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Pardon my ignorance not being a security expert, but given that all endpoints here (software and hardware) are Apple-controlled, just how trivial is spoofing a
by siglesias 13y ago
Pardon my ignorance not being a security expert, but given that all endpoints here (software and hardware) are Apple-controlled, just how trivial is spoofing a keyserver? Genuinely curious.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- nitrogen 13y agoAssuming (perhaps incorrectly) that Apple does not use certificate pinning for their iMessage servers, and the adversary controls a trusted CA (likely for secretive government agencies), and the adversary controls a router somewhere between the device and Apple (also likely for government agencies), it's very trivial. It's a simple matter of redirecting traffic using something like iptables.
- MacsHeadroom 13y agoEven more trivial if the iOS device is managed. by an Enterprise Admin, who can tell the device to trust any arbitrary certs without the user ever knowing.
- fpgeek 13y agoBased on the quarkslab link upthread, Apple wasn't using certificate pinning for iMessage at least as recently as October 2013. Even worse, also as of that article, Apple was sending the AppleID and cleartext password over this MITM-vulnerable SSL connection as part of iMessage login.