4 ms·
> Specifically, I wrote: "But [the problem is] also easily fixed in userland: at boot, seed urandom explicitly". That is not "use random then urandom": that is
by saurik 13y ago
> Specifically, I wrote: "But [the problem is] also easily fixed in userland: at boot, seed urandom explicitly".
That is not "use random then urandom": that is "configure your computer differently"; the person who has the job of following that advice is no longer the person working on the secure software, but the person building the computer; it might even be the end user, whom we have absolutely no reason to believe has any clue how to secure anything (including his lunchbox). Now more people are involved, we have reason to believe that these new people do not understand this issue well, and there is a possibility of failure mode.
This failure mode seems to only be being defended due to some minor performance loss on startup of a select subset of processes. Can I hope to assume you also encourage people to not use stack protector, because the 1% global performance loss is unacceptable, as clearly we should simply trust developers everywhere to write programs that don't have stack overflows? It is exactly the same argument: relying on someone to do something correctly, someone we have evidence to show doesn't do that thing correctly, because we are afraid of some minor performance cost associated with guaranteeing that the problem simply cannot ever happen.
> No developer is making a mistake by using urandom. Every Nacl user, for instance, is relying on urandom. Every Golang user is relying on urandom. Those are two crypto libraries with impeccable pedigrees.
And apparently OpenSSL, as stated in the paper that analyzed the wide-spread cryptographic fail that happened a year or two ago.
- tptacek 13y agoNot using urandom has caused way, way, way more real-world security problems than any bizarro embedded systems cold start entropy problem ever has.
- tveita 13y agoWhat security problems, exactly? In most settings, a dos attack is an inconvenience. A key compromise a disaster, always. e: dos, not ddos.
- tptacek 13y agohttp://sockpuppet.org/blog/2014/02/25/safely-generate-random-numbers/ http://sockpuppet.org/blog/2014/02/25/safely-generate-random...
- tveita 13y agoThat's great. You list a total of zero (0) security issues that have been caused by using /dev/random instead of /dev/urandom for long-lived keys.
- tptacek 13y agoWhat does random or urandom have to do with "long lived keys"? I don't understand the point you're trying to make.
- tveita 13y agoThen I don't understand the point you're trying to make. You have argued that people should always use /dev/urandom, as opposed to the common understanding that /dev/random is safer to use if you need high quality randomness, due to the cold-start issues with urandom. You said that "Not using urandom has caused way, way, way more real-world security problems than any bizarro embedded systems cold start entropy problem ever has.". I asked you for an example of security problems caused by using /dev/random instead of /dev/urandom. You provided a link with no such examples.
- tptacek 13y agoThe common understanding about /dev/random is incorrect. I'm still not reading anything about "long lived keys" in your clarification here. If you are concerned about cold-start entropy on first-ever boot, then seed urandom from random explicitly at boot. There is no reason ever to use /dev/random in crypto code, and you will find that the best crypto code doesn't. I think I'll end my part in this discussion right here.