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It's really difficult to imagine the proposed approach panning out as intended - the infrastructure for STS wasn't set up for really quick turn arounds. STS's c

by thearn4 13y ago

It's really difficult to imagine the proposed approach panning out as intended - the infrastructure for STS wasn't set up for really quick turn arounds. STS's conceptual design was pitched that way (shuttles going up several times a week), but that didn't pan out in design. And the Challenger accident can be blamed in part on a management culture that took too long to accept their engineers telling them that. As terrible as the Columbia accident was, I think this approach (with so many checks skipped to get Atlantis up as quick as possible) would have ended in the loss of both crews & orbiters. And I think if the Columbia crew knew the full extent of the situation, and also knew of this sort of rescue in the works, they probably would have pressed mission control to just let them try the re-entry themselves.

krstck 13y ago
> As terrible as the Columbia accident was, I think this approach (with so many checks skipped to get Atlantis up as quick as possible) would have ended in the loss of both crews & orbiters. Agreed. The article touches on the fact that the Columbia disaster has its roots in decisions that were made far in advance of its final launch. Not that this excuses what happened, but I almost wonder if the reason the photographs of the damage were never taken ("miscommunication") was that the people involved knew there was no possibility of rescue, so better to not know and hope for the best.
- twoodfin 13y ago
  The Wikipedia article on the disaster[1] strongly suggests that this kind of fatalism had permeated the culture: Throughout the risk assessment process, senior NASA managers were influenced by their belief that nothing could be done even if damage were detected. This affected their stance on investigation urgency, thoroughness and possible contingency actions. They decided to conduct a parametric "what-if" scenario study more suited to determine risk probabilities of future events, instead of inspecting and assessing the actual damage. The investigation report in particular singled out NASA manager Linda Ham for exhibiting this attitude. In 2013, Hale recalled that Director of Mission Operations John Harpold told him before Columbia's destruction: "You know, there is nothing we can do about damage to the TPS [Thermal Protection System]. If it has been damaged it's probably better not to know. I think the crew would rather not know. Don't you think it would be better for them to have a happy successful flight and die unexpectedly during entry than to stay on orbit, knowing that there was nothing to be done, until the air ran out?" Hale added, "I was hard pressed to disagree [at the time]. That mindset was widespread. Astronauts agreed. So don't blame an individual; look for the organizational factors that lead to that kind of a mindset. Don't let them in your organization." [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Columbia_disaster http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Columbia_disaster
MrZongle2 13y ago
As terrible as the Columbia accident was, I think this approach (with so many checks skipped to get Atlantis up as quick as possible) would have ended in the loss of both crews & orbiters. IANARS (Rocket Scientist) but I can't help but think the same thing. The ability to get Atlantis safely into orbit in 11 days beggars belief, as much as I wish it could have been done. A catastrophic failure of a rescue mission would have killed the Shuttle program then and there. Aside from the loss of now eleven astronauts and two orbiters, the following post-Columbia activities either could not have taken place or would have been limited to what the Russians could do: 21 ISS resupply/delivery missions, 5 ISS crew transfers, a Hubble telescope servicing mission and major delivery and assembly of ISS components (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISS_assembly_sequence#Assembly_sequence http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISS_assembly_sequence#Assembly_... to get a feel for how incomplete the station was in 2003) Additionally, there would have been an impact on SpaceX as the shuttle had delivered their DragonEye sensor test package as well as communications gear to the station.
hindsightbias 13y ago
> Challenger accident When I was at JSC, a young engineer once referred to Challenger as an accident over lunch. An older engineer looked at him, and said very slowly "Never, ever, call it an accident. Marshall (Space Flight Center) murdered them." As for Columbia, even if you could turn around, that approach just doesn't make sense to me either. Station keeping for that long, without the RMS? It's crazy. I would have thought they'd just take up 5 extra suits, make one approach, get them over, take CM1 & CM2, and come back later for 3 (I think 3 could get in the airlock in a pinch) and then a third pass for the last 2. Obviously missing something there if that wasn't possible.

by thearn4 13y ago

krstck 13y ago

> As terrible as the Columbia accident was, I think this approach (with so many checks skipped to get Atlantis up as quick as possible) would have ended in the loss of both crews & orbiters. Agreed. The article touches on the fact that the Columbia disaster has its roots in decisions that were made far in advance of its final launch. Not that this excuses what happened, but I almost wonder if the reason the photographs of the damage were never taken ("miscommunication") was that the people involved knew there was no possibility of rescue, so better to not know and hope for the best.

twoodfin 13y ago
The Wikipedia article on the disaster[1] strongly suggests that this kind of fatalism had permeated the culture: Throughout the risk assessment process, senior NASA managers were influenced by their belief that nothing could be done even if damage were detected. This affected their stance on investigation urgency, thoroughness and possible contingency actions. They decided to conduct a parametric "what-if" scenario study more suited to determine risk probabilities of future events, instead of inspecting and assessing the actual damage. The investigation report in particular singled out NASA manager Linda Ham for exhibiting this attitude. In 2013, Hale recalled that Director of Mission Operations John Harpold told him before Columbia's destruction: "You know, there is nothing we can do about damage to the TPS [Thermal Protection System]. If it has been damaged it's probably better not to know. I think the crew would rather not know. Don't you think it would be better for them to have a happy successful flight and die unexpectedly during entry than to stay on orbit, knowing that there was nothing to be done, until the air ran out?" Hale added, "I was hard pressed to disagree [at the time]. That mindset was widespread. Astronauts agreed. So don't blame an individual; look for the organizational factors that lead to that kind of a mindset. Don't let them in your organization." [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Columbia_disaster http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Columbia_disaster

MrZongle2 13y ago

As terrible as the Columbia accident was, I think this approach (with so many checks skipped to get Atlantis up as quick as possible) would have ended in the loss of both crews & orbiters. IANARS (Rocket Scientist) but I can't help but think the same thing. The ability to get Atlantis safely into orbit in 11 days beggars belief, as much as I wish it could have been done. A catastrophic failure of a rescue mission would have killed the Shuttle program then and there. Aside from the loss of now eleven astronauts and two orbiters, the following post-Columbia activities either could not have taken place or would have been limited to what the Russians could do: 21 ISS resupply/delivery missions, 5 ISS crew transfers, a Hubble telescope servicing mission and major delivery and assembly of ISS components (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISS_assembly_sequence#Assembly_sequence http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISS_assembly_sequence#Assembly_... to get a feel for how incomplete the station was in 2003) Additionally, there would have been an impact on SpaceX as the shuttle had delivered their DragonEye sensor test package as well as communications gear to the station.

hindsightbias 13y ago

> Challenger accident When I was at JSC, a young engineer once referred to Challenger as an accident over lunch. An older engineer looked at him, and said very slowly "Never, ever, call it an accident. Marshall (Space Flight Center) murdered them." As for Columbia, even if you could turn around, that approach just doesn't make sense to me either. Station keeping for that long, without the RMS? It's crazy. I would have thought they'd just take up 5 extra suits, make one approach, get them over, take CM1 & CM2, and come back later for 3 (I think 3 could get in the airlock in a pinch) and then a third pass for the last 2. Obviously missing something there if that wasn't possible.