3 ms·
"As it relates to the physical implementation of a network, part of the implementation includes configuring the devices." Arguable, but then what makes keys an
by dllthomas 13y ago
"As it relates to the physical implementation of a network, part of the implementation includes configuring the devices."
Arguable, but then what makes keys and passwords "not a part of the implementation"?
"You seem to have an issue with me using the SSID as an example because its so easy to defeat that it would be a waste of time to even try."
That is not my objection. I object to SSID as example of "security through obscurity" because I think it doesn't get at the core of what's wrong with security through obscurity and it has other far more glaring issues - so someone can fully grok that keeping SSID secret is not worthwhile and see "why" but without that "why" generalizing to (say) the company saying "We use our own proprietary cryptosystem. We can't show anyone the algorithm; it's more secure that way!"
"In short, its not an example I made up on my own formed from a lack of understanding security, its an example that's used in textbooks and security-specific certification study guides."
I wasn't questioning your understanding because you picked the example, but because you seem to persist in conflating things that seem clearly (and meaningfully) distinct. If textbooks and security-specific certification study guides use SSID as a canonical example of security through obscurity, I'm more worried not less.
- phaus 13y ago>Arguable, but then what makes keys and passwords "not a part of the implementation"? They are part of the implementation of a network, but the issues involving passwords and cryptographic keys are so complex that they generally aren't lumped into a conversation about security through obscurity. I made the statement in response to your claim that someone obtaining your SSH key would render SSH an example of security through obscurity, if my definition and the author's definition were used. With that line of thinking, the entire cryptography industry is merely security through obscurity and we should just give up. In practice, cryptographic technologies aren't considered to be security through obscurity unless the technologies are provably broken to a point where only an idiot would rely on them (such as WEP or LANMAN). As a caveat to this, when a cryptographic algorithm is hidden from the public in order to remain unbroken, it does become an example of security through obscurity. I just object to the idea that this is the only meaning to the phrase. > I object to SSID as example of "security through obscurity" because I think it doesn't get at the core of what's wrong with security through obscurity and it has other far more glaring issues - so someone can fully grok that keeping SSID secret is not worthwhile and see "why" but without that "why" generalizing to (say) the company saying "We use our own proprietary cryptosystem. We can't show anyone the algorithm; it's more secure that way!" The issue we began with was that you stated that it was not an example of security through obscurity at all. That was an incorrect statement and it still is. If you now want to argue that its not the best example, I would agree with you. As an introductory example it does a good job of explaining the concept to a layperson or even a technical person that's still a bit inexperienced. Could you find a better example to give to a room full of newbies? Probably, but that wasn't the issue we disagreed on. Its also important to note, that in a room full of security experts, you would be able to delve into the more complex aspects of the issue without losing the audience, so of course the example would be different.
- dllthomas 13y agoFacepalm. "The issue we began with was that you stated that it was not an example of security through obscurity at all." If you read up, that is not where this began. You initially responded to my objection to the phrase (from the article): "If the only thing protecting your security is a lack of others knowing the secret, then you have no practical security." I still fully and full-throatedly stand by that objection - particularly since in a security context "secret" is often used to mean "key or password or...". I did eventually state that I wasn't sure hidden SSIDs were actually an example of security through obscurity - I'm still not sure they are. Maybe I'm wrong about that. It's still appearing to me that you aren't really understanding my objections, though. "As an introductory example it does a good job of explaining the concept to a layperson or even a technical person that's still a bit inexperienced." I still say SSID is - at best - a piss poor choice of something that is barely an example of the phenomenon. It does not do a good job of explaining the concept to anyone - newbie or otherwise - because it is poor security for more obvious reasons that have nothing to do with security through obscurity, and is therefore likely to lead to confusion.
- phaus 13y ago>If you read up, that is not where this began. You're right, the first thing we disagreed on was that the article's pretty much industry standard definition of security through obscurity was incorrect because in your opinion, its too ambiguous. I thought we had already resolved that considering the article you linked said pretty much the same thing that I did. It was your second post where you stated that the SSID isn't an example of security through obscurity. >I still say SSID is - at best - a piss poor choice of something that is barely an example of the phenomenon. Considering what you listed as your definition of security through obscurity, it isn't surprising that you think the example is piss-poor. Your personal definition is itself a very specific type of security through obscurity. Therefore, anything that deviates from that specific example is going to seem wrong to you.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]