4 ms·
Since each IdP has a private key, couldn't they request "pinning" it? So, for example, I can ask my IdP to say "I will be the IdP for this user for at least a y
by StavrosK 13y ago
Since each IdP has a private key, couldn't they request "pinning" it? So, for example, I can ask my IdP to say "I will be the IdP for this user for at least a year, if you get a different signature within this year, it's an impostor".
Each client would have to cache the ID specifically for every user, but that doesn't seem too bad for the extra security it gives. Alternately, the user themselves could send the IdP ID to the authenticating site and the site can check that they match, thus detecting any foul play.
Please correct me if I'm talking out of my ass, it's been a while since I implemented an IdP.
- jessaustin 13y agoSmedberg is talking about a situation in which the IdP itself isn't to be trusted: it impersonates the user to the RP.
- StavrosK 13y agoI was talking about the ".well-known/browserid file being changed to something else" attack, #2.
- jessaustin 13y agoAh, sorry for the confusion then. I have to say, an attacker who can change random files on the server can do all sorts of naughty things. Serve evil javascript libs? Change server configuration? Insert her own TLS cert? Check, check, check. Why would .well-known stuff be any different? For those who do have problem with this, I guess I see why they want DNS SRV, but I can also see why the "plain DNS" complaints sidetracked this functionality.
- StavrosK 13y agoWell, it's not necessarily that. For example, my website serves an authority delegation file (https://stavros.io/.well-known/browserid https://stavros.io/.well-known/browserid) which I really don't want an attacker to mess with. Serving JS libs/changing the config/etc wouldn't get them anywhere, unless they could change that single file. Since there are some ways to protect from that (I think the two I proposed above are reasonable), Mozilla probably should think about implementing it.