5 ms·
It doesn't help me to know that an anonymous person had tipped an anonymous vendor. That doesn't add much value. However, it would be sufficient if I could so
by ap22213 13y ago
It doesn't help me to know that an anonymous person had tipped an anonymous vendor. That doesn't add much value.
However, it would be sufficient if I could somehow determine that someone that I knew had tipped the vendor.
Of course, I don't want my friends to see that I had tipped someone, or all of those of whom I have tipped. I just want it to be possible that they can see my tip, within an aggregate poll, only if and when dealing with that vendor.
- hendzen 13y agoPerfect application for a cryptographic one way accumulator. See section 5.2 of http://www.cs.stevens.edu/~mdemare/pubs/owa.pdf http://www.cs.stevens.edu/~mdemare/pubs/owa.pdf
- runeks 13y ago> It's not important for me to know that an anonymous person tipped an anonymous vendor. That doesn't add much value. Allow me to disagree (with the last sentence). If you can see that a certain vendor has spent a total of, say, 100 BTC on fees, to build up a reputation, then it doesn't make financial sense for that person to try to scam you in a 1 BTC transaction.
- ap22213 13y agoMaybe. But, doesn't it make sense for a vendor to spend 100 BTC in fees to build a reputation so that they may scam 1,000 people in 1 BTC transactions?
- runeks 13y agoYes, it does. Which is why you have to have the trust factor incorporate the transaction volume for each vendor (calculated based on how much they've paid in fees). Scamming 1,000 people for 1 BTC would require having 1,000 open orders for 1 BTC each at the same time. If a vendor who has paid 100 BTC in fees has over one hundred 1 BTC pending orders, you'd probably be wise to stay away. And the software can guide you in making this decision.