> A rebuttal can be found here Only that this rebuttal completely misses the point. They misunderstood the criticism being about buffer overflow vulnerability

> A rebuttal can be found here Only that this rebuttal completely misses the point. They misunderstood the criticism being about buffer overflow vulnerability >> So what is the issue? Howard claims that GnuTLS makes liberal use of strcpy(), strcat() and strlen(). Those functions are known to be responsible for several attacks via buffer overflows in current programs. while it was in fact about the nature of the data to be processed, namely that it may not be NUL terminated strings but arbitrary binary data for which the whole bunch of `str…` functions and any other string processing that expects to operate on NUL terminated strings will miserably fail > Looking across more of their APIs, I see that the code makes liberal use of strlen and strcat, when it needs to be using counted-length data blobs everywhere. In short, the code is fundamentally broken; most of its external and internal APIs are incapable of passing binary data without mangling it. The code is completely unsafe for handling binary data, and yet the nature of TLS processing is almost entirely dependent on secure handling of binary data.