3 ms·
Wrong. If a phone can only retrieve the key for it's own number (e.g. via SMS request), that's orders of magnitude better than the current case where one key ca
by hueving 13y ago
Wrong. If a phone can only retrieve the key for it's own number (e.g. via SMS request), that's orders of magnitude better than the current case where one key can decrypt logs for any arbitrary number. Each SMS request could generate a new key, so even if another app on the same phone does it, it won't be able to get the key to read the logs.
- andymcsherry 13y agoThis still relies on the legitimate app not storing the key they fetched in a public directory so the attacker can read it. You can keep adding layers upon this, but it doesn't change that.
- hueving 13y ago>This still relies on the legitimate app not storing the key they fetched in a public directory so the attacker can read it. Obviously. Why would they do anything else? The point is that they can safely store the logs on an SD card under space constraints.