8 ms·
That would only be the case if someone does it by logging in to your iCloud account, which applies to none of these attack scenarios. Even then, it only notifie
by lawnchair_larry 13y ago
That would only be the case if someone does it by logging in to your iCloud account, which applies to none of these attack scenarios. Even then, it only notifies the owner of that account, not the party who is sending messages to unverified keys.
If you're spoofing the keyserver, it's invisible to Apple. If you're the FBI and serving a warrant on Apple, Apple does not send the message telling you that "FBI's MacBook Pro has logged in to your iCloud Account."
- siglesias 13y agoPardon my ignorance not being a security expert, but given that all endpoints here (software and hardware) are Apple-controlled, just how trivial is spoofing a keyserver? Genuinely curious.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- nitrogen 13y agoAssuming (perhaps incorrectly) that Apple does not use certificate pinning for their iMessage servers, and the adversary controls a trusted CA (likely for secretive government agencies), and the adversary controls a router somewhere between the device and Apple (also likely for government agencies), it's very trivial. It's a simple matter of redirecting traffic using something like iptables.
- MacsHeadroom 13y agoEven more trivial if the iOS device is managed. by an Enterprise Admin, who can tell the device to trust any arbitrary certs without the user ever knowing.
- fpgeek 13y agoBased on the quarkslab link upthread, Apple wasn't using certificate pinning for iMessage at least as recently as October 2013. Even worse, also as of that article, Apple was sending the AppleID and cleartext password over this MITM-vulnerable SSL connection as part of iMessage login.