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xkcd's version sounds similar, but simpler: http://xkcd.com/1132/ http://xkcd.com/1132/

klodolph 13y ago
That's the most famous comparison between frequentist and bayesian statistics, and it's a shame because the frequentist interpretation depicted in the comic is really a straw man argument. See: http://stats.stackexchange.com/questions/43339/whats-wrong-with-xkcds-frequentists-vs-bayesians-comic http://stats.stackexchange.com/questions/43339/whats-wrong-w...
- haberman 13y ago
  I'm not sure it's a straw man, there seems to be plenty of examples of people publishing results based on p < 0.05 findings even when it wasn't justified... just like the person mentioned in the Nature article almost did.
  - jamesaguilar 13y ago
    In a world where all statisticians were Bayesian, you'd still see results like this published. It would simply read differently: "We saw something that seems pretty unlikely, care to confirm?"
    - haberman 13y ago
      Perhaps, or perhaps the scientist would try to replicate the results themselves first (as the person in the article did). But even if they published them with the verbiage you mentioned, that would be a better world because reporters would be less likely to turn it into a story with a headline like "Scientists say ...". The prevalence of articles like this erode trust in science, and fill the public's head with misconceptions.
truantbuick 13y ago
This has probably been addressed millions of times, but just to give a response to why this is a misleading comic: If you were equally mocking of both Bayesian and Frequentist, the Bayesian would arguably come up with basically the same conclusion. In this scenario where the Frequentist ignores previous data based on human history and our understanding of the lifecycle of the sun based on physics, the Bayesian should do the same if we are fair. Then his prior distribution would likely be 50% belief that the sun would explode (Why favor either outcome? Thus the prior distribution is split down the middle between both outcomes.). With the new information given from the detector, his posterior would be 35/36 probability that the sun has exploded. Maybe the Bayesian approach provides a more explicit way of incorporating previous information, and without that, it's cause for some misuse with a Frequentist approach, but that doesn't mean Frequentists need be fundamentally ignorant in their approach. The comic's good for a laugh. Just don't take it too seriously as a criticism.

That's the most famous comparison between frequentist and bayesian statistics, and it's a shame because the frequentist interpretation depicted in the comic is really a straw man argument. See: http://stats.stackexchange.com/questions/43339/whats-wrong-with-xkcds-frequentists-vs-bayesians-comic http://stats.stackexchange.com/questions/43339/whats-wrong-w...

haberman 13y ago
I'm not sure it's a straw man, there seems to be plenty of examples of people publishing results based on p < 0.05 findings even when it wasn't justified... just like the person mentioned in the Nature article almost did.
- jamesaguilar 13y ago
  In a world where all statisticians were Bayesian, you'd still see results like this published. It would simply read differently: "We saw something that seems pretty unlikely, care to confirm?"
  - haberman 13y ago
    Perhaps, or perhaps the scientist would try to replicate the results themselves first (as the person in the article did). But even if they published them with the verbiage you mentioned, that would be a better world because reporters would be less likely to turn it into a story with a headline like "Scientists say ...". The prevalence of articles like this erode trust in science, and fill the public's head with misconceptions.

truantbuick 13y ago

This has probably been addressed millions of times, but just to give a response to why this is a misleading comic: If you were equally mocking of both Bayesian and Frequentist, the Bayesian would arguably come up with basically the same conclusion. In this scenario where the Frequentist ignores previous data based on human history and our understanding of the lifecycle of the sun based on physics, the Bayesian should do the same if we are fair. Then his prior distribution would likely be 50% belief that the sun would explode (Why favor either outcome? Thus the prior distribution is split down the middle between both outcomes.). With the new information given from the detector, his posterior would be 35/36 probability that the sun has exploded. Maybe the Bayesian approach provides a more explicit way of incorporating previous information, and without that, it's cause for some misuse with a Frequentist approach, but that doesn't mean Frequentists need be fundamentally ignorant in their approach. The comic's good for a laugh. Just don't take it too seriously as a criticism.