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Many businesses make a tidy profit despite a large number of users being non-profitable "free riders" (Dropbox would be the canonical example). My claim is not

by lukifer 13y ago

Many businesses make a tidy profit despite a large number of users being non-profitable "free riders" (Dropbox would be the canonical example). My claim is not that every human would be immediately elevated to self-actualization. Obviously, a great many would stay home, drink beer and watch TV. My claim is that civilization as a whole would profit; paying people who contribute nothing is merely a "cost of doing business". (And don't forget: there's still an incentive to work for those who want better beer and bigger TVs.)

pdonis 13y ago
Many businesses make a tidy profit despite a large number of users being non-profitable "free riders" (Dropbox would be the canonical example). Having users be free riders is not the same as having employees be free riders. I doubt Dropbox has any of the latter. (And don't forget: there's still an incentive to work for those who want better beer and bigger TVs.) No, there's an incentive for voters to elect politicians who will continue raising the bar for how much beer and what size TV the basic income should buy you.
- lukifer 13y ago
  > No, there's an incentive for voters to elect politicians who will continue raising the bar I agree that there is a severe moral hazard here. However, the fact that some citizens currently vote reflexively for lower taxes, while others do not, suggests that a semi-stable equilibrium could be achieved. (This holds even if you look only at middle-class voters with significant tax burdens, rather than just "makers" vs. "takers".)
  - dragonwriter 13y ago
    > I agree that there is a severe moral hazard here. If the moral hazard for BI was as strong as its opponents argue, it wouldn't take so long after the idea first started being advocated for it to be near universally adopted. Since, the argument that with a UBI of $N/mo, the voting masses will always strongly prefer a UBI of $N+1/mo. applies just as much at a N = 0 as at N = 1000.
    - dllthomas 13y ago
      The article applies, but presumably zero is a Schelling point. If there's no other specific value that everyone can agree is special, it may be that you would see continual upward movement only after we've made it nonzero.
      - dllthomas 13y ago
        s/article/argument/
- dragonwriter 13y ago
  > (And don't forget: there's still an incentive to work for those who want better beer and bigger TVs.) > No, there's an incentive for voters to elect politicians who will continue raising the bar for how much beer and what size TV the basic income should buy you. Actually, there's both. The incentive to work exists because if you want a better TV, etc., now (and if you want a better one that the next guy has) you have to get income outside the BI for it. But, sure, there is something of an incentive for those deriving much of their income from BI to seek politicians that will raise the BI. But if you raise the bar too high -- if you exceed what the economy can support given the current level of automation and demand for labor to support production -- you reach the point where inflation from BI prevents raising the nominal BI amount from increasing raising the purchasing power of the BI. And, of course, even though BI might mitigate income and wealth disparity, the people who have an incentive to seek to politically resist BI increases (and to send messages to the rest of the population to sell that idea) are going to be wealthier.

by lukifer 13y ago

pdonis 13y ago

Many businesses make a tidy profit despite a large number of users being non-profitable "free riders" (Dropbox would be the canonical example). Having users be free riders is not the same as having employees be free riders. I doubt Dropbox has any of the latter. (And don't forget: there's still an incentive to work for those who want better beer and bigger TVs.) No, there's an incentive for voters to elect politicians who will continue raising the bar for how much beer and what size TV the basic income should buy you.

lukifer 13y ago
> No, there's an incentive for voters to elect politicians who will continue raising the bar I agree that there is a severe moral hazard here. However, the fact that some citizens currently vote reflexively for lower taxes, while others do not, suggests that a semi-stable equilibrium could be achieved. (This holds even if you look only at middle-class voters with significant tax burdens, rather than just "makers" vs. "takers".)
- dragonwriter 13y ago
  > I agree that there is a severe moral hazard here. If the moral hazard for BI was as strong as its opponents argue, it wouldn't take so long after the idea first started being advocated for it to be near universally adopted. Since, the argument that with a UBI of $N/mo, the voting masses will always strongly prefer a UBI of $N+1/mo. applies just as much at a N = 0 as at N = 1000.
  - dllthomas 13y ago
    The article applies, but presumably zero is a Schelling point. If there's no other specific value that everyone can agree is special, it may be that you would see continual upward movement only after we've made it nonzero.
    - dllthomas 13y ago
      s/article/argument/
dragonwriter 13y ago
> (And don't forget: there's still an incentive to work for those who want better beer and bigger TVs.) > No, there's an incentive for voters to elect politicians who will continue raising the bar for how much beer and what size TV the basic income should buy you. Actually, there's both. The incentive to work exists because if you want a better TV, etc., now (and if you want a better one that the next guy has) you have to get income outside the BI for it. But, sure, there is something of an incentive for those deriving much of their income from BI to seek politicians that will raise the BI. But if you raise the bar too high -- if you exceed what the economy can support given the current level of automation and demand for labor to support production -- you reach the point where inflation from BI prevents raising the nominal BI amount from increasing raising the purchasing power of the BI. And, of course, even though BI might mitigate income and wealth disparity, the people who have an incentive to seek to politically resist BI increases (and to send messages to the rest of the population to sell that idea) are going to be wealthier.