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But LinkedIn uses SSL. There's no mention of how GCHQ got around this. Does anyone know? EDIT: Because the ability to MITM SSL sessions is a lot more scary to
by jstanley 13y ago
But LinkedIn uses SSL. There's no mention of how GCHQ got around this. Does anyone know?
EDIT: Because the ability to MITM SSL sessions is a lot more scary to me than the willingness to MITM non-SSL sessions.
- dangrossman 13y agoLinkedIn does not require (or automatically redirect to) SSL. If you're not logged in, the homepage is served over https:// https://. If you are logged in, typing linkedin.com brings you to your news feed, no redirect to https:// https://. If you aren't logged in, then enter your username and password, you're redirected from the https:// https:// site to the http:// http:// one.
- anaphor 13y agoI strongly suggest using httpseverywhere for this reason. Although for some reason linkedin.com is listed as "buggy" by default :/ so enabling it might break some stuff.
- metachris 13y agoWell since the GCHQ is part of the government, and the government has a root cert in the browsers, they can basically create all the SSL certificates they want. Governments can MITM without any problems.
- __alexs 13y agoI don't believe the UK gov have a TLS CA in any standard browser deployments do they? I'm not even sure we have a CA HQd here for them to compel into giving them certs for mitm?
- arethuza 13y agoOut of curiosity I had a quick scan through the "Trusted Root Certification Authorities" on this Windows 7 box and it's quite a surprising list - I have no idea who a lot of these organizations are... Also, one thing I'm pretty confident about, is that if GCHQ is behind any of these certs they wouldn't go labeling it as "UK Government - GCHQ". So presumably I'm just trusting Microsoft that when these certs get pushed out as part of Windows they are who they say they are...
- Maxious 13y agoCA's can issue or lose intermediate certificates that they shouldn't. These have been detected at least 3 times when these technically valid but never before seen certificate chains are used for google.com/yahoo.com/microsoft.com etc. http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com.au/2013/01/enhancing-digital-certificate-security.html http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com.au/2013/01/enhancin... https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-authority-compromises-and-web-browser-collusion https://blog.torproject.org/blog/detecting-certificate-autho... http://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/root-ca-policy http://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/root-ca-polic...
- willvarfar 13y agohttp://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/included/ http://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/secur... lists those that firefox currently trusts. How many of them are not amenable to some government somewhere? 0. And how many would GCHQ have to compromise to get deniable MITM? 1.
- kluce1984 13y agoHTTPS stripping attacks http://www.thoughtcrime.org/software/sslstrip/ http://www.thoughtcrime.org/software/sslstrip/ or Valid SSL certificate and MiTM attack https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/04/unqualified-names-ssl-observatory https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/04/unqualified-names-ssl-... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QUANTUM#QUANTUM_attacks https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QUANTUM#QUANTUM_attacks https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comodo_Group#Comodo_Internet_Security https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comodo_Group#Comodo_Internet_S... or Plant your malware directly into the Linked servers https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muscular_%28surveillance_program%29 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muscular_%28surveillance_progr...
- Tobu 13y agoLinkedIn doesn't use HSTS and can be sslstrip-ed. Even then, it's not like GCHQ would have qualms at using a spoofed cert (cert pinning could prevent this but isn't widely deployed), the express purpose of spooks is to use illegal methods.