3 ms·
> It's also a situation where reading from /dev/random only the first time wouldn't fix the perceived bug in our product. If this was the case, that the block
by saurik 13y ago
> It's also a situation where reading from /dev/random only the first time wouldn't fix the perceived bug in our product.
If this was the case, that the block was happening on the very first usage of random data, then you actually managed to build a system that wasn't secure: that first time /dev/random was blocking, when you switched to /dev/urandom, on a newly-created VM, meant that the customer was getting deterministic data from /dev/urandom, and no one ever realized because there is no error condition for this. (Maybe the system clock was accurate on these new VMs and not set later by ntpd; if so, there might be hope that at least there were a few bits of entropy involved ;P.)
- ScottBurson 13y agoYes -- that's what I meant by "this was exactly the case where it could matter".
- saurik 13y agoSorry, I had presumed you meant simply "we were doing key generation" not "we realized that this directly led to not actually getting random data", especially given the "misgivings", which seemed like a light statement.
- ScottBurson 13y agoSorry I was unclear. I think we only had "misgivings" because the key we were generating had only relatively minor use in the product. Alas, I don't recall exactly what that was, and it's certainly possible, in retrospect, that we didn't care as much about the implications of using /dev/urandom as we should have. But that was pre-Snowden.