Don't just vote me down. Give reasons. Critique my arguments. Critique Searle and Nagle, whom I cite. (You have to have read their corpus first.)
Voting my comment down without giving any reason or justification proves my original point that nobody can stomach the actual evidence that I have raised, and which Searle and Nagle have also raised.
You are not yet ready for the Kuhnian revolution in AI which must eventually take place, and you will be on the wrong side of it.
I didn't downvote you (I am not much of a downvoter), but frankly, your comment (the first one) is exactly the sort of thing that can be legitimately downvoted as "not contributing to the discussion". You launched into a vehement philosophical critique that can't possibly be hashed out in a comment thread. Do you want people to start posting 20-page book reviews right here and now? And nothing you said is particulary earth-shatteringly new to anyone. It's just that none of us - not me, certainly - is going to solve or prove unsolvable the secret of consciousness in a HN comment.
You're the outsider opinion here and must present strong evidence. There is no good evidence for dualism, everything we've learned about the brain is completely consistent with materialism.
You must build a stronger case than Searle and Nagel which have been previously thoroughly debunked.
And to your overall point: To claim that we're wasting money on AI in a world we'll have self-driving cars in a few years is ridiculous. I'm surprised your main comment still seems to have a positive number of votes.
What you wish to discuss is philosophical, rather than scientific in nature (for the time being), and there is nothing that can be said in the span of an HN comment that can substantially change anybody's mind, one way or the other.
The Ph.D. degree is all about philosophy, no matter what field it is in.
There is nothing which is scientific (dealing with knowledge in general, according to the Latin roots of the word), which is not also philosophical (dealing with the love of wisdom, according to the Greek roots of the word).
You are correct that I cannot change anybody's mind, one way or the other. I was only hoping to plant seeds.
But there are some things which are philosophical, yet not scientific, which was what I was alluding to. My experience is that these purely philosophical discussions tend to churn over the same issues repetitively without any resolution - because there is no clear way to reach one, unlike there is with science.
In fact, philosophers write whole books addressing each others arguments without much in the way of changing each others' minds. This highly disincentivizes me from attempting to discuss them, at least in a forum like this one.
> But there are some things which are philosophical, yet not scientific
I think you are wrong here as well.
There is an entire branch of philosophy dedicated to the study of what we (can) know, and how we know it: epistemology.
Some philosophers get things wrong, just like some people get their mathematical sums wrong, and some scientists follow incorrect hypotheses for many years. But that is not a valid excuse for neglecting to search for the Truth, or failing to arrive at Truth.
Indeed, the entire aim of all of science is to arrive at Truth.
> because there is no clear way to reach one
The laws of logic are very clear, even though most people do not follow them most of the time. You cannot even think properly without obeying the laws of logic. http://En.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_thought http://En.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_thought (And sadly, indeed, many people do not think properly.)
Epistemology itself is an example of a branch of philosophy that is basically unscientific. That doesn't mean it's of no worth, or anything of the sort. It just means that it makes no falsifiable predictions. This is typical of philosophy - things that are scientific end up outside the purview of philosophical argument, as a scientist can just test it at that point. All that remains in philosophy are thus the unanswered, and possibly unanswerable questions.
> The laws of logic are very clear
Clear logical laws do not imply that truth can always be reached by application of it. Differing (and untestable) premises are also problematic: see all the opposing schools of thought in various branches of philosophy.
Putting aside all philosophical questions, I do want to dispute that we're wasting money on AI. Even if you believe human-level artificial intelligence is not achievable with computers, you can't deny that AI so far has already paid huge dividends, and will continue to pay off even more in the future. Examples abound, such as self-driving cars, medical diagnosis, and automating more and more forms of busy-work that humans currently have to do. So I don't really see how it's a waste at all.
It is obviously not a waste when we use computers to do syntax. Chess-playing computers can now beat the best international grandmasters; this is an example of computers doing syntax.
For every task which is syntax only, it is a fantastic idea to make computers do the work, and relieve humans from the drudgery. I'm all in favor of that.
But for any task which requires semantics -- real human intelligence -- it is foolish to attempt to replace humans. It cannot be done.
What is required is the wisdom to know the difference between the two.
> But for any task which requires semantics -- real human intelligence -- it is foolish to attempt to replace humans. It cannot be done.
Well we don't know this for sure, do we? "It's an open empirical question whether there are actual deterministic physical processes that, in the long run, elude simulation by a Turing machine; furthermore, ... it is an open empirical question whether any such processes are involved in the working of the human brain." [1]
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis#Philosophical_implications http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis#Ph...
If you accept materialism as true, then by the Church-Turing hypothesis it is a necessary and foregone conclusion that computers will achieve full human intelligence, and even more, because they do not get tired and are not distracted.
But the hypothesis of materialism is what is in question here, both by my citation of the difference between syntax and semantics, and the obvious (to anybody who understands what a computer is and does) conclusion that computers do only syntax, while humans clearly do semantics also, and also by Searle's and Nagle's work.
I think that the evidence (which most people want to deny) is very clear that materialism is false. Most people deal with this evidence by ignoring it, or by denying it exists in the first place. They never address it.
You can prove me wrong. You can prove that materialism is correct. Just produce a real AI which is every bit as intelligent and capable as a human. Produce an AI which can really do semantics. Produce an AI which clearly convinces everybody that it is really intelligent in the way humans are, without any parlor tricks (like modelling an idiot savant).
It is much harder to prove that materialism is false, but that is what Nagle has done in his recent book. Have you read it? If he has not convinced you, please critique his arguments.
http://discovermagazine.com/2011/nov/12-out-there-mysterious-fifth-force-atoms-galaxies http://discovermagazine.com/2011/nov/12-out-there-mysterious...
> We know a lot about the physics of the macroscopic world, but can we be sure that we aren’t missing one of those crucial ingredients? The answer is yes: In certain well-defined cases, we can be very sure. [...] And while there may be unknown forces waiting to be discovered, we can say with great confidence that such forces must be so feeble that only a professional physicist like me would really care.
Not only the _detectable_ universe is entirely made of matter and energy (which is not a hypothesis: it's a tautology, if you think about it), but there isn't a single shred of evidence that our brain employs anything beyond chemicals and mundane electromagnetic forces.
"Kuhnian revolution" happens when the evidences mount up to the point the old paradigm cannot explain them away without great contortion. What we have here instead is a very confused semantic hair-splitting (no pun intended) about whether computers can do "semantics".
The modern materialistic science is supported by vast evidence and very alive and well, thank you very much.
Read, and then critique, Nagle's recent book:
http://www.Amazon.com/Mind-Cosmos-Materialist-Neo-Darwinian-Conception/dp/0199919755 http://www.Amazon.com/Mind-Cosmos-Materialist-Neo-Darwinian-...
Please come back and post your response here, or start a new Hacker-News story.
I applaud your clever replacement of the now trite "paradigm shift" with "Kuhnian".
I haven't read the latest from Nagel so can't speak to that, but Searle's arguments work against only the most simplistic approaches to symbolic AI (which is no longer a very common framework) and his continued willful misunderstanding of how people in the field tend to think about cognition betray a lot of essentialism on the topic. Searle's attacks may stand against a naive form of functionalism but no one cares that "Watson doesn't know it won".
Added:
I think non-materialist thinking hasn't caught on in most fields of scientific endeavors because holding non-materialistic views in no way advances those occupations. It isn't the funding, it's that no one has come up with a way that having dualistic approaches lets you generate better testable hypotheses! If they did, the funding would come.
I'm not sure if you're trolling, I'm mostly responding because your comment is just on the edge of being reasonable.
> but no one cares that "Watson doesn't know it won".
I care, especially that Watson doesn't know when it lost or learn from its mistakes, because it doesn't actually understand anything. Watson's fragile intelligence relies on the programmers tweaking its algorithms for every particular subject. It's a glorified search engine, as opposed to a true advance in general AI.
I doubt parent meant that literally. It was probably more a catchy way of saying "we don't care what happens in the Chinese room". Of course IBM Watson, specifically, doesn't exhibit human level intelligence.
Yes, the classic definition of "general AI" is "whatever computers can't do". That is definition is thoroughly out of fashion now.
Searle's whole Chinese Room argument is based on the notion that a Turing-test-passable system for processing Chinese input and responding with syntactically correct Chinese output can be engineered, but the man inside the room won't know what he's doing. This is flawed in two ways.
First, it assumes the man in the room can't learn anything about the system he's manipulating and eventually draw inferences about its grammar, which I think is bogus. Now true, you could sit in the box for a long time and not learn how to speak Chinese because you haven't learned the sounds that are associated with various Chinese characters. But eventually, after sufficient practice, you'd be able to read and write Chinese effectively, and I argue that you'd be able to derive the semantics by inference. I am arguing this on general principle, though having spent some time studying Chinese from books but not speaking much of it, I'm going to throw in 2 cents worth of empirical experience as well.
The other objection is a deeper one, made via a reductio ad absurdum; if a person can't learn Chinese this way, does an English speaker really understand English? Sure, s/he has all the appearance of comprehension and can conduct a conversation in person or via the written word, but how do we know the person isn't just mindlessly manipulating a set of rules that has been internalized since youth? Indeed, given the lack of critical thinking some people exhibit, there might even be some truth to this! but this is the heart of the problem - there's nothing about the Chinese Room argument that can't be restated as an English Room argument and used to deny the sentience of a native English speaker. And now we've come right back to Cartesian arguments about whether there is some particular seat of consciousness within the brain, some part that is more vital than others and which comprises the brain's 'driver's seat' - whether that's the pineal gland (Descartes), the corpus callosum, the anterior hippocampal gyrus (Jaynes) or what-have-you.
Putting this in the context of thermostatic beliefs, I see Searle's point about the thermostat not really believing anything...but then if I believe 'it is too hot/cold in here' am I having a real belief or is this just a convenient abstraction of my aggregate levels of cellular ATP and physical work levels to keep my body functioning, making my brain little more than the thermostat for my organs which is where 'the real action' of consciousness is taking place.
Essentially, I'm abstracting Doug Hofstadter's elaborate refutation of Searle on Godel Escher Bach; I'm with Hofstadter and Dennett in being a materialist proponent of strong AI, and think Searle's argument is isomorphic to the 'god of the gaps' argument made by intelligent design proponents.
I haven't read Nagel's new book yet, and I'll give it a whirl, but since these arguments are essentially philosophical rather than empirical I don't anticipate any sudden conversions. In turn, I think you ought to try Julian Jaynes' Origin of Consciousness in the Brakdown of the Bicameral Mind.
On the thermostat, I get the impression McCarthy was being a bit obtuse just to goad Searle a little. What he was illustrating is that simple systems can exhibit apparent intentionality while remaining simple. A steam governor or a thermostat are great examples. Living creatures, like the Aplysia californica snail studied by Eric Kandel, make use of analogously pretty damn simple mechanisms for reasonably sophisticated behaviour. Following this line of research, we've created remarkably effective systems like the 'syntax-only' Google Translate system, and IBM's Watson.
The questions posed by Nagel and Searle are interesting ones. Qualia is really difficult to account for - it makes sense for a materialistic system to have 'distinct placeholders' for different experiences, but why should they 'feel like' anything? Precisely because they propose a non-materialistic solution, they're difficult ones to explore - and so it's not really surprising that their own attempt to illustrate their perspective haven't been that convincing to materialists. The Chinese Room thought experiment is only convincing if you start out assuming the only thing that can 'think' is the person doing the card shuffling, which begs the question. See Hofstadter's Metamagical Themas for a good exploration of the argument.
If you're interested in sophisticated explanations of conscious experience and semantics from a materialist's perspective, Hofstadter and Sander's 'Surfaces and Essences' and Minsky's 'Society of Mind' and 'Emotion Machine' are great. Dennett's 'Intentional Stance' is also relevant - discussing how we can sensibly talk about material systems as having intention. Bear in mind that dualism is the more 'natural thought' in historical terms, and even hardcore materialists lapse into dualist terms easily. Researchers are rightly suspicious of unexamined assumptions. When it comes to science of the mind we have a history of novel, unnatural thoughts that are also very flawed (like Behaviourism), but critically, materialism (and Behaviourism) have both been productive.
One thing you can comfortably say about the progress of science is that at any point we're going to be partly wrong. Materialists are actively investigating and testing ideas, which meets my definition of 'real science'. Even if researchers are wrong on an important point, it doesn't make their work worthless, so you should probably hold back on the character assassination. Brain injury's effect on subjective experience and behaviour suggests to me that pure mechanism is important to experience, which is why materialism is my 'default hypothesis'.
If you want to ask hard questions, then go back and look at your assertions. What does 'really doing' semantics entail? How can the 'void' between semantic and syntactic systems be accounted for? Or, if we can't currently explain it, what can we do to investigate it?
if i understand you correctly, you seem to believe that qualia definitely affects physical reality. we don't know whether that's true or whether qualia is just a byproduct of physical reality, and given the probabilistic nature of what we can observe physically, we may never know.
I think that "qualia" is the wrong question. Please see my other comments on this story.
i do not believe in materialsm, but i do believe that intention and goals are emergent phenomena. nevertheless, i think that's mostly a separate issue.
it is a false equivalency to say that materialism is false and that it is impossible to build strong AI. if the material world alone can be described
by laws of causality, then we should expect to be able to simulate some significant part of it. if it cannot, and if extra-material forces impact the material world, then we may have no hope. but existence of extra-material stuff (which i call "qualia") may or may not assert a force that affects the material world.
It seems clear to me that qualia must affect physical reality. If it didn't, we wouldn't be talking about it. If it was just a byproduct with causality going only in one direction, then we'd never talk about it, because the behavior of a physical system with that byproduct would be identical to that same physical system without it. There has to be a causal chain from this discussion back to qualia, unless the discussion happened by coincidence, which is extremely unlikely.
I don't think this tells us anything about what qualia is or whether it is or isn't a material process, but I don't think it's tenable to say that it either doesn't exist entirely, or exists but doesn't affect anything.
i'll admit that that's a convincing argument, but there are ways in which apparent causality can be shown to be illusory. one thought experiment i remember from school involves someone watching a movie in which one character punches another character, and the punched character falls backward. suppose the watcher knows absolutely nothing about how movies are recorded, or re-played, and sees only the lifelike images; then there would be clear, apparent causality of the second character falling over as an effect of being punched by the first. in reality, the only causality is that set up by the mechanics of the movie projector.
Don't compilers and type checkers do rudimentary semantics ?
If I understand yc-kjh's point, their "semantics" are really just more complicated syntactic rules. No real understanding occurs within the code. Or, the code doesn't understand what it's doing it's just doing what it's been instructed to do by us. (On that note, the code doesn't understand anything because the code is a non-entity, it's a thing, like a book or a car engine. A car engine doesn't understand the fuel it's burning or the gears it's turning or why, it just does it because that's what it does.)
Yes
>If I understand yc-kjh's point, their "semantics" are really just more complicated syntactic rules. No real understanding occurs within the code.
Excuse me, but did you actually intend to express that anything which can be encoded in second-order logic is just syntax and has no semantic meaning? Because a reasonably sophisticated type system can in fact express arbitrary propositions in second-order logic; the resulting compiler might have undecidable type inference or checking, but it will in fact be following second-order logic.
No. I actually disagree with the point. I was trying to provide an interpretation of what had been written by the OP. And based off their response, my interpretation matched their intended meaning.
EDIT: I wrote this when I wasn't fully awake. I agree with the OP slightly, but that's because the OP is using "semantics" in a different way than how computer scientists (like myself) would use it. OP's definition of syntax is, basically, "rules". OP's definition of semantics is "understanding", not "meaning".
So by that definition, computers really only seem to be following more and more complex rules. OP seems to be of the opinion that the "semantics" side relies on something outside of encodable rules. In that regard, a computer doesn't understand its program anymore than a car engine understands its pistons. That doesn't mean that we can't encode meaning into our programs (what computer scientists intend with the word semantics). It also doesn't mean that I think OPs definition of semantics (understanding) is fundamentally impossible for computers (see my other post in this thread), just that, as far as I've seen and understand, it hasn't happened yet.
> The computer is still doing only syntax, even while appearing to do semantics.
Why do you assume people are not doing the same?
> But humans really do semantics. Nobody questions this, or challenges it, because it is self-evident.
It is no more self evident than your claim that computers don't do semantics.
Your argumentation is circular:
IF computers can't do semantics, and IF humans do, then clearly the humans and computers must be fundamentally different. But your claim that computers can't do semantics (as opposed to, a claim that we don't yet know how to program computers to do semantics) is assuming that humans and computers are fundamentally different - if we are not, and the materalist hypothesis holds, there is simply no basis for assuming that we are fundamentally different (as categories; clearly current computers are not structured as human brains).
> It is easier to be an idiot, because that doesn't put your funding in jeopardy.
Less name calling, and more of an argument that isn't resting on a logical flaw might be preferable.
Are you seriously bringing up Searle's Chinese Room as an argument against AI research? According to Wikipedia, "The Chinese room argument is primarily an argument in the philosophy of mind, and both major computer scientists and artificial intelligence researchers consider it irrelevant to their fields." Right on.
First off, philosophy of mind is 100% irrelevant to modern AI research, which is more concerned with creating algorithms that act as if at a human level of intelligence than creating algorithms that recreate human states of mind. You guys might not get that, but every person working on AI does.
Even given that, it's allowing for a very charitable interpretation of Searle's "work": most of us consider Searle to be a fucking idiot at best, a troll in the most likely case. The Chinese Room analogy is tortured, and pretty much assumes dualism from the start - to me, if a dude in a closet pushing papers around could fake understanding Chinese as far as an outside observer is concerned, we'd have solved strong AI, so I don't care whether Searle thinks we've succeeded or not.
Re: Nagel, I don't know his stuff, but having read http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_it_Like_to_Be_a_Bat%3F http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_it_Like_to_Be_a_Bat%3F, I'm not too interested, there's so much vagueness there that I feel like this is just more bullshit questioning whether we have achieved "real" understanding or just a mechanical approximation. And again, I don't care. I want a program that acts as if it's intelligent, and it needs to pass most normal people's bar for intelligence, not some dipshit philosopher's bar for being human.
Philosophers have always been misinterpreting AI research's goals, which is why nobody in AI has ever paid them any attention, and which is also why they'll never be relevant to anything. Even if they're right, they're not asking questions that anyone cares about.
Eh, this is ungracious. Of course computationalism, eliminative materialism and so on are bosh. But AI research has has produced many practical advances and will produce more. And not just AI advances: look what JMC and the AI labs did for programming languages, algs & DS, and operating systems. Hard to grudge the lads some recognition for that.
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I cannot believe this misguided crap is second comment. Searle has been debunked so thoroughly and so many times, he's like the Kirk Cameron of AI.
> My thermostat has three possible beliefs: 1) It is too warm in here. 2) It is too cold in here. 3) It is just about right.
Translated to the current scientific fashion:
My brain has three possible beliefs: 1) It is too warm in here. 2) It is too cold in here. 3) It is just about right
There is no such thing as semantics (in the sense that you mean.) You are basing your entire argument on a bad intuition. You literally just made up a definition of "semantics" that excludes computers, and then Argue 'By Definition' (http://lesswrong.com/lw/nz/arguing_by_definition/ http://lesswrong.com/lw/nz/arguing_by_definition/).
SimAntics is a visual artificial intelligence programming language for scripting the behavior of irrational simulated people and intelligent inanimate objects, developed for The Sims at Maxis. ;)
(That's lower case game industry artificial intelligence, not Upper Case Marvin Minsky Artificial Intelligence.)
http://wiki.niotso.org/SimAntics http://wiki.niotso.org/SimAntics
http://simswiki.info/SimAntics http://simswiki.info/SimAntics
http://modthesims.info/t/111469 http://modthesims.info/t/111469
http://niotso.org/2012/12/23/edith-cracked/ http://niotso.org/2012/12/23/edith-cracked/
http://www.qrg.cs.northwestern.edu/papers/Files/Programming_Objects_in_The_Sims.pdf http://www.qrg.cs.northwestern.edu/papers/Files/Programming_...
http://donhopkins.com/home/movies/TheSimsPieMenus.mov http://donhopkins.com/home/movies/TheSimsPieMenus.mov
Searle is ignored by AI researchers because it has no relevance--it has been thoroughly debunked.
The question of whether the man in the chinese room understands chinese is the wrong question. Someone reading symbols from outside of the room is not interacting with the man, they are interacting with the symbols--the algorithm. The algorithm itself does understand chinese! This algorithm is made real, it is reified by the actions of the man in the room to create and sustain it. The algorithm exists on an entirely new layer of abstraction from the man. So while it is true that the man does not understand chinese, the algorithm itself demonstrates every possible requirement for understanding--semantics as you would put it.
A human is analogous to the algorithm and the man shuffling papers is analogous to our neurons. Of course our neurons do not "understand" what they are processing, but as a whole our neurons create an entity that itself has full understanding.
Semantics do in fact come from symbols. When I enter my password into my computer and it uses that password and allows me access to some resource as a consequence, that is semantics. The password string exists in a specific context within the computer system, from which it derives meaning. The difference between the computer system and a person is that the semantic meaning is not generic and integrated. The password exists within the semantic context of granting or revoking access to a resource. It can only exist here as there is no mechanism in standard programming languages for that semantic meaning to be integrated with other parts of the system (without explicitly programming every single case). The brain on the other hand has generic semantics that effortlessly allows integration of different kinds of semantics into a single whole. This is the only meaningful difference.
To what are you referencing with the word Idiocy? Minsky winning a prize?
"But the evidence is overwhelming. The evidence cannot be denied."
OK, so provide the irrefutable evidence instead of your opinionated, anecdotal "evidence" that computers cannot associate meaning with a symbol. You make an untestable claim that computers cannot do semantics, perhaps they can and we haven't built the right type of computer. Then you use circular logic to "prove" that a computer can only do syntax. Of course a computer that can only do syntax can only do syntax. The first rule of tautology club is the first rule of tautology club.
I have not read the Nagel book, and I am not saying you are wrong, I am saying that nobody is going to believe you if you don't substantiate your argument with real evidence.
If your "idiocy" claim was against Minsky, I would urge you to read even a small portion of his work, particularly Causal Diversity/the Future of AI [1] which is a short technical paper where he talks about how computers will not be able to advance in many areas until they can understand word meanings (semantics).
[1] http://web.media.mit.edu/~minsky/papers/CausalDiversity.html http://web.media.mit.edu/~minsky/papers/CausalDiversity.html
Henry Minsky, Marvin's son, works at Nest on the "Thermogotchi", a digital pet that lives on your wall, that's a sensor-driven, Wi-Fi-enabled, self-learning, programmable thermostat which you train to adapt to your habits and lifestyle, and keep happy by feeding love and energy.
http://www.beartronics.com/ http://www.beartronics.com/
Google liked the idea so much that they acquired the company that developed it. So if that isn't a practical application of AI, I don't know what is.