and atoms making up your body are still you as they move through time.

collyw 13y ago

>Does cold-starting from the same neural network give you the same consciousness or a copy? You are making a rather big assumption that consciousness comes about because of brain activity. As far as I am aware this has not been scientifically proven. (I am not denying a relationship between the two).

malka 13y ago
given that consciousness is inherently subjective (I cannot assert that you or any other human being has a consciousness /lives a subjective experience.), I have doubts that the scientific method will be appliable someday to such a field.
- collyw 13y ago
  Buddhists write a lot more logically than scientists on the subject. As they point out, "you can not observe an experience", and science relies on observing subjects.
  - omarchowdhury 13y ago
    When did Buddhists say "you can not observe an experience"?
    - collyw 13y ago
      Something the Dali Lama talks about in the book "The Art of Happiness". Or has science come up with a way to observe that now?

smegel 13y ago

The network is chemical, not electrical, so why would a freeze/thaw change anything? (unless it actually did have some chemical reaction, which hopefully wont happen).

noonespecial 13y ago

That seems as silly as asking if when I reboot my computer is it has the "same" data or a copy. The bit pattern is the bit pattern. Another way to think about it might be "how would the 'copy' know its a copy? If it doesn't, does it even matter?

6d0debc071 13y ago

It seems like a worthwhile gamble either way. If my consciousness dies, then the last function of my life would be giving my family and friends someone who would still love them and take care of them, and, in a way, it would be giving birth to a new life. It's something I'd want them to have even if I weren't there. And if my consciousness lives, so much the better.

Houshalter 13y ago

Would it matter if it was a "copy"? Whatever that even means when we are talking about the same brain. It's certainly the same person with the same memories and everything. I don't see why going unconscious would change that.

mikeash 13y ago

Before we discuss the continuity of consciousness after suspending brain activity like this, I think we should first demonstrate continuity of consciousness from one moment to the next. Are you the "same person" you were one second ago? We all think we are, but there's no proof. The continuity we experience could merely be an artifact of memory, and not real. Me-in-one-second might not share consciousness with me-now. It seems to be jumping the gun a great deal to try to establish this for exceptional circumstances before we establish it for the common everyday one.