This is probably one of the better articles I've read on this subject, but I feel it walks around a greater issue that afflicts much of modern philosophical dis

This is probably one of the better articles I've read on this subject, but I feel it walks around a greater issue that afflicts much of modern philosophical discourse. It is nearly impossible to divorce the way we view the world with the way we talk about the world. This is basically what the author of this article is saying (and that societal structures reinforce this view by enforcing restrictions on language). The key point there is that the way we view truths about the world doesn't necessarily reveal any truths about the way the world actually is: this is a trap that makes all but the most abstract (and meaningless) philosophical metaphysics paper turn into an exercise in reading jargon. The author limits his analysis to morality, but I think it can be extended to any sort of classification exercise. If societal definitions of truth and heresy change over time, why can't the definition of a chair? So while two thousand years ago, "chair" could have meant either something with four legs, a back and a seat or simply a straw mat.