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As much as I agree that the software should be open source, that's not nearly enough. There are large numbers of rootkits and vulnerabilities for Linux, for in

by smw 13y ago

As much as I agree that the software should be open source, that's not nearly enough. There are large numbers of rootkits and vulnerabilities for Linux, for instance. There would be a huge incentive to modify the software of these machines in some undetectable way in order to influence elections. There's been a lot of scholarly literature written on how to do secure electronic voting, and I understand the consensus is that some sort of voter verifiable paper audit trail is the only way to match or exceed the security of the paper ballot system.

wiml 13y ago
stretchwithme addresses that in the third (and subsequent) sentences of his comment. I know that's a lot to read, but still. They were in fact describing a voter-verified paper trail system.
- acdha 13y ago
  He appeared to specifically exclude that possibility by requiring a machine to read it. This entire discussion is predicated on a mistaken assumption that we have significant levels of fraud – often asserted but never convincingly supported – or that electronic systems reduce those odds. We'd be much better off sticking with a simple optical system which can be reviewed and scored by hand and providing a computer-assisted system to help those who have difficulty to fill in that ballot. As a plus, this system is really cheap and easy to scale rather than requiring a bunch of expensive computers and support staff for an infrequent event.
- stretchwithme 13y ago
  acdha, I proposed machines and apps voters could use to confirm their ballot was punched correctly, to make sure the first machine isn't compromised. These apps could be made by anybody with access to the details of the particular ballot. In other words, those in control of voting can't control a myriad of independent app developers. People could also do what they did before: put their ballot into the old voting device and look at the holes themselves. The actual counting of the ballots could be done however it was done before.
the_ancient 13y ago
with electronic voiting the wrong question is often asked... "How can we build a fraud proof system" While it is a nice ideal, it is not realistic... The real question should be "How can we build a system that has less fraud than todays system" That is far more achievable, today no one really knows how rampant voter fraud is, if at all, due to the nature of the outmoded, non-accountable system the trust is placed with corruptible humans at the polling places, I personally believe that fraud is rampant.
stretchwithme 13y ago
If you can look at the paper ballot it produces and confirm your choices are punched, there's no problem. And people were already looking at their ballots so they could punch the right holes. Even if only 5% checked their physical ballot to make sure its right, that's enough to detect something fishy. Just to be clear, the actual physical ballots would still be counted they way they were before 2000. The only thing that needed to be improved was the punching of the holes. So have a machine punch and have the human visually confirm. Or the phone app or a myriad of other machines confirm. They can't all be controlled by one root kit.

by smw 13y ago

wiml 13y ago

stretchwithme addresses that in the third (and subsequent) sentences of his comment. I know that's a lot to read, but still. They were in fact describing a voter-verified paper trail system.

acdha 13y ago
He appeared to specifically exclude that possibility by requiring a machine to read it. This entire discussion is predicated on a mistaken assumption that we have significant levels of fraud – often asserted but never convincingly supported – or that electronic systems reduce those odds. We'd be much better off sticking with a simple optical system which can be reviewed and scored by hand and providing a computer-assisted system to help those who have difficulty to fill in that ballot. As a plus, this system is really cheap and easy to scale rather than requiring a bunch of expensive computers and support staff for an infrequent event.
stretchwithme 13y ago
acdha, I proposed machines and apps voters could use to confirm their ballot was punched correctly, to make sure the first machine isn't compromised. These apps could be made by anybody with access to the details of the particular ballot. In other words, those in control of voting can't control a myriad of independent app developers. People could also do what they did before: put their ballot into the old voting device and look at the holes themselves. The actual counting of the ballots could be done however it was done before.

the_ancient 13y ago

with electronic voiting the wrong question is often asked... "How can we build a fraud proof system" While it is a nice ideal, it is not realistic... The real question should be "How can we build a system that has less fraud than todays system" That is far more achievable, today no one really knows how rampant voter fraud is, if at all, due to the nature of the outmoded, non-accountable system the trust is placed with corruptible humans at the polling places, I personally believe that fraud is rampant.

stretchwithme 13y ago

If you can look at the paper ballot it produces and confirm your choices are punched, there's no problem. And people were already looking at their ballots so they could punch the right holes. Even if only 5% checked their physical ballot to make sure its right, that's enough to detect something fishy. Just to be clear, the actual physical ballots would still be counted they way they were before 2000. The only thing that needed to be improved was the punching of the holes. So have a machine punch and have the human visually confirm. Or the phone app or a myriad of other machines confirm. They can't all be controlled by one root kit.