3 ms·
At the time this article was written, AEAD modes were apparently still too new, and their implementations too untrustworthy: http://www.daemonology.net/blog/20
by pjscott 13y ago
At the time this article was written, AEAD modes were apparently still too new, and their implementations too untrustworthy:
http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2009-06-24-encrypt-then-mac.html http://www.daemonology.net/blog/2009-06-24-encrypt-then-mac....
At the moment, the best-supported AEAD mode seems to be AES-GCM, which has received a fair bit of attention since then. Alternately, {Salsa20,ChaCha20}-Poly1305 has some good implementations, e.g.
http://nacl.cr.yp.to/ http://nacl.cr.yp.to/
and in TLS:
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/02/27/tlssymmetriccrypto.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/02/27/tlssymmetriccrypto...
- cperciva 13y agoAEAD modes were apparently still too new, and their implementations too untrustworthy Also, using Encrypt-then-MAC allows you to discard inauthentic messages without ever decrypting anything, which protects you from side channels in your block cipher.
- pjscott 13y agoIt's bizarre that this is still something we have to worry about.