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> how do I know that Maria is actually Maria? How will you verify that ``Maria'' actually owns that twitter, github, gmail. > confirmed they're all her, using

> how do I know that Maria is actually Maria? How will you verify that ``Maria'' actually owns that twitter, github, gmail. > confirmed they're all her, using GnuPG to review a signed tweet and gist she posted. So it sounds like it you believe in GPG as a viable method of id, there's no reason not to trust this.

sneak 13y ago
Except the part where you're contacting keybase over https and they're handing you some key that says "this is maria's key, trust us". That's the part where you trust the PKI, and that part is easily subverted, breaking the trust of the entire system. If they were using the inherent properties of maria's key (e.g. the fingerprint), then they wouldn't need this whole silly website and username database. Maybe this should be an offline tool that just goes and fetches tweets and gists so we don't have to trust them. You could add friend mappings with key fingerprint + nickname.
- jonesetc 13y ago
  Sorry if this is a dumb question, but I do not heavily follow cypto goings. How are you normally accessing the GPG public keys? The way I understood it was that you always access key servers through http or https from a key server.
  - theboss 13y ago
    When I get someone's GPG key I can call them on the telephone or go to their house and make sure I got the right one. I add it and use it. When you use this, I'm assuming I get that key every time from the server. I can get it and verify it once, or twice, or three times, but what about the 1000th time? What happens when I am important enough that they return a public key that is not Maria's, and I am none the wiser.
    - malgorithms 13y ago
      boss, I'm glad you answered this question. Because it explains the impetus for Keybase. I think what Keybase is addressing in the status quo is twofold: (1) sadly, almost no one does what you describe; in person meeting key exchanges and webs of trust may sadly be as unpopular in 20 years as they are now, and as they were 20 years ago. People who go to them are often confused, even programmers. I wish it were different. And (2) more important, in 2014, often the person you're dealing with is someone whose digital public identity is what matters, not their face in real life or phone number. If you know me online as github/malgorithms and twitter/malgorithms, to get my key, meeting someone in person or talking on the phone to someone who claims to be me is actually less compelling than a signed statement by malgorithms in all those places you know me. And if you do know me in real life, then I can tell you my keybase username and fingerprint, exactly as you're used to. So it's still as powerful for meeting in person. With the added benefit you can confirm my other identities, which you likely know to. In answer to your scenario about verifying: you only need to review the "maria" the server provides once, and then your private key signs a full summary of maria -- her key and proofs. Cases 2 through 1000 of performing a crypto action on maria involve you only trusting your own signature of what "maria" is. The client can query the server for changes to her identity, and this will be configurable; if maria adds a new proof, you might wish to know.
    - jonesetc 13y ago
      This is what I assumed the answer would be, and at this point it just becomes a difference in opinion. I personally do not believe that the methods you describe are generally acceptable options in the modern age. My phone number and address are much more important to me than the off chance of someone capturing my https traffic, breaking it, and inserting a fake public key. There is a point where the absolute security of exchanging public keys written on pieces of paper in a park are called for, but it's not for everyone or even most.
      - theboss 13y ago
        None of the attacks I thought of rely on an attacker to break https....
- derefr 13y ago
  The... the whole point of this is to avoid the "you could add friend mappings with key fingerprint + nickname" part. You do realize that, right?

sneak 13y ago

Except the part where you're contacting keybase over https and they're handing you some key that says "this is maria's key, trust us". That's the part where you trust the PKI, and that part is easily subverted, breaking the trust of the entire system. If they were using the inherent properties of maria's key (e.g. the fingerprint), then they wouldn't need this whole silly website and username database. Maybe this should be an offline tool that just goes and fetches tweets and gists so we don't have to trust them. You could add friend mappings with key fingerprint + nickname.

jonesetc 13y ago
Sorry if this is a dumb question, but I do not heavily follow cypto goings. How are you normally accessing the GPG public keys? The way I understood it was that you always access key servers through http or https from a key server.
- theboss 13y ago
  When I get someone's GPG key I can call them on the telephone or go to their house and make sure I got the right one. I add it and use it. When you use this, I'm assuming I get that key every time from the server. I can get it and verify it once, or twice, or three times, but what about the 1000th time? What happens when I am important enough that they return a public key that is not Maria's, and I am none the wiser.
  - malgorithms 13y ago
    boss, I'm glad you answered this question. Because it explains the impetus for Keybase. I think what Keybase is addressing in the status quo is twofold: (1) sadly, almost no one does what you describe; in person meeting key exchanges and webs of trust may sadly be as unpopular in 20 years as they are now, and as they were 20 years ago. People who go to them are often confused, even programmers. I wish it were different. And (2) more important, in 2014, often the person you're dealing with is someone whose digital public identity is what matters, not their face in real life or phone number. If you know me online as github/malgorithms and twitter/malgorithms, to get my key, meeting someone in person or talking on the phone to someone who claims to be me is actually less compelling than a signed statement by malgorithms in all those places you know me. And if you do know me in real life, then I can tell you my keybase username and fingerprint, exactly as you're used to. So it's still as powerful for meeting in person. With the added benefit you can confirm my other identities, which you likely know to. In answer to your scenario about verifying: you only need to review the "maria" the server provides once, and then your private key signs a full summary of maria -- her key and proofs. Cases 2 through 1000 of performing a crypto action on maria involve you only trusting your own signature of what "maria" is. The client can query the server for changes to her identity, and this will be configurable; if maria adds a new proof, you might wish to know.
  - jonesetc 13y ago
    This is what I assumed the answer would be, and at this point it just becomes a difference in opinion. I personally do not believe that the methods you describe are generally acceptable options in the modern age. My phone number and address are much more important to me than the off chance of someone capturing my https traffic, breaking it, and inserting a fake public key. There is a point where the absolute security of exchanging public keys written on pieces of paper in a park are called for, but it's not for everyone or even most.
    - theboss 13y ago
      None of the attacks I thought of rely on an attacker to break https....
derefr 13y ago
The... the whole point of this is to avoid the "you could add friend mappings with key fingerprint + nickname" part. You do realize that, right?